Ethical considerations in the use of computers in psychological testing and assessment

Ethical considerations in the use of computers in psychological testing and assessment are discussed. Particular attention is given to existing ethics and standards that provide guidance to users of computerized test interpretation and report-writing programs. Issues covering professional accountability and confidentiality are also discussed as they relate to computer-assisted assessment. Areas of appropriate use of computers in testing and assessment are suggested, including test scoring, the analysis of scores, and generating remedial recommendations. Findings are summarized and several guidelines are suggested for users of computers in testing and assessment.     

Discriminated interresponse times: role of autoshaped responses.

When discriminated interresponse-time (IRT) procedures have been used to assess preference relations among temporally extended operants, deviations from matching have been obtained. Using a yoked-control procedure, the present study found that key pecking in a discriminated IRT procedure has two sources of strength--that arising from the response-reinforcer contingency that is explicitly arranged, and that arising from a stimulus-reinforcer contingency that is a by-product of the explicitly arranged contingency. The key pecking of all lead birds, and that of 3 of the 4 birds exposed to a yoked autoshaping procedure, was controlled by the keylight that signaled the lead birds' criterion IRTs. Because stimulus control of key pecking by the keylight, whether autoshaped or discriminative, fosters deviations from matching, the discriminated IRT procedure does not provide an appropriate basis for conclusions about preference relations among IRTs.     

Resolving discrepant results of the Wheatstone Experiment

Summary Soon after Wheatstone published his results obtained with the twelve earliest stereograms. Brewster disputed the result obtained with one of them. This stereogram consisted of a thick vertical line presented to one eye and a thin vertical and thick inclined line to the other. Wheatstone reported seeing depth with this figure but Brewster did not. We conducted three experiments to explore the possible reason for the disagreement. Experiment 1 indicated that the stereogram produces a variety of perceptions including the depth as reported by Wheatstone and the rivalry as reported by Brewster. Experiment 2 showed that Brewster's procedure of keeping the eyes fixed while viewing the stereogram reduces the proportion of subjects reporting depth. In Experiment 3, the top half and the bottom half of the stereogram were presented in different trials. The top of the stereogram that contains no conflicting cues produced reliable depth, but the bottom that does, did not. It is concluded that the difference in the procedures they used and the nature of the stimulus were responsible for the conflicting results.     

Masculinity,femininity, self-esteem,and subclinical depression

A study involving 197 university undergraduates (83 males, 114 females) tested the hypothesis that depressive symptoms assessed by the short form of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) would be negatively related to masculinity (M) scores from the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) but unrelated to femininity scores (F). It was also hypothesized that the negative relationship between masculinity and self-reports of depressive symptoms may be due to shared variance in self-esteem. The results supported predictions. In particular, the negative relationship linking masculinity to depressive symptoms disappeared when the effects of self-esteem were partialed out. Results are discussed in terms of the thesis that self-esteem may reflect in part the dominant masculine values of Western-type cultures and that manifestations of psychological ill health may occur when there is reduced opportunity to engage in behaviors that reflect these values.     

Do alcoholic Korsakoff's syndrome patients acquire affective reactions?

In this study we report two experiments that investigate the acquisition of affective reactions. In Experiment 1, unfamiliar melodies were played to Korsakoff's syndrome patients and alcoholic and nonalcoholic control subjects who were matched with them according to age and education. Following a retention interval of 5 min, subjects received a preference test on old and new melodies. Korsakoff's syndrome patients showed the same increase in preference for old melodies as a consequence of prior exposures as control subjects did, but their recognition of melodies was significantly impaired in comparison with controls. In Experiment 2, the same subjects saw photographs of two men. Fictional biographical information depicted one as a "good guy" and the other as a "bad guy." After a retention interval of approximately 20 days, Korsakoffs recalled virtually none of the biographical information; however, 78% preferred the good guy, and impression ratings were less favorable for the bad guy. Korsakoff patients developed preferences and impressions even though they did not have voluntary access to the information on which the preferences were based. However, their impression ratings were less extreme than those of controls. The pattern of results of the two studies is discussed in terms of Johnson's (1983) MEM model of memory.     

Disqualified and qualified poor sleepers: subjective and objective variables

Sleep laboratory studies of patients complaining of insomnia have demonstrated discrepancies between subjective reports and electroencephalograph (EEG)-recorded measures. In our research studies on sleeping aids, 60% of the self-described poor sleepers who reported usual sleep latencies of at least 45 min did not meet the laboratory qualification criterion of a 30-min or longer sleep latency. To learn to predict who would qualify for our studies, we compared 30 laboratory-qualified poor sleepers (QPS) with 30 laboratory-disqualified poor sleepers (DPSs) on subjective report, mood, and all-night sleep laboratory variables. QPSs had significantly lower sleep efficiency and total sleep time in the laboratory, but these differences were due to the longer sleep latencies (50.7 +/- 27.8 min vs. 15.2 +/- 6.1 min) of the QPS group. QPSs and DPSs differed significantly in their morning estimates of their laboratory sleep latencies; as a group, QPSs gave an accurate estimate (51.6 +/- 27.8 min), but DPSs were significantly more likely to exaggerate their sleep latencies. Although we did not identify ways of predicting which poor sleepers would show sleep-onset insomnia in the sleep laboratory, we did find that, in this young, healthy population, there are poor sleepers who give an accurate report of a rather severe sleep-onset insomnia.     

Doctoral training in behavior analysis: Training generalized problem-solving skills

This essay provides guidelines for designing a doctoral program in behavior analysis. First, we propose a general accomplishment for all behavior analytic doctoral students: that they be able to solve problems concerning individual behavior within a range of environments. Second, in order to achieve this goal, we propose that students be trained in conceptual and experimental analysis of behavior, the application of behavioral principles and the administration of behavioral programs. This training should include class work, but it should emphasize the immersion of students in a variety of environments in which they are required to use behavior analytic strategies. Third, we provide an example of a hypothetical graduate program that involves the proposed training. Finally, an evaluation plan is suggested for determining whether a training program is in fact producing students who are generalized problem-solvers. At each step, we justify our point of view from a perspective that combines principles from behavior analysis and educational systems design.     

Psychoanalysis as science: the inductivist's resistance revisited

The scientific status of psychoanalysis has been the focus of heated debates among philosophers of science and among psychoanalysts. The most recent challenge to psychoanalysis as a science comes from the quarters of the inductivist philosophy of science. Since inductivism is a self-defeating philosophy, it is not surprising that inductivists demand that psychoanalysts pay an unlimited price for their claim of scientific status for psychoanalysis. Most psychoanalysts, in their response to this impossible challenge, unwittingly claim to have paid the price. What is worse, the claim is made in a confused and emotionally charged manner. Hence, psychoanalysts are usually defensive and, thus, in error when repelling (in this way) the attack of the inductivist philosopher. It is not psychoanalysis inductivists attack, but their own commitment to their own logic which leads inexorably to the dissolution of their argument, of all science, and, indeed, of psychoanalysis as well. It seems much more reasonable to postpone any response to the challenges that confront psychoanalysis today and to invest effort in a reformulation of the problem of the scientific status of psychoanalysis. Different rational solutions to the problem may evolve if we take care to become well informed first about the limits of our theoretical frameworks and show readiness to change them, if and when needed. That is to say, we can start with a somewhat tentative, not to say skeptical, frame of mind concerning the very concept of scientific status. We may try to keep and to contain our skepticism to the degree required by the discourse at hand, carry on exploring in our practice, report our results, and discuss them respectfully. We should start by admitting that, quite possibly, our discourse will end inconclusively.