How do we evaluate learning from the curriculum? Thirty phone interviews with Institutes of the American Psychoanalytic Association

A telephone survey of curriculum directors of the thirty institutes of the American Psychoanalytic Association revealed that 75 percent of institutes highly value the importance of evaluating what candidates learn from the curriculum. Paradoxically, however, most institutes do not do evaluations in this area. Typically, institutes evaluate candidates' satisfaction with courses, or their attendance and conduct in classes, rather than learning per se. Some institutes have more rigorous evaluation methods, including oral exams. Objections to evaluating what candidates learn included (1) evaluations involve too much work; (2) evaluations of learning are considered inappropriate or invalid; (3) evaluations would hurt candidates, faculty, the learning process, and the institute. Some curriculum directors dismissed these objections, contending that it is the responsibility of psychoanalytic educators to set teaching goals and evaluate learning.     

The Structure of Female Subgroups: An Exploration of Ambivalent Stereotypes

The present research concerns the stereotypes associated with subgroups of women. Previous researchers have considered the ambivalent nature of stereotypes, particularly along the dimensions of warmth and competence (Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23:1323–1334, 1997). In Study 1, we looked at the degree to which the superordinate social category of “women” is differentiated into distinct subgroups and whether warmth and competence are the primary dimensions of this differentiation. In Study 2, we assessed the degree to which businesswomen and homemakers are automatically associated with warmth and competence. Results showed that men and women differ in the valence associated with specific subgroups, and it is this valence, rather than stereotype content, that is automatically associated with these female subgroups.     

Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect

The concept of acting intentionally is an important nexus where theory of mind and moral judgment meet. Preschool children's judgments of intentional action show a valence-driven asymmetry. Children say that a foreseen but disavowed side effect is brought about "on purpose" when the side effect itself is morally bad, but not when it is morally good. This is the first demonstration in preschoolers that moral judgment influences judgments of whether something was done on purpose (as opposed to judgments of purpose influencing moral judgment). Judgments of intentionality are usually assumed to be purely factual. That these judgments are sometimes partly normative-even in preschoolers-challenges current understanding. Young children's judgments regarding foreseen side effects depend on whether the children process the idea that the character does not care about the side effect. As soon as preschoolers effectively process the theory-of-mind concept "not care that P," children show the side-effect effect.     

Leadership in multiteam systems

This study examined 2 leader functions likely to be instrumental in synchronizing large systems of teams (i.e., multiteam systems [MTSs]). Leader strategizing and coordinating were manipulated through training, and effects on functional leadership, interteam coordination, and MTS performance were examined. Three hundred eighty-four undergraduate students participated in a laboratory simulation modeling a 3-team MTS performing an F-22 battle simulation task (N = 64 MTSs). Results indicate that both leader training manipulations improved functional leadership and interteam coordination and that functional leader behavior was positively related to MTS-level performance. Functional leadership mediated the effects of both types of training on interteam coordination, and interteam coordination fully mediated the effect of MTS leadership on MTS performance.     

Orthographic directionality and thematic role illustration in English and Arabic

This study tested the hypotheses that people had a bias for drawing agents on the left of a picture when given a verb stimulus targeting an active or passive event (e.g., "kicked" or "is kicked") and that orthographic directionality would influence the way events were illustrated. Monolingual English speakers, who read and write left-to-right, and Arabic speakers, who read and write right-to-left, drew agents and patients in response to verb stimuli. We found no significant orthographic directionality effects and no preference for positioning agents on the left of pictures in either group or sentence type. Instead, participants drew agents on the right regardless of language or sentence type, and this was exaggerated in English speakers illustrating passive verbs. These findings support the existence of a preference for placing agents in the right hemispace that may result from asymmetrical hemispheric (i.e., left>right) activation induced by language processing. Our results are consistent with findings that people prefer pictures in which focus is on the right, a preference strongest in pictures with no implicit directionality of movement. This suggests that the methodology of the current study encouraged a static rather than dynamic interpretation of the verb in most participants.     

Is young children’s recognition of pretense metarepresentational or merely behavioral? Evidence from 2- and 3-year-olds’ understanding of pretend sounds and speech

When young children observe pretend-play, do they interpret it simply as a type of behavior, or do they infer the underlying mental state that gives the behavior meaning? This is a long-standing question with deep implications for how “theory on mind” develops. The two leading accounts of shared pretense give opposing answers. The behavioral theory proposes that children represent pretense as a form of behavior (behaving in a way that would be appropriate if P); the metarepresentational theory argues that children instead represent pretense via the early concept PRETEND. A test between these accounts is provided by children’s understanding of pretend sounds and speech. We report the first experiments directly investigating this understanding. In three experiments, 2- and 3-year-olds’ listened to requests that were either spoken normally, or with the pretense that a teddy bear was uttering them. To correctly fulfill the requests, children had to represent the normal utterance as the experimenter’s, and the pretend utterances as the bear’s. Children succeeded at both ages, suggesting that they can represent pretend speech (the requests) as coming from counterfactual sources (the bear rather than the experimenter). We argue that this is readily explained by the metarepresentational theory, but harder to explain if children are behaviorists about pretense.     

Sex Differences in Relationships between Verbal Fluency and Personality

The Thurstone Verbal Fluency Test, Vandenberg Mental Rotation Test, and NEO-FFI personality test were administered to 182 university participants (126 female, 56 male). The men scored higher than the women on the spatial test, and the women scored higher than the men for the verbal fluency test, as reported by others. Women reported more extraversion and agreeableness than men. Extraversion was correlated with verbal fluency for both sexes. For the men, verbal fluency was also positively associated with agreeableness, and for the women, verbal fluency was associated with openness and conscientiousness. No relationships between personality and spatial ability were found. Thus, the relationships between cognitive variables and personality factors differed between the sexes. These findings are discussed in terms of the common frontal neural substrate of verbal fluency and these aspects of personality, as well as the inherently social nature of language as a communication tool.     

Observer‐relative chances and the doomsday argument

Suppose various observers are divided randomly into two groups, a large and a small. Not knowing into which group anyone has been sent, each can have strong grounds for believing in being in the large group, although recognizing that every observer in the other group has equally powerful reasons for thinking of this other group as the large one. Justified belief can therefore be observer‐relative in a rather paradoxical way. Appreciating this allows one to reject an intriguing new objection against Brandon Carter's ‘doomsday argument’. Carter encourages us to doubt that we are among only the first hundredth, say, or first millionth, of all humans who will ever have existed. He thereby reinforces whatever reasons we may have for suspecting that, unless we take great care, the human race will not survive long. Admittedly his argument is weakened if our world is indeterministic, so that there is no suitably guaranteed ‘fact of the matter’ of how many humans will ever have existed. But even then, it can caution us against believing that a lengthy future for humankind ‘is as good as determined’. Of all the objections the argument has yet faced, the new one is the most interesting.     

What does it mean to be an ally?: The perception of allies from the perspective of people of color

Allies are frequently studied from the viewpoint of dominant group members. Three studies took a different perspective by investigating how people of color perceive both White allies and allies of color. Study 1 used content analysis of qualitative data from 80 people of color to describe eight major themes of ally perception. With samples of 182 and 195 people of color, Studies 2 and 3 employed exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to identify two subscales, informed action and affirmation, based on the themes. Both independent and paired samples t tests showed that people of color rating a White ally versus an ally of color perceived significantly less willingness to engage racial issues. Findings are discussed in relation to existing allies research.     

The CS-Preexposure Effect in Conditioned Taste-Aversion Learning in Golden Hamsters

In Experiment 1, golden hamsters were injected with either 0.9% saline or the nausea-inducing agent, lithium chloride (LiCL), immediately after consuming a flavored diet that was either novel or familiar. The LiCl-induced aversion was strong in hamsters for which the flavored diet was novel, but no significant aversion was observed in hamsters that were familiar with the flavored diet. In Experiment 2, the strength of the LiCl-induced aversion was related inversely to the amount of conditioned-stimulus (CS) preexposure and directly to the duration of the preexposure-conditioning interval. Thus, although some previous researchers have suggested that hamsters may not demonstrate the CS-preexposure effect in a conditioned taste-aversion paradigm, they clearly did so under the conditions of the present experiments, and moreover, the characteristics of the CS-preexposure effect in hamsters were generally similar to those observed in rats.