Chaos,danger, and maternal parenting in families: Links with adolescent adjustment in low‐ and middle‐income countries

The current longitudinal study is the first comparative investigation across low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs) to test the hypothesis that harsher and less affectionate maternal parenting (child age 14 years, on average) statistically mediates the prediction from prior household chaos and neighborhood danger (at 13 years) to subsequent adolescent maladjustment (externalizing, internalizing, and school performance problems at 15 years). The sample included 511 urban families in six LMICs: China, Colombia, Jordan, Kenya, the Philippines, and Thailand. Multigroup structural equation modeling showed consistent associations between chaos, danger, affectionate and harsh parenting, and adolescent adjustment problems. There was some support for the hypothesis, with nearly all countries showing a modest indirect effect of maternal hostility (but not affection) for adolescent externalizing, internalizing, and scholastic problems. Results provide further evidence that chaotic home and dangerous neighborhood environments increase risk for adolescent maladjustment in LMIC contexts, via harsher maternal parenting.     

Emotional intelligence and job performance: The mediating role of work-family balance

In this study, we examine the dynamics between emotional intelligence, work-family balance, and job performance. A review of the literature to date has shown distinct relationships between emotional intelligence to job performance and work-family balance to job performance. We utilize a sample of 233 respondents to empirically test our set of hypotheses that contend work-family balance mediates the relationship between emotional intelligence and job performance. Our results support these hypotheses. Practical implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

Lie-toe-tease: double negatives and unexcluded middles

Litotes, “a figure of speech in which an affirmative is expressed by the negative of the contrary” (OED) has had some tough reviews. For Pope and Swift (“Scriblerus” 1727), litotes—stock examples include “no mean feat”, “no small problem”, and “not bad at all”—is “the peculiar talent of Ladies, Whisperers, and Backbiters”; for Orwell (1946), it is a means to affect “an appearance of profundity” that we can deport from English “by memorizing this sentence: A not unblack dog was chasing a not unsmall rabbit across a not ungreen field.” But such ridicule is not without equivocation, given that litotes, or “logical” (non-concordial) double negation, may or may not be semantically redundant. When the negation of a logical contrary yields an unexcluded middle, it contributes to expressive power: someone who is not unhappy may not be happy either, and an occurrence may not be infrequent without being frequent. But if something is not possible, what can it be but possible? Why does Crashaw’s “not impossible she” survive rhetorically while Orwell’s “not unsmall rabbit” is doomed? How is Robbie being “not not friends” with Mary on 7th Heaven distinct from being friends with her, if not not-p reduces to p? The key is recognizing in litotes a corollary of MaxContrary, the tendency for contradictory (wide-scope) sentential negation ¬p to strengthen (at least) pragmatically to a contrary ©p, as when the formal contradictory Fr. “Il ne faut pas partir” (lit. ‘It is not necessary to leave’) is reinterpreted as expressing a contrary (‘one must not-leave’). Just as the Law of Excluded Middle can apply where it “shouldn’t”, resulting in pragmatically presupposed disjunctions between semantic contraries, so that “p v ©p” amounts to an instance of “p v ¬p”, the Law of Double Negation can fail to apply where it “should”. When not not-p conveys ¬©p, the negation of a virtual contrary, the middle between p and not-p is no longer excluded, rendering the Fregean dictum that “Wrapping up a thought in double negation does not alter its truth value” not unproblematic.     

Adolescent risk-taking is predicted by individual differences in cognitive control over emotional,but not non-emotional,response conflict

While much research on adolescent risk behaviour has focused on the development of prefrontal self-regulatory mechanisms, prior studies have elicited mixed evidence of a relationship between individual differences in the capacity for self-regulation and individual differences in risk taking. To explain these inconsistent findings, it has been suggested that the capacity for self-regulation may be, for most adolescents, adequately mature to produce adaptive behaviour in non-affective, “cold” circumstances, but that adolescents have a more difficult time exerting control in affective, “hot” contexts. To further explore this claim, the present study examined individual differences in self-control in the face of affective and non-affective response conflict, and examined whether differences in the functioning of cognitive control processes under these different conditions was related to risk taking. Participants completed a cognitive Stroop task, an emotional Stroop task, and a risky driving task known as the Stoplight game. Regression analyses showed that performance on the emotional Stroop task predicted laboratory risk-taking in the driving task, whereas performance on the cognitive Stroop task did not exhibit the same trend. This pattern of results is consistent with theories of adolescent risk-taking that emphasise the impacts of affective contextual influences on the ability to enact effective cognitive control.     

The effect of familiarity on face adaptation

Face aftereffects can provide information on how faces are stored by the human visual system (eg Leopold et al, 2001 Nature Neuroscience 4 89-94), but few studies have used robustly represented (highly familiar) faces. In this study we investigated the influence of facial familiarity on adaptation effects. Participants were adapted to a series of distorted faces (their own face, a famous face, or an unfamiliar face). In experiment 1, figural aftereffects were significantly smaller when participants were adapted to their own face than when they were adapted to the other faces (ie their own face appeared significantly less distorted than a famous or unfamiliar face). Experiment 2 showed that this 'own-face' effect did not occur when the same faces were used as adaptation stimuli for participants who were unfamiliar with them. Experiment 3 replicated experiment 1, but included a pre-adaptation baseline. The results highlight the importance of considering facial familiarity when conducting research on face aftereffects.     

A brief history of negation

The history of scholarship on negation tracks and illuminates the major developments in the history of metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind, from Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle through Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein to contemporary formal theorists. Our perspective focuses on the catalytic role played by the 20th century philosopher of language Paul Grice, whose views on negation serve as a fulcrum for his attempt to bridge the (neo-)Traditionalist and Formalist traditions in logical thought. Grice's remarks on negation and speaker meaning and the elaboration of his ideas by subsequent neo-Griceans are summarized and situated within a broader picture of the role of contradictory and contrary negation in the frameworks of Aristotelians, Medievals, early modern schoolmaster-logicians, 19th and early 20th century neo-Idealists and Formalists, Oxford ordinary-language analytics, practitioners of classical and non-classical logics, and a range of other philosophers and linguists. Particular attention is paid to the relations between negation and the other operators of propositional and predicate calculus. Implications for accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of natural language are also pursued and extensive references to related work are provided.     

A scaling analysis of the snake lightness illusion

Logvinenko and Maloney (2006) measured perceived dissimilarities between achromatic surfaces placed in two scenes illuminated by neutral lights that could differ in intensity. Using a novel scaling method, they found that dissimilarities between light surface pairs could be represented as a weighted linear combination of two dimensions, "surface lightness" (a perceptual correlate of the difference in the logarithm of surface albedo) and "surface brightness" (which corresponded to the differences of the logarithms of light intensity across the scenes). Here we attempt to measure the contributions of these dimensions to a compelling lightness illusion (the "snake illusion"). It is commonly assumed that this illusion is a result of erroneous segmentation of the snake pattern into regions of unequal illumination. We find that the illusory shift in the snake pattern occurs along the surface lightness dimension, with no contribution from surface brightness. Thus, even if an erroneous segmentation of the snake pattern into strips of unequal illumination does happen, it reveals itself, paradoxically, as illusory changes in surface lightness rather than as surface brightness. We conjecture that the illusion strength depends on the balance between two groups of illumination cues signaling the true (uniform) illumination and the pictorial (uneven) illumination.