Anger at unfairness: is it moral outrage?

Anger at unfair treatment has been called moral outrage. However, moral outrage—anger at the violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from personal anger at being harmed and empathic anger at seeing another for whom one cares harmed. Across a preliminary experiment and a main experiment, both designed to manipulate the appraisal conditions for these three forms of anger, we found evidence of personal anger and empathic anger, but little evidence of moral outrage. Participants perceived unfair treatment of another, even another for whom they had not been induced to feel empathy, to be as unfair as participants perceived unfair treatment of themselves. But the appraisal conditions that evoked anger were unfair treatment of self and unfair treatment of a cared-for other, not unfairness per se. In the absence of empathic concern, unfair treatment of another evoked little anger. Possible implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are suggested. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors

Over the past decade, distrust of atheists has been documented in psychological literature yet remains relatively understudied. The current research sought to test the robustness of anti-atheist prejudice. Specifically, it examined the extent to which an individual’s anti-atheist prejudice remained unchanged in light of new information. One hundred participants from the United Kingdom completed an online experiment. The experiment involved reading a vignette describing the actions of an untrustworthy individual. Participants were asked to make a judgment with regards to the untrustworthy individual’s identity. The occurrence of a cognitive bias, namely, the conjunction fallacy, was used to measure the frequency of anti-atheist prejudice. An examination of judgment errors (i.e., conjunction fallacies) under different conditions was used to test the robustness of anti-atheism prejudice. The results show that anti-atheist prejudice is not confined either to dominantly religious countries or to religious individuals but rather appears to be a robust judgment about atheists.     

Psychometric Evaluation of the Rage Outbursts and Anger Rating Scale in an Outpatient Psychiatric Sample

The primary objective of this study was to examine the psychometric properties of a measure of anger/rage attacks—the Rage Outburst and Anger Rating Scale (ROARS)—in a sample of youth (n = 81, ages 7–17 years, 72.8 % male) receiving treatment at an outpatient pediatric psychiatric clinic. A trained rater completed the ROARS and Clinical Global Impression-Rage (CGI-Rage). Children completed the Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale for Children and Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale. Parents completed the Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale for Parents. Internal consistency (α = .89), inter-rater reliability (κ = .94) and 1-week test–retest reliability (r = .72) were calculated for the ROARS. The ROARS was correlated with CGI-Rage (r = .68, ρ < .001), although not with parent- and child-rated anxiety symptoms or with child-rated depressive symptoms. Implications regarding clinical utility of the ROARS and directions for future research are discussed.     

The fate of unattended stimuli and emotional habituation: Behavioral interference and cortical changes

The interference produced by the viewing of emotional distractors has been interpreted as evidence that emotional cues are processed in a fairly mandatory fashion, and that they divert attention from the primary ongoing task. However, few studies have examined how behavioral emotional interference varies with repeated presentation of the same emotional distractors. In two experiments, while participants were engaged in a parity judgment task, we investigated the effects of repetition of task-irrelevant emotional pictures, as reflected in both behavioral interference (Experiments 1 and 2) and neural activity (Experiment 2). Both experiments showed that the slowing of reaction times that was observed when viewing emotional, compared to neutral, scenes disappeared after only a few repetitions, suggesting diminished attention allocation to repeated emotional pictures. Conversely, in Experiment 2, neural correlates of picture processing revealed that the late positive potential (LPP) amplitude continued to be enhanced for emotional, compared to neutral, distractors despite picture repetition and the presence of a concurrent task. Altogether, these findings suggest that while evaluative processes are mandatory, and continue to engage cortico-limbic appetitive and defensive systems even after massive repetition, as suggested by the affective modulation of the LPP, attentional processes are not necessary after several repetitions of the same stimulus, as indicated by the rapid decline of behavioral emotional interference.     

Barriers to Seeking Psychotherapy for Mental Health Problems in Adolescents: a mixed method study

Journal of Child and Family Studies - Given the large discrepancy between prevalence rates of mental disorders in adolescents and actual treatment rates, there is a need to understand what prevents...     

De‐legitimizing hostility and strengthening joint agency: Lutheran inter‐religious commitment today

The ELCA Declaration of Inter‐Religious Commitment is an important instrument for mainstreaming inter‐religious engagement in local communities and diverse ministries. This article assesses this recent policy document and highlights how the text engages Lutheran theological reasoning on “the neighbor” for a profound understanding of God's grace, theologically de‐legitimizes hostility and exclusion, and strengthens joint agency. This resonates with current concerns in the global Lutheran communion and the wider ecumenical movement.