A Puzzle about Knowing Conditionals

We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a disjunction.     

Proactive behavior,but not inhibitory control,predicts repeated innovation by spotted hyenas tested with a multi-access box

Innovation is widely linked to cognitive ability, brain size, and adaptation to novel conditions. However, successful innovation appears to be influenced by both cognitive factors, such as inhibitory control, and non-cognitive behavioral traits. We used a multi-access box (MAB) paradigm to measure repeated innovation, the number of unique innovations learned across trials, by 10 captive spotted hyenas (Crocuta crocuta). Spotted hyenas are highly innovative in captivity and also display striking variation in behavioral traits, making them good model organisms for examining the relationship between innovation and other behavioral traits. We measured persistence, motor diversity, motivation, activity, efficiency, inhibitory control, and neophobia demonstrated by hyenas while interacting with the MAB. We also independently assessed inhibitory control with a detour cylinder task. Most hyenas were able to solve the MAB at least once, but only four hyenas satisfied learning criteria for all four possible solutions. Interestingly, neither measure of inhibitory control predicted repeated innovation. Instead, repeated innovation was predicted by a proactive syndrome of behavioral traits that included high persistence, high motor diversity, high activity and low neophobia. Our results suggest that this proactive behavioral syndrome may be more important than inhibitory control for successful innovation with the MAB by members of this species.     

When Mental States Matter,When They Don't,and What That Means for Morality

Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.     

Detecting latent taxa: Monte Carlo comparison of taxometric, mixture model, and clustering procedures

A Monte Carlo evaluation of four procedures for detecting taxonicity was conducted using artificial data sets that were either taxonic or nontaxonic. The data sets were analyzed using two of Meehl's taxometric procedures, MAXCOV and MAMBAC, Ward's method for cluster analysis in concert with the cubic clustering criterion and a latent variable mixture modeling technique. Performance of the taxometric procedures and latent variable mixture modeling were clearly superior to that of cluster analysis in detecting taxonicity. Applied researchers are urged to select from the better procedures and to perform consistency tests.     

Thirsty for H2O? Multiple essences and psychological essentialism

Within psychology, essentialism has often been understood as the imputation of a hidden natural underpinning that determines the identity and membership of a given category. This naturalistic understanding has failed to address the varied and multi-faceted manner in which essentialist beliefs function on a cognitive level. Specifically, such an understanding does not account for essentialist beliefs that are related to functional categories derivative of a particular individual's present needs or social context. A parsimonious theory of psychological essentialism that accounts for beliefs in essences with respect to all categories, including those believed to be “natural”, is found in the writing of James (The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, Dover, New York, NY, 1890/1950). After accounting for the manner in which James’ theory addresses the limitations of the naturalistic view and extends it, it is recommended that his theory be incorporated into future empirical study of psychological essentialism.     

Beyond Psychotherapy: On Becoming a (Radical) Psychoanalyst by Barnaby B. Barrett,Routledge, Abingdon and New York, 2019, 281 pp.

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Child and parent predictors of perceptions of parent--child relationship quality

OBJECTIVE/METHOD: Predictors of perceptions of parent-child relationship quality were examined for 175 children with ADHD, 119 comparison children, and parents of these children, drawn from the follow-up phase of the Multimodal Treatment Study of Children with ADHD. RESULTS/CONCLUSION: Children with ADHD perceived their mothers and fathers as more power assertive than comparison children. Children higher on depressive symptomatology also perceived their mothers and fathers as less warm and more power assertive. Mothers perceived themselves as more power assertive and fathers perceived themselves as less warm if they were higher on depressive symptomatology themselves or had children with ADHD or higher levels of depressive symptomatology. Several interactions indicated that the association between child factors and parental perceptions of warmth and power assertion often depended on parental depressive symptomatology. The findings resolve a previous contradiction in the literature regarding the relationship between child depressive symptoms and parental perceptions of parent-child relationship quality.