Anticipating the Societal Challenges of Nanotechnologies

“In this article we sketch out the landscape for this Special Issue on anticipating and embedding the societal challenge of nanotechnologies. Tools that actors may choose to employ for these processes are articulated, and further explored through the introduction of the seven articles which comprise this Issue. Taken together, these articles create a cogent narrative on the societal challenges posed by nanotechnologies. They are drawn together by three distinct themes, each of which is briefly considered within this context of this Introductory article”.     

Anger at unfairness: is it moral outrage?

Anger at unfair treatment has been called moral outrage. However, moral outrage—anger at the violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from personal anger at being harmed and empathic anger at seeing another for whom one cares harmed. Across a preliminary experiment and a main experiment, both designed to manipulate the appraisal conditions for these three forms of anger, we found evidence of personal anger and empathic anger, but little evidence of moral outrage. Participants perceived unfair treatment of another, even another for whom they had not been induced to feel empathy, to be as unfair as participants perceived unfair treatment of themselves. But the appraisal conditions that evoked anger were unfair treatment of self and unfair treatment of a cared-for other, not unfairness per se. In the absence of empathic concern, unfair treatment of another evoked little anger. Possible implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are suggested. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors

Over the past decade, distrust of atheists has been documented in psychological literature yet remains relatively understudied. The current research sought to test the robustness of anti-atheist prejudice. Specifically, it examined the extent to which an individual’s anti-atheist prejudice remained unchanged in light of new information. One hundred participants from the United Kingdom completed an online experiment. The experiment involved reading a vignette describing the actions of an untrustworthy individual. Participants were asked to make a judgment with regards to the untrustworthy individual’s identity. The occurrence of a cognitive bias, namely, the conjunction fallacy, was used to measure the frequency of anti-atheist prejudice. An examination of judgment errors (i.e., conjunction fallacies) under different conditions was used to test the robustness of anti-atheism prejudice. The results show that anti-atheist prejudice is not confined either to dominantly religious countries or to religious individuals but rather appears to be a robust judgment about atheists.     

Psychometric Evaluation of the Rage Outbursts and Anger Rating Scale in an Outpatient Psychiatric Sample

The primary objective of this study was to examine the psychometric properties of a measure of anger/rage attacks—the Rage Outburst and Anger Rating Scale (ROARS)—in a sample of youth (n = 81, ages 7–17 years, 72.8 % male) receiving treatment at an outpatient pediatric psychiatric clinic. A trained rater completed the ROARS and Clinical Global Impression-Rage (CGI-Rage). Children completed the Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale for Children and Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale. Parents completed the Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale for Parents. Internal consistency (α = .89), inter-rater reliability (κ = .94) and 1-week test–retest reliability (r = .72) were calculated for the ROARS. The ROARS was correlated with CGI-Rage (r = .68, ρ < .001), although not with parent- and child-rated anxiety symptoms or with child-rated depressive symptoms. Implications regarding clinical utility of the ROARS and directions for future research are discussed.     

When does imagery practice enhance performance on a motor task?

Imagery practice of motor tasks has been recommended for a wide range of activities as from flight training to basketball. A key question, both from a practical and a theoretical standpoint, is when during the learning process does imagery practice confer the most benefit? However, the literature does not provide clear guidance, in part because of methodological limitations. A 3 x 2 (physical practice x pretest-posttest) split-plot design was employed to investigate the effects of imagery practice on the acquisition of a discrete target at three different stages of learning. Analysis indicated that imagery practice was most beneficial in the early stages of learning and showed an inverse relationship between experience and efficacy of imagery practice. Results are discussed in terms of current theories of imagery practice and suggestions are made regarding when such practice might be best applied during skill development.     

Minimally Creative Thought

Creativity has received, and continues to receive, comparatively little analysis in philosophy and the brain and behavioural sciences. This is in spite of the importance of creative thought and action, and the many and varied resources of theories of mind. Here an alternative approach to analyzing creativity is suggested: start from the bottom up with minimally creative thought. Minimally creative thought depends non‐accidentally upon agency, is novel relative to the acting agent, and could not have been tokened before the time it is in fact tokened, relative to the agent in question. Thoughts that meet these three conditions—agency, psychological novelty, and modal—are what may be called cognitive breakthroughs. Even if such breakthroughs are not necessary to or definitive of richer creativity, they are indeed central to much of creativity. The minimal analysis provides a more workable explanandum for theories of creativity of varied motivation and method.     

Developmental patterns of change in the influence of safe and risky peer choices on risky decision‐making

Adolescents take more risks when peers monitor their behavior. However, it is largely unknown how different types of peer influence affect adolescent decision‐making. In this study, we investigate how information about previous choices of peers differentially influences decision‐making in adolescence and young adulthood. Participants (N = 99, age range 12–22) completed an economic choice task in which choice options were systematically varied on levels of risk and ambiguity. On each trial, participants selected between a safer choice (low variability in outcome) and a riskier choice (high variability in outcome). Participants made choices in three conditions: a solo condition in which they made choices with no additional information, a social condition in which they saw choices of supposed peers, and a computer condition in which they saw choices of a computer. Results showed that participants’ choices conform to the choices made by the peers, but not a computer. Furthermore, when peers chose the safe option, late adolescents were especially likely to make a safe choice. Conversely, when the peer made a risky choice, late adolescents were least likely to follow choices made by the peer. We did not find evidence for differential influence of social information on decisions depending on their level of risk and ambiguity. These results show that information about previous decisions of peers are a powerful modifier for behavior and that the effect of peers on adolescents’ decisions is less ubiquitous and more specific than previously assumed.