Stress as a trigger for headaches: relationship between exposure and sensitivity

This study investigated the relationship between length of exposure to a stressor and capacity of the stressor to elicit head pain. Some 127 participants, 93 of whom suffered from regular headaches, were randomly assigned to five experimental conditions, defined by length of exposure to a stressor. Participants attended a single laboratory session divided into three phases: pre-intervention test, intervention and post-intervention test. The main finding was a significant cubic trend between length of exposure to the stressor and ratings of head pain. This trend indicated that very short exposure to the stressor increased sensitivity, whilst longer exposure decreased sensitivity, but even longer exposure increased sensitivity. These results build on earlier studies that suggest the traditional clinical advice to headache sufferers, that the best way to prevent headaches is to avoid the triggers, runs the risk of establishing an insidious sensitization process, thereby increasing headache frequency.     

Prolonged exposure therapy for chronic combat-related PTSD: a case report of five veterans

Prolonged exposure (PE) therapy has been found efficient in reducing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms mostly among rape victims, but has not been explored in combat-related PTSD. Five patients with severe chronic PTSD, unresponsive to previous treatment (medication and supportive therapy) are described. Patients were evaluated with the PTSD Symptom Scale-Interview, and Beck Depression Inventory, before and after 10-15 sessions of PE therapy. All five patients showed marked improvement with PE, with a mean decrease of 48% in PTSD Symptom Scale-Interview score and 69% in Beck Depression Inventory score. Moreover, four patients maintained treatment gains or kept improving 6-18 months after the treatment. The results suggest that PE was effective in reducing combat-related chronic PTSD symptoms.     

Aboriginal Practitioners Offer Culturally Safe and Responsive CBT: Response to Commentaries

We appreciate the valuable commentaries that have been provided for our paper “Can CBT be effective for Aboriginal Australians? Perspectives of Aboriginal practitioners trained in CBT.” The international authors identify how CBT, with adaptations by culturally responsive practitioners can be of value for non‐Western and Indigenous peoples. The commentary by Australian psychologists Dudgeon and Kelly questions the value of CBT for Indigenous Australians, terming it a “Western therapy” that is “culturally unresponsive” and “culturally blind.” They also critique the methodology of the study. We argue that CBT can be adapted by culturally competent practitioners to be culturally safe in Australia, as elsewhere. Cultural safety is mostly a function of the therapist, not the therapy. In the Bennett‐Levy et al. (2014) study, CBT was delivered in a culturally responsive way by Aboriginal counsellors within their own communities. CBT is a particularly adaptable and versatile therapy, and embodies principles of empowerment and self‐determination that are central to Indigenous social and emotional well‐being. We are concerned that CBT, which has strong empirical support and has been adapted elsewhere for a range of cultures, including Indigenous cultures, may be being denied to Indigenous Australian clients. There is considerable opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness and versatility of CBT, and variations of its mode of delivery, for all Australians.     

Frankfurt in Fake Barn Country

It is very widely held that Frankfurt‐style cases—in which a counterfactual intervener stands by to bring it about that an agent performs an action but never actually acts because the agent performs that action on her own—show that free will does not require alternative possibilities. This essay argues that that conclusion is unjustified, because merely counterfactual interveners may make a difference to normative properties. It presents a modified version of a fake barn case to show how a counterfactual intervener can make the difference between an agent knowing a fact or merely truly believing that fact, by eliminating veretic epistemic luck. If counterfactual interveners can make this kind of difference to the epistemic status of agents, the essay argues, there is no reason why they can't make an analogous difference to agents' moral responsibility. It concludes that reflection on these cases reveals that despite the mountains of words spilled on the topic, we still don't fully understand what role access to alternative possibilities plays in whether or not agents are morally responsible for their actions.     

Thinking with Beauvoir on the Freedom of the Child

Among philosophers, Simone de Beauvoir is unique in treating childhood as a philosophical phenomenon. In both The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, she examines the relationship between childhood and human freedom and considers its role in the development of subjectivity. Despite this, few sustained analyses of her treatment of the phenomenon exist. I argue that Beauvoir's conception of childhood is not uniform, but changes from The Ethics of Ambiguity to The Second Sex. Whereas the former presents children as lacking moral freedom, as not fully sovereign individuals, the latter suggests that children are just as free as adults. When children do not fully possess or exercise freedom, it is not because they are not in a position to do so, but rather because various social institutions hinder them. I find this position useful for developing a phenomenological account of childhood as a site for freedom. Hence, Beauvoir becomes a source for thinking of issues in philosophical anthropology concerning the temporality of human existence and the nature of human agency over a lifespan.