Psychological Interpbetation by Leon H. Levy

Hispanics in the United States mainland underutilize mental health services and drop out of treatment sooner than dominant culture groups. One reason for this problem is that the sociocultural value orientation and expectations of the Hispanic patient are discordant with the values and expectations of the professional offering help. This paper focuses on the special problems resulting from the sociocultural differences between therapist and patient, and discusses why group therapy is uniquely suited to address these problems. It argues that group therapy offered by a leader with knowledge of the culture has an advantage over other forms of treatment in engaging Hispanic patients and in helping them to increase the effective use of mental health services. Issues of group formation, pregroup contracting, and the stages in the life of a Hispanic therapy group are also discussed.     

Item-Cued Directed Forgetting of Related Words and Pictures in Children and Adults: Selective Rehearsal Versus Cognitive Inhibition

The main purpose of this study was to compare the relative importance of selective rehearsal and cognitive inhibition in accounting for developmental changes in the directed-forgetting paradigm developed by R. A. Bjork (1972). In two experiments, children in Grades 2 and 5 and college students were asked to remember some words or pictures and to forget others when items were categorically related. Their memory for both items and the associated remember or forget cues was then tested with recall and recognition. Fifth graders recognized more of the forget-cued words than college students did. The pattern of results suggested that age differences in rehearsal and source monitoring (i.e., remembering whether a word had been cued remember or forget) were better explanatory mechanisms for children's forgetting inefficiencies than retrieval inhibition was. The results are discussed in terms of a multiple process view of inhibition.     

The Complexity of Quest in Emerging Adults’ Religiosity,Well‐Being,and Identity

The construct of quest as measured by the Quest Scale raises complexities that this study addressed with online surveys measuring religiosity, ego identity, and well‐being of graduates from two Christian colleges. Intrinsic questers (those above the scale midpoint in intrinsic and quest scores but below the extrinsic midpoint) made up over half of those high in intrinsic religiosity and did not differ in Christian orthodoxy, religious identity, religious coping, or well‐being from the pure intrinsics (those high in intrinsic religiosity). Indiscriminately pro‐religious questing individuals (those high in intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity and quest) were less religious and showed poorer coping than intrinsic questers. Quest appears to be a reasonable measure of religious orientation, improving prediction of Christian orthodoxy, religious identity, and religious coping, and was more highly correlated with ego identity exploration than with stress. In association with intrinsic religiosity quest does not appear to indicate weak religiosity or poor well‐being. Instead, intrinsic questers may pursue a distinctive developmental trajectory, a path of existential searching by which emerging adults manage the demands of contemporary culture while maintaining a mature faith.     

Structure and Validity of Sluggish Cognitive Tempo Using an Expanded Item Pool in Children with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder

We evaluated the latent structure and validity of an expanded pool of Sluggish Cognitive Tempo (SCT) items. An experimental rating scale with 44 candidate SCT items was administered to parents and teachers of 165 children in grades 2–5 (ages 7–11) recruited for a randomized clinical trial of a psychosocial intervention for Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Predominantly Inattentive Type. Exploratory factor analyses (EFA) were used to extract items with high loadings (>0.59) on primary factors of SCT and low cross-loadings (0.30 or lower) on other SCT factors and on the Inattention factor of ADHD. Items were required to meet these criteria for both informants. This procedure reduced the pool to 15 items. Generally, items representing slowness and low initiative failed these criteria. SCT factors (termed Daydreaming, Working Memory Problems, and Sleepy/Tired) showed good convergent and discriminant validity in EFA and in a confirmatory model with ADHD factors. Simultaneous regressions of impairment and comorbidity on SCT and ADHD factors found that Daydreams was associated with global impairment, and Sleepy/Tired was associated with organizational problems and depression ratings, across both informants. For teachers, Daydreams also predicted ODD (inversely); Sleepy/Tired also predicted poor academic behavior, low social skills, and problem social behavior; and Working Memory Problems predicted organizational problems and anxiety. When depression, rather than ADHD, was included among the predictors, the only SCT-related associations rendered insignificant were the teacher-reported associations of Daydreams with ODD; Working Memory Problems with anxiety, and Sleepy/Tired with poor social skills. SCT appears to be meaningfully associated with impairment, even when controlling for depression. Common behaviors resembling Working Memory problems may represent a previously undescribed factor of SCT.     

Validity of the Sluggish Cognitive Tempo Symptom Dimension in Children: Sluggish Cognitive Tempo and ADHD-Inattention as Distinct Symptom Dimensions

This study examined the validity of the sluggish cognitive tempo (SCT) symptom dimension in children. Ten symptom domains were used to define SCT (i.e., (1) daydreams; (2) attention fluctuates; (3) absent-minded; (4) loses train of thought; (5) easily confused; (6) seems drowsy; (7) thinking is slow; (8) slow-moving; (9) low initiative; and (10) easily bored, needs stimulation). Teacher ratings of 366 children (ages 5 to 13 with 56 % girls) along with parent ratings of 703 children (ages 5 to 13 with 55 % girls) indicated that SCT symptom domains one to eight showed convergent validity (i.e., substantial loadings on the SCT factor) and discriminant validity with the ADHD-IN dimension (i.e., higher loadings on the SCT factor than the ADHD-IN factor). Higher scores on this eight-symptom measure of SCT predicted lower levels of academic and social competence even after controlling for ADHD-IN and ADHD-HI. In addition, higher SCT scores still predicted higher anxiety/depression scores after controlling for ADHD-IN and ADHD-HI. Higher SCT scores also predicted lower ADHD-HI scores after controlling for ADHD-IN and anxiety/depression while higher ADHD-IN and anxiety/depression scores predicted higher ADHD-HI scores after controlling for SCT and anxiety/depression or ADHD-IN. SCT also showed a unique negative relationship with ODD while ADHD-IN and anxiety/depression showed unique positive relationships with ODD. This new measure of the SCT dimension was meaningfully independent from the ADHD-IN and anxiety/depression dimensions and suggests that such an SCT dimension may signify a distinct presentation of ADHD or a different (if highly comorbid) disorder altogether.     

Concept learning set‐size functions for Clark's nutcrackers

Same/Different abstract‐concept learning by Clark's nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana) was tested with novel stimuli following learning of training set expansion (8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, and 1024 picture items). The resulting set‐size function was compared to those from rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), and pigeons (Columba livia). Nutcrackers showed partial concept learning following initial eight‐item set learning, unlike the other species (Magnotti, Katz, Wright, & Kelly, 2015). The mean function for the nutcrackers' novel‐stimulus transfer increased linearly as a function of the logarithm of training set size, which intersected its baseline function at the 128‐item set size. Thus, nutcrackers on average achieved full concept learning (i.e., transfer statistically equivalent to baseline performance) somewhere between set sizes of 64 to 128 items, similar to full concept learning by monkeys. Pigeons required a somewhat larger training set (256 items) for full concept learning, but results from other experiments (initial training and transfer with 32‐ and 64‐item set sizes) suggested carryover effects with smaller set sizes may have artificially prolonged the pigeon's full concept learning. We find it remarkable that these diverse species with very different neural architectures can fully learn this same/different abstract concept, and (at least under some conditions) do so with roughly similar sets sizes (64‐128 items) and numbers of training exemplars, despite initial concept learning advantages (nutcrackers), learning disadvantages (pigeons), or increasing baselines (monkeys).     

Multisource Network and Latent Variable Models of Sluggish Cognitive Tempo,ADHD-Inattentive,and Depressive Symptoms with Spanish Children: Equivalent Findings and Recommendations

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - Multisource network and latent variable models were used to examine the construct validity of sluggish cognitive tempo (SCT) symptoms relative to...     

Maturation of EEG power spectra in early adolescence: a longitudinal study

This study investigated the fine-grained development of the EEG power spectra in early adolescence, and the extent to which it is reflected in changes in peak frequency. It also sought to determine whether sex differences in the EEG power spectra reflect differential patterns of maturation. A group of 56 adolescents were tested at age 10 years and then at two further time-points approximately 18 months apart. The EEG was recorded during both eyes-closed and eyes-open conditions and Fourier transformed to provide estimates of absolute and relative spectral power at 0.5 Hz intervals from 0.5 to 40 Hz. The peak alpha frequency for each individual at each time-point was also determined for relative spectral power. Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis was used to determine the combination of electrodes and frequencies that showed developmental change, or differed between the sexes. As a function of age, absolute delta and theta frequencies power decreased, and relative alpha2 and beta frequencies increased, replicating the standard findings of a decrease in lower, and increase in higher, frequencies with age. A small but significant increase in peak alpha frequency with age was detected. Moreover PLS analysis performed with individual alpha frequencies aligned to 10 Hz suggested that the age-related increase seen in alpha2 relative power was driven by changes in the peak frequency. Although males demonstrated higher alpha power than females, there were no sex differences in peak frequency, suggesting that there may be more to sex differences in EEG power than simply different rates of maturation between the two sexes.     

Do 18-month-olds really attribute mental states to others? A critical test

In the research reported here, we investigated whether 18-month-olds would use their own past experience of visual access to attribute perception and consequent beliefs to other people. Infants in this study wore either opaque blindfolds (opaque condition) or trick blindfolds that looked opaque but were actually transparent (trick condition). Then both groups of infants observed an actor wearing one of the same blindfolds that they themselves had experienced, while a puppet removed an object from its location. Anticipatory eye movements revealed that infants who had experienced opaque blindfolds expected the actor to behave in accordance with a false belief about the object's location, but that infants who had experienced trick blindfolds did not exhibit that expectation. Our results suggest that 18-month-olds used self-experience with the blindfolds to assess the actor's visual access and to update her belief state accordingly. These data constitute compelling evidence that 18-month-olds infer perceptual access and appreciate its causal role in altering the epistemic states of other people.