Proactive behavior,but not inhibitory control,predicts repeated innovation by spotted hyenas tested with a multi-access box

Innovation is widely linked to cognitive ability, brain size, and adaptation to novel conditions. However, successful innovation appears to be influenced by both cognitive factors, such as inhibitory control, and non-cognitive behavioral traits. We used a multi-access box (MAB) paradigm to measure repeated innovation, the number of unique innovations learned across trials, by 10 captive spotted hyenas (Crocuta crocuta). Spotted hyenas are highly innovative in captivity and also display striking variation in behavioral traits, making them good model organisms for examining the relationship between innovation and other behavioral traits. We measured persistence, motor diversity, motivation, activity, efficiency, inhibitory control, and neophobia demonstrated by hyenas while interacting with the MAB. We also independently assessed inhibitory control with a detour cylinder task. Most hyenas were able to solve the MAB at least once, but only four hyenas satisfied learning criteria for all four possible solutions. Interestingly, neither measure of inhibitory control predicted repeated innovation. Instead, repeated innovation was predicted by a proactive syndrome of behavioral traits that included high persistence, high motor diversity, high activity and low neophobia. Our results suggest that this proactive behavioral syndrome may be more important than inhibitory control for successful innovation with the MAB by members of this species.     

Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes

In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard’s version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard’s. In Section 3, I consider some ways in which Gibbard might attempt to avoid the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue that all of these ways fail to achieve their aim and further contend that the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem cannot be solved in a sufficiently convincing manner by the widely used method of making ad hoc distinctions among kinds of properties, kinds of attitudes, and kinds of reasons. In Section 4, I sketch my own version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness and show that it simply avoids the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem rather than attempting to solve the problem on a piecemeal basis.     

When Mental States Matter,When They Don't,and What That Means for Morality

Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.     

Motion aftereffects and retinal motion

Two experiments are described in which it was investigated whether the adaptation on which motion aftereffects (MAEs) are based is a response to retinal image motion alone or to the motion signal derived from the process which combines the image motion signal with information about eye movement (corollary discharge). In both experiments observers either fixated a stationary point or tracked a vertically moving point while a pattern (in experiment 1, a grating; in experiment 2, a random-dot pattern) drifted horizontally across the field. In the tracking condition the adapting retinal motion was oblique. In the fixation condition it was horizontal. In every case in both conditions the MAE was horizontal, in the direction opposite to that of pattern motion. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the adaptation is a response to the motion signal derived from the comparison of eye and image motion rather than to retinal motion per se. An alternative explanation is discussed.