Charles “Erik” Eriksen (1923-2018)

A towering figure in experimental psychology, Charles W. Eriksen, passed away in February this year. “Erik” made extensive original and lasting contributions to both research methods and theories in several areas of psychology, especially involving visual information processing. His research exhibited consistent concerns with experimental methods for distinguishing among alternative explanations and distinguishing perception from behavior. Erik pioneered many research methods now in common use—including converging operations, visual search, rapid serial presentations, the stop-signal paradigm, temporal integration in form perception, spatial cues for guiding selective attention, and the flankers task. He also introduced and tested many theories of selective attention. Erik was the founding editor of Perception & Psychophysics, and served for 23 years as its principal editor. An impressive and unforgettable person, Erik was a compelling personification of “the greatest generation.”     

Metametaphysics and Substance: Two Case Studies

This paper examines an often-ignored aspect of the evaluation of metaphysical analyses, namely, their ontological commitments. Such evaluations are part of metaphysical methodology, and reflection on this methodology is itself part of metametaphysics. I will develop a theory for assessing what these commitments are, and then I will apply it to an important historical and an important contemporary metaphysical analysis of the concept of an individual substance (i.e., an object, or thing). I claim that in evaluating metaphysical analyses, we should not only rule out counterexamples, but also compare them with respect to their ontological commitments, and we should hold that if they are comparable in other respects, then an analysis with fewer such commitments is preferable to one with more (There is, of course, a connection between counterexamples and ontological commitments. If the existence or possible existence of something one is committed to the existence or possible existence of is incompatible with an analysis, then one should reject that analysis as inadequate to the data. On the other hand, if one is uncertain about the existence or possible existence of something that is incompatible with an analysis, then while this does not refute the analysis for one, it raises doubts about it. The fewer such doubts are raised by an analysis, the better it is.).     

Beyond the intellectual

Pastoral Psychology -     

Passions in girls and women: toward a bridge between critical relational theory of gender and modern conflict theory

This paper considers (1) some aspects of the lack of dialogue among psychoanalytic schools; (2) Brenner's (1982) conception of drives and drive derivatives as inextricably linked to relationships, and some of its less-appreciated implications; (3) the debate over the importance of childhood sexuality in mental life; (4) the attempts by relational theorists to address and reintegrate the role of sexuality and gender, particularly in the study of feminine psychology; (5) the problematic role of aggression in psychoanalytic theories of women; (6) the avoidance by both men and women of women's passions and their anatomical loci, especially the clitoris, whose only function is the provision of pleasure; and (7) the suggestion that an integrated theory, including an understanding of the role of the body as well as of the passions and the defenses against them, results in the most effective clinical psychoanalytic approach. It then suggests that a bridge could be built between a relational point of view that takes into consideration the role of bodily experiences, and a classical point of view in which drive is seen as inextricably linked to relationships from birth on.     

The relationship of psychology to delinquency: a comprehensive approach

Three psychological perspectives on youth deviance are presented. Two traditional theoretical approaches to understanding and intervening in delinquent behavior are explained. A third perspective, a youth advocacy approach, is described and expanded upon in the light of cognitive developmental theory. Youth's developmental needs and their opportunity to complete developmental tasks are stressed.     

Lifted-weight difference thresholds as a function of hand

A study was conducted to determine if the two hands of right-handers are differentially sensitive to changes in perceived weight. Using the method of limits, the left and right hands of 20 college students were tested at each of three reference weights: 90, 100, and 110 gm. Results indicated that, over-all, difference thresholds for the two hands were not reliably different, though a trend did emerge toward greater right-handed sensitivity to weight changes at smaller weights and greater left-handed sensitivity at greater weights.     

Unity of perception

Perceptual scientists have recently enjoyed success in constructing mathematical theories for specific perceptual capacities, capacities such as stereovision, auditory localization, and color perception. Analysis of these theories suggests that they all share a common mathematical structure. If this is true, the elucidation of this structure, the study of its properties, the derivation of its consequences, and the empirical testing of its predictions are promising directions for perceptual research. We consider a candidate for the common structure, a candidate called an "observer". Observers, in essence, perform inferences; each observer has a characteristic class of perceptual premises, a characteristic class of perceptual conclusions, and its own functional relationship between these premises and conclusions. If observers indeed capture the structure common to perceptual capacities, then each capacity, regardless of its modality or manner of instantiation, can be described as some observer. In this paper we develop the definition of an observer. We first consider two examples of perceptual capacities: the measurement of visual motion, and the perception of depth from visual motion. In each case, we review a formal theory of the capacity and abstract its structural essence. From this essence we construct the definition of observer. We then exercise the definition in discussions of transduction, perceptual illusions, perceptual uncertainty, regularization theory, the cognitive penetrability of perception, and the theory neutrality of observation.