Age, training, and previous experience predict race performance in long-distance inline skaters, not anthropometry

The association of characteristics of anthropometry, training, and previous experience with race time in 84 recreational, long-distance, inline skaters at the longest inline marathon in Europe (111 km), the Inline One-eleven in Switzerland, was investigated to identify predictor variables for performance. Age, duration per training unit, and personal best time were the only three variables related to race time in a multiple regression, while none of the 16 anthropometric variables were related. Anthropometric characteristics seem to be of no importance for a fast race time in a long-distance inline skating race in contrast to training volume and previous experience, when controlled with covariates. Improving performance in a long-distance inline skating race might be related to a high training volume and previous race experience. Also, doing such a race requires a parallel psychological effort, mental stamina, focus, and persistence. This may be reflected in the preparation and training for the event. Future studies should investigate what motivates these athletes to train and compete.     

Articulation in the context of edge classification

Many researchers believe the human visual system classifies luminance edges into those produced by reflectance edges or those produced by illumination edges, yet this classification process is not completely understood. One suggestion is that heuristics are used for edge classification. For example. specific contrast relationships at the luminance edge ('codirectional contrast invariance' and 'transversal luminance-ratio preserving') may distinguish an illumination edge from a reflectance edge on the one hand, and from a translucent edge on the other. Distinct from luminance junctions, these features are global characteristics of the luminance pattern that make distinguishing between different types of edge easier with more highly articulated scenes. I demonstrate that apparent translucency, nonreversing X-junctions, and single-reversing X-junctions are insufficient on their own to produce the lightness illusion of Adelson's well-known tile pattern. While tolerating violations of the codirectional contrast invariance and transversal-luminance-ratio presersving without reversing the sign of contrast, the visual system is quite sensitive to such contrast reversal at the luminance edge. I account for this by suggesting that humans process lightness in terms of an ordinal, rather than interval, (or ratio) scale.     

Straightness as a cue for luminance edge interpretation

In order to determine the reflectance of a surface, it is necessary to discount luminance changes produced by illumination variation, a process that requires the visual system to respond differently to luminance changes that are due to illumination and reflectance. It is known that various cues can be used in this process. By measuring the strength of lightness illusions, we find evidence that straightness is, used as a cue: When a boundary is straight rather than curved, it has a greater tendency to be discounted, as if it were an illumination edge. The strongest illusions occur when a boundary has high contrast and has multiple X-junctions that preserve a consistent contrast ratio.     

Eye movements and word skipping during reading revisited

The authors examined word skipping in reading in 2 experiments. In Experiment 1, skipping rates were higher for a preview of a predictable word than for a visually similar nonword, indicating there is full recognition in parafoveal vision. In Experiment 2, foveal load was manipulated by varying the frequency of the word preceding either a 3-letter target word or a misspelled preview. There was again a higher skipping rate for a correct preview and a lower skipping rate when there was a high foveal load, but there was no interaction, and the pattern of effects in fixation times was the same as in the skipping data. Experiment 2 also showed significant skipping of nonwords similar to the target word, indicating skipping based on partial information.     

Updating target location at the end of an orienting saccade affects the characteristics of simple point-to-point movements

Six results are reported. (a) Reaching accuracy increases when visual capture of the target is allowed (e.g., target on vs. target off at saccade onset). (b) Whatever the visual condition, trajectories diverge only after peak acceleration, suggesting that accuracy is improved through feedback mechanisms. (c) Feedback corrections are smoothly implemented, causing the corrected and uncorrected velocity profiles to exhibit similar shapes. (d) Initial kinematics poorly predict final accuracy whatever the condition, indicating that target capture is not the only critical input for feedback control. (e) Hand and eye final variability are unrelated, suggesting that gaze direction is not a target signal for arm control. (f) Extent errors are corrected without modification of movement straightness; direction errors cause path curvature to increase. Together these data show that movements with straight paths and bell-shaped velocity profiles are not necessarily ballistic.     

How Do Trait Dimensions Map onto ADHD Symptom Domains?

Theories of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) implicate dysfunctional regulation mechanisms that have been conceptually grouped into “top-down” control and “bottom-up” affective/reactive processes. This dual-process account can be invoked in relation to temperament or personality traits and may clarify how traits relate to ADHD. Two samples were examined to illuminate developmental effects. The younger sample was 179 youngsters aged 7 to 12 years (113 boys; 107 with ADHD). The older sample was 184 adolescents (109 boys; 87 with ADHD) aged 13 to 18 years. Structural equation models included parent-rated traits, teacher-rated ADHD symptoms, and laboratory-obtained executive functions. A control or “top-down” factor included cognitive control and conscientiousness/effortful control. A second factor labeled affective or “bottom-up” included neuroticism/negative emotionality, agreeableness, and reactive control. In the younger sample, these two factors were differentially and specifically related to inattention and hyperactivity, respectively. However, in the older sample, the first factor was related to inattention and hyperactivity, whereas the second factor was related to hyperactivity. Personality traits appear to map onto ADHD symptoms in a meaningful manner consistent with a dual-process model of temperament and ADHD. This research was supported by NIH National Institute of Mental Health Grant R01-MH63146, MH59105, and MH70542 to Joel Nigg. Martel was supported by NIH F31 MH075533. We are indebted to the families and staff who made this study possible.     

Blocking of spatial learning between enclosure geometry and a local landmark

In a virtual environment, blocking of spatial learning to locate an invisible target was found reciprocally between a distinctively shaped enclosure and a local landmark within its walls. The blocking effect was significantly stronger when the shape of the enclosure rather than the landmark served as the blocking cue. However, the extent to which the landmark blocked enclosure-shape learning was not influenced by increasing the physical salience of the landmark. The outcomes are the first to suggest that cue-interaction effects, commonly found in human and animal contingency learning experiments, are also found in human spatial learning based on landmarks and enclosure walls. The data are discussed in terms of spatial reference frames.     

Epistemic contextualism can be stated properly

It has been argued that epistemic contextualism faces the so-called factivity problem and hence cannot be stated properly. The basic idea behind this charge is that contextualists supposedly have to say, on the one hand, that knowledge ascribing sentences like “S knows that S has hands” are true when used in ordinary contexts while, on the other hand, they are not true by the standard of their own context. In my paper, I want to show that the argument to the factivity problem fails because it rests on the mistaken premise that contextualists are committed to the truth of particular ordinary knowledge attributions.