Judging near and distant virtue and vice

We propose that people judge immoral acts as more offensive and moral acts as more virtuous when the acts are psychologically distant than near. This is because people construe more distant situations in terms of moral principles, rather than attenuating situation-specific considerations. Results of four studies support these predictions. Study 1 shows that more temporally distant transgressions (e.g., eating one’s dead dog) are construed in terms of moral principles rather than contextual information. Studies 2 and 3 further show that morally offensive actions are judged more severely when imagined from a more distant temporal (Study 2) or social (Study 3) perspective. Finally, Study 4 shows that moral acts (e.g., adopting a disabled child) are judged more positively from temporal distance. The findings suggest that people more readily apply their moral principles to distant rather than proximal behaviors.     

Sophistry In and As Its Course

Although sophistry has been characterized as separable from real philosophy, formal analysis does not work without it and one cannot always identify just where philosophy leaves off and sophistry begins. Whether sophistry offers anything to thinking reason has to do with what parties in dialogue do with sophistries. Sophistries can close down or open up philosophical perspectives, depending on the local work that sophistic strategies accomplish. Such local work of philosophers is rarely available to analyses of docile texts, but they can be furthered by ethnomethodological studies of illustrative philosophical argumentation presented and analyzed in videotaped format.

Affirmation, acknowledgment of in-group responsibility, group-based guilt, and support for reparative measures

Three studies, 2 conducted in Israel and 1 conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, demonstrated that affirming a positive aspect of the self can increase one's willingness to acknowledge in-group responsibility for wrongdoing against others, express feelings of group-based guilt, and consequently provide greater support for reparation policies. By contrast, affirming one's group, although similarly boosting feelings of pride, failed to increase willingness to acknowledge and redress in-group wrongdoing. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated the mediating role of group-based guilt. That is, increased acknowledgment of in-group responsibility for out-group victimization produced increased feelings of guilt, which in turn increased support for reparation policies to the victimized group. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed.     

The name of the game: predictive power of reputations versus situational labels in determining prisoner's dilemma game moves

Two experiments, one conducted with American college students and one with Israeli pilots and their instructors, explored the predictive power of reputation-based assessments versus the stated "name of the game" (Wall Street Game vs. Community Game) in determining players' responses in an N-move Prisoner's Dilemma. The results of these studies showed that the relevant labeling manipulations exerted far greater impact on the players' choice to cooperate versus defect--both in the first round and overall--than anticipated by the individuals who had predicted their behavior. Reputation-based prediction, by contrast, failed to discriminate cooperators from defectors. A supplementary questionnaire study showed the generality of the relevant short-coming in na?ve psychology. The implications of these findings, and the potential contribution of the present methodology to the classic pedagogical strategy of the demonstration experiment, are discussed.     

Local and global judgments of confidence

Studies of calibration have shown that people's mean confidence in their answers (local confidence) tends to be greater than their overall estimate of the percentage of correct answers (global confidence). Moreover, whereas the former exhibits overconfidence, the latter often exhibits underconfidence. Three studies present evidence that global underconfidence reflects a failure to make an allowance for correct answers that are likely to result from mere guessing and can be eliminated by informing participants of the dubious normative status of estimates below 50% (i.e., chance). Previously reported discrepancies between global and local confidence, it is concluded, arise less from possible methodological artifacts in assessment of local confidence than from normatively inappropriate assessments of global confidence.     

Imagining how you'd feel: the role of motivational experiences from regulatory fit

The authors propose that how people imagine they would feel about making a choice is affected not only by the outcome's anticipated pleasure or pain but also by regulatory fit. Regulatory fit occurs when people pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their regulatory state and it intensifies the motivation to pursue that goal. Considering positive outcomes fits a promotion focus more than a prevention focus, whereas the reverse is true for negative outcomes. Thus, it is proposed that anticipating a desirable choice is more intensely positive for promotion than prevention, and anticipating an undesirable choice is more intensely negative for prevention than promotion. The results of three studies support these predictions. Studies 2 and 3 also demonstrate that motivational intensity underlies the stronger responses. Thus, to understand fully what it means to feel good or bad about a prospective choice, motivational experiences from regulatory fit must be considered.     

Expression after suppression: a motivational explanation of postsuppressional rebound

Five studies examined the effect of expressing a construct after suppressing it on subsequent accessibility. Suppression of color terms (Studies 1, 2, and 5) and of stereotypes (Studies 3 and 4) were examined. Both expression alone and suppression alone enhanced the construct's accessibility relative to the no-suppression/no-expression condition, demonstrating activation by recent construct use and postsuppressional rebound, respectively. However, introducing expression after suppression reduced accessibility relative to both the suppression alone and the expression alone conditions. These results are explained within a motivational theory of rebound, according to which suppressing a construct induces a need to use it, and subsequent expression satisfies this need, thereby instigating an inhibition of the accessibility of need-related constructs.