What Does the Narcissistic Personality Inventory Measure Across the Total Score Continuum?

The Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) is the most widely used measure of narcissism in the social-personality psychology literature. It contains 40 items that tap into a variety of traits that theoretically comprise narcissism, such as feelings of superiority and willingness to exploit others. Most researchers focus on the total score produced by the NPI and may logically assume that increments in total NPI score correspond with similar increments in underlying narcissism traits. However, research presented in this article suggests that the traits measured by the NPI do not increment at the same rate. Traits reflecting intrapersonally healthy qualities (e.g., leadership, superiority) increment most rapidly within the lower portions of the NPI total score continuum, whereas traits reflecting interpersonally harmful qualities (e.g., entitlement, exploitativeness) increment most rapidly within the upper portions of the NPI continuum. These differences have implications for the meaning of scores on the NPI and how they correlate with other variables. For example, we demonstrate that lower NPI scores best predict self-esteem and higher NPI scores best predict psychopathy.     

Psychological Adjustment,Social Responsiveness and Parental Distress in an Italian Sample of Siblings of Children with High-Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder

The psychosocial adjustment of siblings of children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a relatively recent field of study, but results in literature are often inconsistent, and studies specifically focused on samples of siblings of children with high-functioning ASD are very few. This paper analyzes the level of social impairment (index of broader autism phenotype), the risk of internalizing and externalizing problems (index of psychological adjustment) and the parenting distress in an Italian sample of siblings of children with high-functioning ASD (n = 26). The presence of risk factors (birth order, sex and number of siblings in the family) and the role of the siblings’ age are also explored. The data were collected through self-report instruments administered to parents. The results do not show higher average risk levels for psychosocial adjustment problems, even though a minority of the cases is at risk for social impairments (7.7 %), internalizing (23.1 %), externalizing (3.8 %) and total difficulties (11.5 %) and for distress in the parent–child system (15 %). Distress in the parent-sibling system seems to be modulated by the sibling’s features and to be higher when the sibling is older than the child with ASD. Additionally, a link between difficulties in psychological adjustment and broader autism phenotype is suggested.     

Two notions of epistemic validity

How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in (Ramsey 1990). (RT) ‘If A, then B’ must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B. In this article we propose a formulation of (RT), which unlike some of its predecessors, is compatible with our best theory of belief revision, the so-called AGM theory (see (Gärdenfors 1988), chapters 1–5 for a survey). The new test, which, we claim, encodes some of the crucial insights defended by F. P. Ramsey in (Ramsey 1990), is used to study the conditionals epistemically validated by the AGM postulates. Our notion of validity (PV) is compared with the notion of negative validity (NV) used by Gärdenfors in (Gärdenfors 1988). It is observed that the notions of PV and NV will in general differ and that when these differences arise it is the notion of PV that is preferable. Finally we compare our formulation of the Ramsey test with a previous formulation offered by Gärdenfors (GRT). We show that any attempt to interpret (GRT) as delivering acceptance conditions for Ramsey's conditionals is doomed to failure.     

Begging what is at issue in the argument

This paper objects to treating begging the question as circular reasoning. It argues that what is at issue in the argument is not to be confused with the claim or position that the arguer is adopting, and that logicians from Aristotle on give the wrong definition and have difficulty making sense of the fallacy because they try to define it in terms of how an argument is defined by logical theory - as a sequence consisting of premises followed by a conclusion. That the problematic about begging the question depends on treating an argument as a context-less sequence of statements seems to be anticipated by the pragma-dialectical approach. The paper offers a critique of this dialogical approach, as exemplified by Douglas Walton in his recent book on begging the question, on the grounds that it raises more problems than it solves. It concludes with the suggestion that what is really at issue in discussions of begging the question is the need for a theory of fallacy.     

Mr. Magoo’s mistake

Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.

Evidence and the openness of knowledge

The paper argues that knowledge is not closed under logical inference. The argument proceeds from the openness of evidential support and the dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, to the conclusion that knowledge is open. Without attempting to provide a full-fledged theory of evidence, we show that on the modest assumption that evidence cannot support both a proposition and its negation, or, alternatively, that information that reduces the probability of a proposition cannot constitute evidence for its truth, the relation of evidential support is not closed under known entailment. Therefore the evidence-for relation is deductively open regardless of whether evidence is probabilistic or not. Given even a weak dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, we argue that empirical knowledge is also open. On this basis, we also respond to the strongest argument in support of knowledge closure (Hawthorne 2004a). Finally, we present a number of significant benefits of our position, namely, offering a unified explanation for a range of epistemological puzzles.     

Measuring change in psychotherapeutic work with a traumatised child on the autistic spectrum

This paper describes a developmental psychotherapy undertaken with a physically disabled latency boy, with a background of significant developmental deficits and multiple psychological trauma, diagnosed by CAMHS as being on the autistic spectrum. Using an assessment framework following Anna Freud’s conceptualisation of developmental lines, pathology as a deviation from the norm was formulated. Assessments using standard psychological tests were made at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of his therapy, in order to study the changes in his personality development. Standard assessment findings were also used to portray the fragmentation of the boy’s psyche in a concrete fashion, in order to facilitate his re-integration.