Perceiving personal discrimination: the role of group status and legitimizing ideology

It was hypothesized that relative group status and endorsement of ideologies that legitimize group status differences moderate attributions to discrimination in intergroup encounters. According to the status-legitimacy hypothesis, the more members of low-status groups endorse the ideology of individual mobility, the less likely they are to attribute negative outcomes from higher status group members to discrimination. In contrast, the more members of high-status groups endorse individual mobility, the more likely they are to attribute negative outcomes from lower status group members to discrimination. Results from 3 studies using 2 different methodologies provide support for this hypothesis among members of different high-status (European Americans and men) and low-status (African Americans, Latino Americans, and women) groups.     

Evidence for preserved representations in change blindness

People often fail to detect large changes to scenes, provided that the changes occur during a visual disruption. This phenomenon, known as "change blindness," occurs both in the laboratory and in real-world situations in which changes occur unexpectedly. The pervasiveness of the inability to detect changes is consistent with the theoretical notion that we internally represent relatively little information from our visual world from one glance at a scene to the next. However, evidence for change blindness does not necessarily imply the absence of such a representation---people could also miss changes if they fail to compare an existing representation of the pre-change scene to the post-change scene. In three experiments, we show that people often do have a representation of some aspects of the pre-change scene even when they fail to report the change. And, in fact, they appear to "discover" this memory and can explicitly report details of a changed object in response to probing questions. The results of these real-world change detection studies are discussed in the context of broader claims about change blindness.     

Categorical perception occurs in newly learned faces, other-race faces, and inverted faces

On the basis of findings that categorical perception (CP) is possible in complex visual stimuli such as faces, the present study tested for CP on continua between unfamiliar face pairs. Results indicate that CP can be observed for unfamiliar faces, in both familiar (same-race) and unfamiliar (other-race) groups. In addition, significant CP effects were observed in inverted faces. Finally, half-continua were tested where midpoint stimuli became endpoints. This was done to ensure that stimulus artifacts did not account for the observed CP effects. Consistent with the perceptual rescaling associated with CP, half-continua showed a rescaled CP effect. We argue that these CP effects are based on the rapid acquisition of perceptual equivalence classes.     

No pause for a brief disruption: failures of visual awareness during ongoing events

Past research has repeatedly documented the close relationship between visual attention and awareness. Most recently, research exploring change blindness, inattentional blindness, repetition blindness, and the attentional blink has converged on the conclusion that attention to one aspect of a scene or event may lead to a highly circumscribed awareness of only the specific information attended, while other information, even that which is spatially or temporally nearby can go completely unnoticed. In the present report, we extend these observations to the dynamic allocation of attention during a well-structured meaningful event. In two experiments, subjects viewed brief videos of simple events and were told to pay close attention to them. During the events, an unexpected disruption consisting of a brief low spatial frequency motion field occurred. Despite intensive questioning and opportunities for recognition, the majority of subjects reported no awareness of 200, 400, or 600 ms disruptions. In a second experiment, blank-screen disruptions were added, and these resulted in no increase in detection. We conclude that visual attention may result in far more transitory awareness of visual information than previously appreciated.     

Nothing compares 2 views: change blindness can occur despite preserved access to the changed information

Change blindness, the failure to detect visual changes that occur during a disruption, has increasingly been used to infer the nature of internal representations. If every change were detected, detailed representations of the world would have to be stored and accessible. However, because many changes are not detected, visual representations might not be complete, and access to them might be limited. Using change detection to infer the completeness of visual representations requires an understanding of the reasons for change blindness. This article provides empirical support for one such reason: change blindness resulting from the failure to compare retained representations of both the pre- and postchange information. Even when unaware of changes, observers still retained information about both the pre- and postchange objects on the same trial.     

Knowledge about the probability of change affects change detection performance

The visual system continually selects some information for processing while bypassing the processing of other information, and as a consequence, participants often fail to notice large changes to visual stimuli. In the present studies, the authors investigated whether knowledge about the probability of particular changes occurring over time increased the likelihood that changes that were likely to occur in the real world (probable changes) would be detected. The results of two experiments showed that participants were more likely to detect probable changes. This occurred whether or not they were processing the scene in a meaningful manner or actively searching the scene for changes. Furthermore, participants were unable to accurately predict change detection performance for probable and improbable changes.     

How is emergent writing based on drawing? Analyses of children's products and their sorting by children and mothers

Writing and drawing produced by children 28-53 months old were compared. Israeli and Dutch preschoolers were asked to draw and write, to classify their products as drawing and writing, and to decide what they had drawn or written. Israeli and Dutch mothers classified the products. Scores on a scale for writing composed of graphic, "writing-like," and symbolic schemes showed improvement with age. Recognition of drawings as drawings preceded recognition of writings as writings. Scores on writing and drawing were substantially correlated, even with age partialed out, suggesting (a) that when children start drawing objects referentially, they write by drawing "print" and (b) that progress in object drawing involves progress in drawing print, so that their writing becomes more writing-like. Children unable to communicate meaning by writing spontaneously resort to drawing-like devices, indicating the primacy of drawing as a representational-communicative system.     

Psychopathological correlates of contextualized images in dreams

A contextualized image is a powerful central image in a dream which provides a picture context for the dominant emotion of the dreamer. This study examined the psychopathological correlates of both dream and nightmare contextualized images in a community-based sample of 378. As predicted, mean nightmare contextualized image scores were significantly higher than mean dream scores. In addition, while dream contextualized images were unrelated to psychopathology, nightmare contextualized images were significantly associated with elevated scores on three SCL-90-R subscales and the General Symptom Distress Index.