Developmental parallels in understanding minds and bodies

A recent article by Onishi and Baillargeon presents evidence that 15-month-old infants attribute false beliefs (FBs) to other people. If correct, it lends dramatic new support to the idea that mental state concepts ("theory of mind") emerge from a specialized neurocognitive mechanism that matures during the second year of life. But it also raises new puzzles concerning the FB task--puzzles that have intriguing parallels in results from infants' reasoning about solid bodies.     

Processing demands in belief‐desire reasoning: inhibition or general difficulty?

Most 4-year-olds can predict the behavior of a person who wants an object but is mistaken about its location. More difficult is predicting behavior when the person is mistaken about location and wants to avoid the object. We tested between two explanations for children's difficulties with avoidance false belief: the Selection Processing model of inhibitory processing and a General Difficulty account. Children were presented with a false belief task and a control task, in which belief attribution was as difficult as in the false belief task. Predicting behavior in light of the character's desire to avoid the object added more difficulty in the false belief task. This finding is consistent with the Selection Processing model, but not with the General Difficulty account.     

Core mechanisms in "theory of mind"

Our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people does not initially develop as a theory but as a mechanism. The "theory of mind" mechanism (ToMM) is part of the core architecture of the human brain, and is specialized for learning about mental states. Impaired development of this mechanism can have drastic effects on social learning, seen most strikingly in the autistic spectrum disorders. ToMM kick-starts belief-desire attribution but effective reasoning about belief contents depends on a process of selection by inhibition. This selection process (SP) develops slowly through the preschool period and well beyond. By modeling the ToMM-SP as mechanisms of selective attention, we have uncovered new empirical phenomena. We propose that early "theory of mind" is a modular-heuristic process of domain-specific learning.     

Clark's nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana) and the effects of goal--landmark distance on overshadowing

Three groups of Clark's nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana) were trained to find a goal location defined by an array of 4 landmarks that varied in goal--landmark distance. The arrays for each group differed in the distance of the closest landmark and contained goal--landmark distances that were common across groups, allowing for the examination of the effects of both relative and absolute goal--landmark distance on encoding of a landmark array. All 3 groups readily learned the task and were subsequently tested in probe tests with only single landmarks from the array available. Search error in tests with single landmarks was compared both within and across groups. Results demonstrated that both relative and absolute goal-landmark distances are important in spatial search.     

Associations in the course of personality disorders and Axis I disorders over time

In this study, the authors examined time-varying associations between schizotypal (STPD), borderline (BPD), avoidant (AVPD), or obsessive-compulsive (OCPD) personality disorders and co-occurring Axis I disorders in 544 adult participants from the Collaborative Longitudinal Personality Disorders Study. The authors tested predictions of specific longitudinal associations derived from a model of crosscutting psychobiological dimensions (L. J. Siever & K. L. Davis, 1991) with participants with the relevant Axis I disorders. The authors assessed participants at baseline and at 6-, 12-, and 24-month follow-up evaluations. BPD showed significant longitudinal associations with major depressive disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder. AVPD was significantly associated with anxiety disorders (specifically social phobia and obsessive-compulsive disorder). Two of the four personality disorders under examination (STPD and OCPD) showed little or no association with Axis I disorders.     

Normative data for the selective reminding test: a random digit dialing sample

Healthy control participants (46 women, M age=44.3 yr., SD=7.6; 29 men) were recruited to undergo a comprehensive neuropsychological battery and serve as a comparison group in a study of cognitive functioning in patients with Lyme isease. Participants were selected using Mitofsky-Waksberg random digit dialing. The Buschke 12-word, six-trial Selective Reminding Test was administered as part of the neuropsychological battery and normative data are presented stratified by age and sex. Performance on alternate forms of this measure were examined. Mean education, intelligence quotient, and Wide Range Achievement Test-3 Reading scores are reported.     

A field study of frame-of-reference effects on personality test validity

As part of a test validation study at a major U.S.-based airline, the authors tested the effects of providing an "at work" frame-of-reference on the validity of the NEO Five-Factor Inventory among a sample of customer service supervisors (N = 206). Frame-of-reference moderated the validity of the Extraversion and Openness to Experience subscales after controlling for cognitive ability. In addition, the frame-of-reference personality test showed incremental validity over cognitive ability (deltaR2 = .16), but the standard personality test did not (deltaR2 = .05). The authors' discussion focuses on implications for personality theory and research and on implications for increasing the validity of personality tests in organizational settings.     

A test of the ABC model underlying rational emotive behavior therapy

The ABC model underlying Ellis's Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy predicts that people who think more irrationally should respond to daily stressors or hassles differently than do people who think less irrationally. This study tested this aspect of the ABC model. 192 college students were administered the Survey of Personal Beliefs and the Hassles Scale to measure irrational thinking and daily hassles, respectively. Students who scored higher on overall irrational thinking reported a significantly higher frequency of hassles than did those who scored lower on overall irrational thinking, while students who scored higher on awfulizing and low frustration tolerance reported a significantly greater intensity of hassles than did those who scored lower on awfulizing and low frustration tolerance. This indicates support for the ABC model, especially Ellis's construct of irrational beliefs central to this model.