Depth from binocular half-occlusions in stereoscopic images of natural scenes

Over the past two decades psychophysical experiments have firmly established that binocular half-occlusions are useful sources of information for the human visual system. The existing literature has focused on simplified stimuli that have no additional cues to depth, apart from stereopsis. From this large body of work we can be confident that the visual system is able to exploit binocular half-occlusions to aid depth perception; however, we do not know if this signal has any influence on perception when observers view complex stereoscopic stimuli with multiple sources of depth information. This issue is addressed here with the use of stereoscopic images of natural scenes, some of which have been digitally altered to manipulate a major half-occlusion signal. Our results show that depth-ordering judgments for these relatively complex stimuli are significantly affected by the nature of the half-occlusion signal, but only when highly textured surfaces are viewed. Under such conditions, the replacement of a binocular half-occlusion with background texture slows reaction time relative to performance when the occluded region is consistent with the foreground object. This result is specific to conditions when the depth ordering is correct (ie not reversed) and depends upon the size of the half-occlusion. The influence of the half-occlusion information in the presence of potent depth cues such as perspective, texture gradient, shading, and interposition is convincing evidence that this information plays a significant role in human depth perception.     

Flanker compatibility effects in patients with Parkinson's disease: impact of target onset delay and trial-by-trial stimulus variation

Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients and healthy controls were administered a flanker task that consisted of the presentation of colored targets and distractors. Participants were required to attend to the center target and identify its color. The stimulus displays were either congruent (i.e., the target and flankers were the same color) or incongruent. The time between the onset of the flanker and the target color (the target onset delay) was either short or long. Results indicated that PD patients and controls did not differ in the magnitude of the flanker effect within individual trials in that both groups demonstrated a typical flanker effect at the short target onset delay and neither group demonstrated a flanker effect at the longer delay. However, when performance was examined on a trial-by-trial basis, PD patients demonstrated a slowing of reaction time relative to controls when having to make the same response across consecutive trials at longer inter-trial intervals when the flankers were incongruent across consecutive trials and the display on the second of two trials was incongruent. These results indicate that PD patients are impaired in inhibiting the distractors over an extended delay and that this deficit may impact motor responding in these patients, suggesting that the basal ganglia contribute to the interface of attention and action.     

Predictors of Media Effects on Body Dissatisfaction in European American Women

This study involved a sample of 81 European American women viewing either appearance-related or non-appearance-related magazine advertisements. Participants completed measures of demographics and objectified body consciousness prior to viewing these images and a measure of body dissatisfaction prior to and after viewing the images. Body dissatisfaction scores worsened after viewing images of women who exemplified cultural standards of the thin beauty ideal. Neither objectified body consciousness nor body mass index predicted degree of change in body dissatisfaction after viewing the images. In other words, the impact of viewing the images was the same for all women, despite varying body mass index levels and varied degrees of objectified body consciousness. Implications are discussed.     

The origins of cognitive dissonance: evidence from children and monkeys

In a study exploring the origins of cognitive dissonance, preschoolers and capuchins were given a choice between two equally preferred alternatives (two different stickers and two differently colored M&M's, respectively). On the basis of previous research with adults, this choice was thought to cause dissonance because it conflicted with subjects' belief that the two options were equally valuable. We therefore expected subjects to change their attitude toward the unchosen alternative, deeming it less valuable. We then presented subjects with a choice between the unchosen option and an option that was originally as attractive as both options in the first choice. Both groups preferred the novel over the unchosen option in this experimental condition, but not in a control condition in which they did not take part in the first decision. These results provide the first evidence of decision rationalization in children and nonhuman primates. They suggest that the mechanisms underlying cognitive-dissonance reduction in human adults may have originated both developmentally and evolutionarily earlier than previously thought.     

Necessity and Apriority

The classical view of the relationship between necessity and apriority, defended by Leibniz and Kant, is that all necessary truths are known a priori. The classical view is now almost universally rejected, ever since Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam discovered that there are necessary truths that are known only a posteriori. However, in recent years a new debate has emerged over the epistemology of these necessary a posteriori truths. According to one view – call it the neo-classical view – knowledge of a necessary truth always depends on at least one item of a priori knowledge. According to the rival view – call it the neoempiricist view – our knowledge of necessity is sometimes broadly empirical. In this paper I present and defend an argument against the neo-empiricist view. I argue that knowledge of the necessity of a necessary truth could not be broadly empirical.     

Indeterminacy,identity and counterparts: Evans reconsidered

In this paper I argue that Gareth Evans’ famous proof of the impossibility of de re indeterminate identity fails on a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the determinacy operators. I attempt to motivate a counterpart-theoretic reading of the determinacy operators and then show that, understood counterpart-theoretically, Evans’ argument is straightforwardly invalid.