Seeing is Knowing: On the Predictive Accuracy of Self‐ and Informant Reports for Prosocial and Moral Behaviours

Under certain circumstances, well‐known others (so‐called informants) may possess unique insights into targets' personality traits beyond the targets' self‐views. Specifically, as proposed by the self–other knowledge asymmetry model, an incremental predictive ability of informants is most likely for traits and corresponding behaviours that are clearly visible to others and highly evaluative in nature. In two studies, we provide an empirical test of this proposition and extend prior research to one of the most important domains of interpersonal interaction: prosocial and moral behaviours. Specifically, we investigate the unique predictive power of informant reports in trait Honesty–Humility for fairness in the dictator game and dishonesty in a cheating paradigm. Importantly, while both these classes of behaviour are highly evaluative in nature, only fairness is clearly visible to others. Correspondingly, in line with the self–other knowledge asymmetry model, our results reveal unique predictive accuracy of informant reports for fairness. For dishonesty, by contrast, there was no conclusive evidence for incremental predictive power of informant reports. This implies that informants may indeed provide valuable information beyond targets' self‐reports on trait aspects driving fair behaviour, but that targets themselves are their own best experts when it comes to judging trait aspects driving dishonest behaviour. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Daily depression and cognitions about stress: evidence for a traitlike depressogenic cognitive style and the prediction of depressive symptoms in a prospective daily diary study

The authors examined the stability and dynamic structure of negative cognitions made to naturalistic stressors and the prediction of depressive symptoms in a daily diary study. Young adults reported on dispositional depression vulnerabilities at baseline, including a depressogenic cognitive style, dysfunctional attitudes, rumination, neuroticism, and initial depression, and then completed short diaries recording the inferences they made to the most negative event of the day along with their experience of depressive symptoms every day for 35 consecutive days. Daily cognitions about stressors exhibited moderate stability across time. A traitlike model, rather than a contextual one, explained this pattern of stability best. Hierarchical linear modeling analyses showed that individuals' dispositional depressogenic cognitive style, neuroticism, and their daily negative cognitions about stressors predicted fluctuations in daily depressive symptoms. Dispositional neuroticism and negative cognitive style interacted with daily negative cognitions in different ways to predict daily depressive symptoms.     

Action,Control and Sensations of Acting

Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for action according to the causal theory, or Searle’s theory, do not add up to agency. I find the agent at work, her engagement in her action, in her sensation of acting.It is often thought that bodily movements are either mere events or actions. I suggest that there is a third possibility: that they are activities which are not actions. Activities, whether they are actions or not, differ from mere events in that they are controlled from within the brain. They are actions only if this control forms agent control, that is, control in which the conscious mind, the agents’ intentions in acting and her sensations of acting, participates.Internally wayward actions are characterized by the fact that the person involved does not have a sensation of action and therefore does not control her movements. In the absence of such a sensation she does not act.     

Gender differences in social support: a question of skill or responsiveness?

Spouses often report that wives provide better social support than husbands. Yet studies observing spouses' supportive interactions challenge this perception, finding no differences between husbands' and wives' supportive behaviors. This article offers reconciliation by suggesting that husbands and wives may differ, not in their skill at providing support, but in their responsiveness to their partners' changing needs over time. Observational and diary data from couples confirmed that, whereas husbands and wives did not differ on average in the support they provided each other, they did differ in the timing of that support. Wives tended to provide better support on days that their husbands experienced greater stress. However, when wives experienced greater stress, their husbands displayed both support and negativity.     

Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity

Permissivism about rationality is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. In this paper I discuss the relationship between permissivism, deference to rationality, and peer disagreement. I begin by arguing that—contrary to popular opinion—permissivism supports at least a moderate version of conciliationism. I then formulate a worry for permissivism. I show that, given a plausible principle of rational deference, permissive rationality seems to become unstable and to collapse into unique rationality. I conclude with a formulation of a way out of this problem on behalf of the permissivist.     

Children’s Externalizing and Internalizing Symptoms over Time: The Role of Individual Differences in Patterns of RSA Responding

We examined associations between basal respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) in conjunction with RSA regulation with the hypothesis that their interaction would explain unique variability in children’s prospective adjustment 2 years later. Participants were 176 children (98 girls; 78 boys) in middle childhood. RSA regulation was assessed through social and problem-solving challenges. Parents reported on children’s internalizing and externalizing symptoms. Interactions between RSA baseline and regulation to the social stressor predicted children’s later internalizing symptoms. Interactions between RSA baseline and responding to the problem-solving stressor predicted children’s externalizing symptoms. The highest levels of internalizing symptoms were predicted for children with both lower basal RSA and higher RSA suppression. The highest levels of externalizing symptoms were predicted for children who demonstrated lower basal RSA in conjunction with RSA augmentation. Findings highlight the importance of the contemporaneous consideration of basal RSA and RSA regulation in the prediction of developmental psychopathology symptomology.     

Guarding against hostile thoughts: trait anger and the recruitment of cognitive control

Trait anger is a robust predictor of the angry and aggressive response to hostile situational input, but it is important to better understand the mechanisms underlying this dimension of personality. The present two studies (total N=106) examined the possibility that individuals low in trait anger systematically recruit cognitive control resources within hostile contexts. These resources would likely be useful in facilitating emotion regulation operations. In support of this cognitive control framework, Experiment 1 found that low (but not high) trait anger individuals exhibited superior response-switching abilities in a hostile stimulus context. Experiment 2 conceptually replicated this pattern using a different cognitive control measure related to flanker interference effects. The convergence of findings across studies provides one likely mechanism for the reduced levels of reactivity at low levels of trait anger. Findings are discussed in relation to broader theories of trait anger and emotion regulation.     

The impact of subjective recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multinomial processing tree approach

The recognition heuristic (RH) theory states that, in comparative judgments (e.g., Which of two cities has more inhabitants?), individuals infer that recognized objects score higher on the criterion (e.g., population) than unrecognized objects. Indeed, it has often been shown that recognized options are judged to outscore unrecognized ones (e.g., recognized cities are judged as larger than unrecognized ones), although different accounts of this general finding have been proposed. According to the RH theory, this pattern occurs because the binary recognition judgment determines the inference and no other information will reverse this. An alternative account posits that recognized objects are chosen because knowledge beyond mere recognition typically points to the recognized object. A third account can be derived from the memory-state heuristic framework. According to this framework, underlying memory states of objects (rather than recognition judgments) determine the extent of RH use: When two objects are compared, the one associated with a “higher” memory state is preferred, and reliance on recognition increases with the “distance” between their memory states. The three accounts make different predictions about the impact of subjective recognition experiences—whether an object is merely recognized or recognized with further knowledge—on RH use. We estimated RH use for different recognition experiences across 16 published data sets, using a multinomial processing tree model. Results supported the memory-state heuristic in showing that RH use increases when recognition is accompanied by further knowledge.     

Time,space, and memory for order

Information about the order of items in a sequence can be conveyed either spatially or temporally. In the present investigation, we examined whether these different modes of presentation map onto compatible mental representations of serial order. We examined this issue in three immediate serial-recall experiments, in which participants recalled lists of letters in the temporal order in which they had appeared. Each letter in a to-be-remembered sequence was presented in a unique spatial position, with the order of these spatial positions progressing from either left to right or right to left. In this way, the visually presented lists contained both temporal and spatial order information. Recall of the temporal order information was more accurate with congruent spatial order information—that is, when the letters progressed from left to right, following the typical reading direction of English—than when the spatial order information was incongruent. These results suggest compatible representations of serial order when sequences are conveyed spatially and temporally.     

On the classification of diseases

Identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for individuating and classifying diseases is a matter of great importance in the fields of law, ethics, epidemiology, and of course, medicine. In this paper, I first propose a means of achieving this goal, ensuring that no two distinct disease-types could correctly be ascribed to the same disease-token. I then posit a metaphysical ontology of diseases—that is, I give an account of what a disease is. This is essential to providing the most effective means of interfering with disease processes. Following existing work in the philosophy of medicine and epidemiology (primarily Christopher Boorse; Caroline Whitbeck; Alexander Broadbent), philosophy of biology (Joseph LaPorte; D.L. Hull), conditional analyses of causation (J.L. Mackie; David Lewis), and recent literature on dispositional essentialism (Stephen Mumford and Rani Anjum; Alexander Bird), I endorse a dispositional conception of disease. Following discussion of various conceptions of disease-identity, their relations to the clinical and pathological effects of the diseases in question, and how diseases are treated, I conclude (i) that diseases should be individuated by their causes, and (ii) that diseases are causal processes best seen as simultaneously acting sequences of mutually manifesting dispositions.