Psychometric Analysis and Tentative Shortening of Survey of Personal Beliefs

The Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB) is a frequently used measure of irrational beliefs, but can display less than ideal psychometric properties. In the first study of the present project, the five subscales of the SPB correlated as expected with higher levels of perfectionism, shame, and guilt. A confirmatory factor analysis, nevertheless, revealed that these subscales did not adequately describe responding on the SPB, and internal reliability for some subscales was poor. An abbreviated 12-item version of the SPB was more reliable than the subscales and generally as valid as the full 50-item instrument. With a second data set, the shortened version of the SPB was more consistent than the full 50-item scale in correlating positively with at least some measures of maladjustment that included depression, anxiety, neuroticism, and alexithymia. Future researchers may want to utilize the shorter 12-item version of the SPB as a more convenient and psychometrically acceptable measure of irrational beliefs.     

Coping with Rejection: Derogating Those Who Choose Us Last

Interpersonal rejection poses a threat to people's identities as competent, desirable individuals. This study examined the possibility that people buffer themselves against the implications of rejection by derogating those who reject them and by concluding that the rejector did not know them well. Participants were led to believe that a team captain had selected them either first or last for a laboratory team, then rated the captain and indicated how well he or she knew them. Results showed that, compared to those who were selected first for the team, participants who were selected last rated the team captains less positively, were less interested in having them as friends, and indicated that the captains knew them less well. Mediational analyses suggested that ratings of the captains were mediated by perceived rejection and that derogation helped to maintain participants' positive affect following rejection.     

In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief

Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. But the former claim only shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the latter claim is wrong—we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief.     

Why might poor sleep quality lead to depression? A role for emotion regulation

Disordered sleep is strongly linked to future depression, but the reasons for this link are not well understood. This study tested one possibility – that poorer sleep impairs emotion regulation (ER), which over time leads to increased depressive symptoms. Our sample contained individuals with a wide range of depression symptoms (current depression, N?=?54, remitted depression, N?=?36, and healthy control, N?=?53), who were followed clinically over six months and reassessed for changes in depressive symptom levels. As predicted, maladaptive ER mediated both cross-sectional and prospective relationships between poor sleep quality and depression symptoms. In contrast, an alternative mediator, physical activity levels, did not mediate the link between sleep quality and depression symptoms. Maladaptive ER may help explain why sleep difficulties contribute to depression symptoms; implications for interventions are discussed.     

Defending internalists from acquired sociopaths

People who suffer brain damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VM patients) have a puzzling psychological profile: they seem to retain high intellect and practical reasoning skills after their brain injuries, but continually make poor decisions in many aspects of their lives. Adina Roskies argues that their behavior is explained by the fact that, although VM patients make correct judgments about what they ought to do, they are entirely unmotivated by those judgments. Roskies thus takes VM patients to be real-world counterexamples to motivational internalism: the thesis that, necessarily, if S judges that she ought to φ in circumstances C, then S is somewhat motivated to φ in C. In this paper, however, I argue that the neuropsychological evidence that Roskies appeals to does not actually show that VM patients are entirely unmotivated by their normative judgments. Rather, I argue, the evidence suggests that VM patients form weaker normative judgments than normals during practical deliberation. And this affords the internalist with a plausible explanation for VM patients’ behavior: because VM patients form weaker normative judgments than normals, they are less motivated by their normative judgments than normals, which allows their decision-making to be overruled by their standing desires for greater and more immediate rewards.     

Crossing the Threshold: First Impressions in Psychoanalysis and Negotiation

This paper explores the role that first impressions play in two different relational contexts: psychodynamic treatment and negotiation. Although the goals of therapy and negotiation are very different, both endeavors rest on the capacity of the participants to engage in a process of constructive dialogue, and to get things done via a relationship. We argue for the utility of an interdisciplinary conversation between psychoanalysis and negotiation, and specifically suggest that exploring these similarities and differences about first steps in building a working relationship may be instructive for practitioners in both professions.     

Why does social exclusion hurt? The relationship between social and physical pain

The authors forward the hypothesis that social exclusion is experienced as painful because reactions to rejection are mediated by aspects of the physical pain system. The authors begin by presenting the theory that overlap between social and physical pain was an evolutionary development to aid social animals in responding to threats to inclusion. The authors then review evidence showing that humans demonstrate convergence between the 2 types of pain in thought, emotion, and behavior, and demonstrate, primarily through nonhuman animal research, that social and physical pain share common physiological mechanisms. Finally, the authors explore the implications of social pain theory for rejection-elicited aggression and physical pain disorders.     

Evolutionary origins of stigmatization: the functions of social exclusion

A reconceptualization of stigma is presented that changes the emphasis from the devaluation of an individual's identity to the process by which individuals who satisfy certain criteria come to be excluded from various kinds of social interactions. The authors propose that phenomena currently placed under the general rubric of stigma involve a set of distinct psychological systems designed by natural selection to solve specific problems associated with sociality. In particular, the authors suggest that human beings possess cognitive adaptations designed to cause them to avoid poor social exchange partners, join cooperative groups (for purposes of between-group competition and exploitation), and avoid contact with those who are differentially likely to carry communicable pathogens. The evolutionary view contributes to the current conceptualization of stigma by providing an account of the ultimate function of stigmatization and helping to explain its consensual nature.     

The impostor phenomenon: self-perceptions, reflected appraisals, and interpersonal strategies

Three studies tested theoretical assumptions regarding the impostor phenomenon. In Study 1, participants completed measures of impostorism, rated themselves, and indicated how they thought other people regarded them. Contrary to standard conceptualizations of impostorism, high impostors were characterized by a combination of low self-appraisals and low reflected appraisals. Study 2 was an experiment designed to determine whether the behaviors associated with the impostor phenomenon are interpersonal strategies. Participants were told that they were expected to perform either better or worse than they had previously predicted on an upcoming test, then expressed their reactions anonymously or publicly. High impostors expressed lower performance expectations than low impostors only when their responses were public. When expectations for performance were low, participants high in impostorism responded differently under public than private conditions. Study 3 examined the possibility that high scores on measures of impostorism may reflect two types of impostors--true impostors (who believe that others perceive them too positively) and strategic impostors (who only claim that they are not as good as other people think). The results did not support this distinction; however, evidence for the strategic nature of impostorism was again obtained. Although people may experience true feelings of impostorism, these studies suggest that the characteristics attributed to so-called impostors are partly interpersonal, self-presentational behaviors designed to minimize the implications of poor performance.