Acquisition of a non-vocal ‘language’ by aphasic children

Alphasic children with serious language deficits were taught to communicate via a system of visual symbols originally devised by David Premack (1969) for use with chimpanzees. The subjects, lacking normal language, readily learned to express several language functions in this way (word, sentence, class-concept, question, negation). The linguistic status of ‘Premackese’ is questioned, and it is suggested that it is better viewed as a communication system. It may, therefore, be that the aphasic children lack some specifically linguistic ability.     

Effects of time and event uncertainty upon sequential information processing

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the psychological refractory period (PRP), a delay induced into the second of two reaction times (RT) when the interstimulus interval (ISI) is short. In Experiment1, time and event uncertainty were factorially varied by providing or not providing S with foreknowledge of the ISI and the order in which the two events would occur, respectively. ISIs of0, 50, 100, 200, and400 msec were used. Time and event uncertainty produced independent degradation of both RTs. Also, the second RT (RT ₂ ) was delayed at50 msec ISI when both time and event certainty were present. Experiment 2 attempted to replicate this latter finding using ISIs of0, 25, 50, 75, and100 msec. Delays in RT ₂ were found for the middle three values of ISI. These results were interpreted as supporting a modified single channel theory of the PRP.     

Punishment of observing by the negative discriminative stimulus

To determine the effect of a negative discriminative stimulus on the response producing it, two pigeons were each studied in a three-key conditioning chamber. During alternating periods of unpredictable duration, pecking the center (food) key either was reinforced with grain on a variable-interval schedule or was never reinforced. On equal but independent variable-interval schedules, pecking either of the side (observing) keys changed the color of all keys for 30 sec from yellow to either green or red. When the schedule on the center key was variable-interval reinforcement, the color was green (positive discriminative stimulus); when no reinforcements were scheduled, the color was red (negative discriminative stimulus). Since pecking the side keys did not affect grain deliveries, changes in the rate of pecking could not be ascribed to changes in the frequency of primary reinforcement. In subsequent sessions, red was withheld as one of the possible consequences of pecking a given side key. When red was omitted, the rate on that key increased, and when red was restored, the rate decreased. It was concluded that red illumination of the keys, the negative discriminative stimulus, had a suppressive effect on the response that produced it.     

The temporal course of the frustration effect

General activity subsequent to reward (R) and nonreward (N) was monitored at 5-sec intervals with a stabilimeter in the runway goal box. Activity of never-rewarded control Ss was also measured. In Expt 1 it was found that the frustration effect (difference between N- and R-trial activities) disappeared after about 40 sec of goal box confinement. This disappearance of the frustration effect was due to activity increase on R trials rather than activity decrease on N trials as a function of time. Comparison of N-trial activity with control group activity indicated that frustration does not dissipate within 60 sec. Expt 2 investigated activity following reward and nonreward as a function of reward magnitude. Evidence from these experiments suggests that the late R-trial activity increase results from frustration, possibly conditioned to apparatus cues on N trials.     

Limits to preference and the sensitivity of choice to rate and amount of food

Studies of choice holding food‐amount ratio constant while varying food‐rate ratio within sessions showed that local changes in preference depend on relative amount of food. The present study investigated whether sensitivity of choice to food‐rate ratio and sensitivity to food‐amount ratio are independent of one another when food‐rate ratios are varied across sessions and food‐amount ratios are varied within sessions. Food deliveries for rats’ presses on the left and right levers were scheduled according to three different food‐rate ratios of 1:1, 9:1, and 1:9; each food‐rate ratio lasted for 106 sessions and was arranged independently of seven food‐amount ratios (7:1, 6:2, 5:3, 4:4, 3:5, 2:6, and 1:7 food pellets) occurring within sessions in random sequence. Each amount ratio lasted for 10 food deliveries and was separated from another by a 60‐s blackout. Sensitivity to rate ratio was high (1.0) across food deliveries. Sensitivity to amount ratio was low when food rates were equal across alternatives, but was high when rate ratio and amount ratio opposed one another. When rate ratio and amount ratio went in the same direction, choice ratio reached an elevenfold limit which reduced sensitivity to approximately zero. We conclude that three factors affect sensitivity to amount: (1) the limit to preference, (2) the equal effect on preference of amounts greater than four pellets, and (3) the absence of differential effects of switches in amount in the equal‐rates (1:1) condition. Taken together, these findings indicate that rate and amount only sometimes combine independently as additive variables to determine preference when amount ratios vary frequently within sessions.     

Precocious quantitative cognition in monkeys

Basic quantitative abilities are thought to have an innate basis in humans partly because the ability to discriminate quantities emerges early in child development. If humans and nonhuman primates share this developmentally primitive foundation of quantitative reasoning, then this ability should be present early in development across species and should emerge earlier in monkeys than in humans because monkeys mature faster than humans. We report that monkeys spontaneously make accurate quantity choices by 1 year of age in a task that human children begin to perform only at 2.5 to 3 years of age. Additionally, we report that the quantitative sensitivity of infant monkeys is equal to that of the adult animals in their group and that rates of learning do not differ between infant and adult animals. This novel evidence of precocious quantitative reasoning in infant monkeys suggests that human quantitative reasoning shares its early developing foundation with other primates. The data further suggest that early developing components of primate quantitative reasoning are constrained by maturational factors related to genetic development as opposed to learning experience alone.