Reality monitoring in patients with body dysmorphic disorder

Patients with body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) typically have very poor insight into their disorder. Their conviction in their ugliness is often of delusional intensity. Reality monitoring is the ability to distinguish in memory between things that one has imagined and things that one has perceived. Deficits in reality monitoring have been associated with the development of other delusional beliefs. Therefore, in the present study we investigated whether individuals with BDD (n = 20) demonstrate impairments in reality monitoring relative to individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; n = 20) and healthy controls (n = 20). This hypothesized impairment might predispose people with BDD to confuse memories of how they imagine themselves to appear (i.e., ugly) with memories of how they actually appear (i.e., normal). All participants completed a memory task assessing reality-monitoring ability for verbal stimuli. The BDD patients did not exhibit a reality-monitoring deficit despite elevated levels of focal delusionality. The results suggest that impairments in reality monitoring do not contribute to the development or maintenance of appearance-related beliefs in BDD.     

Is there brief temporal buffering of successive visual inputs?

The part-report advantage has been used to identify short-lived forms of visual storage (Sperling, 1960). We adopt the part-report paradigm to test whether visual memory can preserve, for a brief time, successive inputs and their temporal order. In our experiments, two successive arrays, each of 4 digits, were presented on each trial. The two arrays were spatially coincident, and each was followed by a random pattern-mask. In the part-report conditions, an auditory cue indicated whether the participant should report the first array or the second array. The results consistently showed a part-report advantage, which ranged in size from 16% to 37%. Delaying the cue by 500?ms abolished most of this advantage, in that performance was then similar to that in whole-report conditions. Subsequent experiments confirmed that the part-report superiority we measure is not achieved by (a) making eye movements that spatially displace the second array relative to the first; (b) extracting information from a single snapshot containing an integrated representation of the targets and masks; or (c) transferring a subset of material to a phonological store. We propose instead that observers have access to a limited, rapidly decaying representation of successive visual inputs stored in temporal sequence.     

Listening to your heart. How interoception shapes emotion experience and intuitive decision making

Theories proposing that how one thinks and feels is influenced by feedback from the body remain controversial. A central but untested prediction of many of these proposals is that how well individuals can perceive subtle bodily changes (interoception) determines the strength of the relationship between bodily reactions and cognitive-affective processing. In Study 1, we demonstrated that the more accurately participants could track their heartbeat, the stronger the observed link between their heart rate reactions and their subjective arousal (but not valence) ratings of emotional images. In Study 2, we found that increasing interoception ability either helped or hindered adaptive intuitive decision making, depending on whether the anticipatory bodily signals generated favored advantageous or disadvantageous choices. These findings identify both the generation and the perception of bodily responses as pivotal sources of variability in emotion experience and intuition, and offer strong supporting evidence for bodily feedback theories, suggesting that cognitive-affective processing does in significant part relate to "following the heart."     

Schizotypy and mental time travel

Mental time travel is the capacity to imagine the autobiographical past and future. Schizotypy is a dimensional measure of psychosis-like traits found to be associated with creativity and imagination. Here, we examine the phenomenological qualities of mental time travel in highly schizotypal individuals. After recollecting past episodes (autobiographical memory) and imagining future events (episodic future thinking), those scoring highly on positive schizotypy reported a greater sense of ‘autonoetic awareness,’ defined as a greater feeling of mental time travel and re-living/‘pre-living’ imagined events. Furthermore, in contrast to other sensory domains, imagery of the past and future episodes contained more olfactory detail in these high scorers. The results are discussed in relation to previous reports of anomalous olfactory experiences in schizotypy and heightened vividness of olfactory imagery in post-traumatic stress disorder, for which schizotypy is a risk factor.     

The effect of humor on memory: constrained by the pun

In a series of experiments, we investigated the effect of pun humor on memory. In all experiments, the participants were exposed to knock-knock jokes in either the original form retaining the pun or in a modified form that removed the pun. In Experiment 1, the authors found that pun humor improved both recall and recognition memory following incidental encoding. In Experiment 2, they found evidence that rehearsal is not the cause of the humor effect on memory. In Experiments 3 and 4, the authors found that the constraints imposed by puns and incongruity may account for the humor effects observed. Puns constrain and limit the information that can fit in the final line of a joke and thus make recall easier.     

Becoming self-directed: Abstract representations support endogenous flexibility in children

A fundamental part of growing up is going beyond routines. Children become increasingly skilled over the first years of life at actively maintaining goals in the service of flexible behavior, allowing them to break out of habits and switch from one task to another. Their early successes often occur with exogenous (externally-provided) goals, and only later with endogenous (internally-driven) goals – a developmental progression that may reflect the greater demands on selection processes inherent in deciding what to do. Three studies investigated the mechanisms supporting endogenous flexibility, using a verbal fluency task in which children generated members of a category and could decide on their own when to switch from one subcategory to another. Children’s verbal fluency related to their performance in a more constrained and well-established switching task (Experiment 1), suggesting that the more complex verbal fluency measure taps the flexibility processes of interest. Children’s verbal fluency was also linked to their abstract, categorical representations in both individual difference analyses (Experiment 2) and experimental manipulation (Experiment 3). We interpret these results in terms of the role of abstract representations in reducing selection demands to aid the development of endogenous control.     

Attribute and Responsibility Framing Effects in Television News Coverage of Poverty1

This study looks at how television news may contribute to inaction toward the poor through the attribute and responsibility framing of poverty stories. Participants were shown 1 of 4 news presentations on poverty. The news presentations depicted the poor as either primarily Black or primarily White, and framed poverty stories either episodically or thematically. Individuals shown presentations depicting the poor as White felt stronger that too little was being spent on poverty programs and were more likely to take a flyer about volunteering with a poverty charity than were participants shown presentations depicting the poor as Black. This pattern of results was found for both White and Black participants. No effects were found based on the responsibility framing.     

Reasons for Belief

Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is presupposed in Davidson's claim. While 1 focus on McDowell's view, the argument generalizes to other views which take experiences as reasons for belief.     

Imagination links with schizotypal beliefs,not with creativity or learning

Imagination refers to creating mental representations of concepts, ideas, and sensations that are not contemporaneously perceived by the senses. Although it is key to human individuality, research on imagination is scarce. To address this gap, we developed here a new psychometric test to assess individual differences in imagination and explored the role of imagination for learning, creativity, and schizotypal beliefs. In a laboratory‐based (N = 180) and an online study (N = 128), we found that imagination is only weakly associated with learning achievement and creativity, accounting for 2–8% of the variance. By contrast, imagination accounted for 22.5% of the variance in schizotypal beliefs, suggesting overall that imagination may be more indicative of cognitive eccentricities rather than benefit the accumulation of knowledge or production of novel and useful ideas.