Open-Minded Discussion in Organizations: A Meta-Analytic Evaluation of Cooperation and Competition Theory

Journal of Business and Psychology - Despite the extensive interest in open-minded discussion in organizations, inconsistencies regarding its antecedents and consequences remain. Drawing upon...     

The effects of cognitive load and encoding modality on prospective memory

Cognitive Processing - Successful execution of an intention as planned is necessary for people's normal life. However, people sometimes even forget intentions that they consider as...     

Life Satisfaction in China, 2010–2018: Trends and Unique Determinants

Applied Research in Quality of Life - This study is one of the first to explore the 5 waves of the China Family Panel Studies data from 2010 to 2018, assessing determinants of life satisfaction...     

Evaluation of Electronic Service-Learning (e-Service-Learning) Projects in Mainland China under COVID-19

Applied Research in Quality of Life - The use of electronic service-learning (e-Service-Learning or e-SL) is valuable under COVID-19 because we can provide the service without physical contact....     

The priming effect of translation equivalents across languages for concrete and abstract words

The present study used a masked priming paradigm and two language tasks (lexical decision, semantic categorical judgment) to investigate whether concrete and abstract words share the same degree of conceptual representation across languages for bilinguals. The results showed that the priming effect of translation equivalents did not differ for concrete and abstract words in the lexical decision task, in both prime-target directions (in Experiment 1). The same results were also found in the semantic categorical judgment task in either prime-target direction (in Experiment 2). Our results do not provide support for the representation difference hypothesis of concrete and abstract words of Distributed Representation Model (De Groot, 1992a, 1992b; Van Hell & De Groot, 1998), which assumes that concrete words share more semantic components in the conceptual representations across languages, compared with abstract words. Rather, our findings suggest that both concrete and abstract words have the same degree of overlap in conceptual representations across a bilingual's two languages.     

The Role of Identity Integration in Enhancing Creativity Among Mixed‐Race Individuals

Identity integration among bicultural individuals refers to the perception that their two cultural identities are compatible. Previous research has shown that identity integration is likely to lead to enhanced creativity. However, this research was conducted among first‐ and second‐generation immigrants, but not among mixed‐race individuals. The current research examined identity integration and creativity among mixed‐race individuals. We also explored the role of integrated identity experiences at home. We found that identity integration was related to increases in creativity; and this was partly mediated via integrated identity experiences at home. Our findings suggest that positive bicultural experiences at home may create a context for the individual to integrate their biracial identities; and this is ultimately beneficial for creativity.     

Adult Attachment Ratings (AAR): An Item Response Theory Analysis

The Adult Attachment Ratings (AAR) include 3 scales for anxious, ambivalent attachment (excessive dependency, interpersonal ambivalence, and compulsive care-giving), 3 for avoidant attachment (rigid self-control, defensive separation, and emotional detachment), and 1 for secure attachment. The scales include items (ranging from 6–16 in their original form) scored by raters using a 3-point format (0 = absent, 1 = present, and 2 = strongly present) and summed to produce a total score. Item response theory (IRT) analyses were conducted with data from 414 participants recruited from psychiatric outpatient, medical, and community settings to identify the most informative items from each scale. The IRT results allowed us to shorten the scales to 5-item versions that are more precise and easier to rate because of their brevity. In general, the effective range of measurement for the scales was 0 to +2 SDs for each of the attachment constructs; that is, from average to high levels of attachment problems. Evidence for convergent and discriminant validity of the scales was investigated by comparing them with the Experiences of Close Relationships–Revised (ECR–R) scale and the Kobak Attachment Q-sort. The best consensus among self-reports on the ECR–R, informant ratings on the ECR–R, and expert judgments on the Q-sort and the AAR emerged for anxious, ambivalent attachment. Given the good psychometric characteristics of the scale for secure attachment, however, this measure alone might provide a simple alternative to more elaborate procedures for some measurement purposes. Conversion tables are provided for the 7 scales to facilitate transformation from raw scores to IRT-calibrated (theta) scores.     

Why does guessing incorrectly enhance,rather than impair,retention?

The finding that trying, and failing, to predict the upcoming to-be-remembered response to a given cue can enhance later recall of that response, relative to studying the intact cue–response pair, is surprising, especially given that the standard paradigm (e.g., Kornell, Hays, & Bjork, 2009) involves allocating what would otherwise be study time to generating an error. In three experiments, we sought to eliminate two potential heuristics that participants might use to aid recall of correct responses on the final test and to explore the effects of interference both at an immediate and at a delayed test. In Experiment 1, by intermixing strongly associated to-be-remembered pairs with weakly associated pairs, we eliminated a potential heuristic participants can use on the final test in the standard version of the paradigm—namely, that really strong associates are incorrect responses. In Experiment 2, by rigging half of the participants’ responses to be correct, we eliminated another potential heuristic—namely, that one’s initial guesses are virtually always wrong. In Experiment 3, we examined whether participants’ ability to remember—and discriminate between—their incorrect guesses and correct responses would be lost after a 48-h delay, when source memory should be reduced. Across all experiments, we continued to find a robust benefit of trying to guess to-be-learned responses, even when incorrect, versus studying intact cue–response pairs. The benefits of making incorrect guesses are not an artifact of the paradigm, nor are they limited to short retention intervals.     

Person–organization fit effects on organizational attraction: A test of an expectations-based model

This study investigates the mechanisms that explain why person–organization (PO) fit impacts organizational attraction. Adopting Edwards and Cable’s (2009) approach, an integrative model is developed around the idea that experiencing value congruence during the recruitment process perpetuates certain expectations about future work environments and employer relationships. These expectations in turn have a positive impact on organizational attraction. Evidence from a longitudinal study on a sample of job seekers suggests that expected opportunities for value expression and need fulfillment offered the most viable explanations of value congruence effects. The implications of important observed differences in the experience of PO fit between job seekers and full-time employees are discussed.     

Reply to Rouder (2014): Good frequentist properties raise confidence

Established psychological results have been called into question by demonstrations that statistical significance is easy to achieve, even in the absence of an effect. One often-warned-against practice, choosing when to stop the experiment on the basis of the results, is guaranteed to produce significant results. In response to these demonstrations, Bayes factors have been proposed as an antidote to this practice, because they are invariant with respect to how an experiment was stopped. Should researchers only care about the resulting Bayes factor, without concern for how it was produced? Yu, Sprenger, Thomas, and Dougherty (2014) and Sanborn and Hills (2014) demonstrated that Bayes factors are sometimes strongly influenced by the stopping rules used. However, Rouder (2014) has provided a compelling demonstration that despite this influence, the evidence supplied by Bayes factors remains correct. Here we address why the ability to influence Bayes factors should still matter to researchers, despite the correctness of the evidence. We argue that good frequentist properties mean that results will more often agree with researchers’ statistical intuitions, and good frequentist properties control the number of studies that will later be refuted. Both help raise confidence in psychological results.