Criteria for admissibility of inference rules. Modal and intermediate logics with the branching property

The main result of this paper is the following theorem: each modal logic extendingK4 having the branching property belowm and the effective m-drop point property is decidable with respect to admissibility. A similar result is obtained for intermediate intuitionistic logics with the branching property belowm and the strong effective m-drop point property. Thus, general algorithmic criteria which allow to recognize the admissibility of inference rules for modal and intermediate logics of the above kind are found. These criteria are applicable to most modal logics for which decidability with respect to admissibility is known and to many others, for instance, to the modal logicsK4,K4.1,K4.2,K4.3,S4.1,S4.2,GL.2; to all smallest and greatest counterparts of intermediate Gabbay-De-Jong logicsD _n; to all intermediate Gabbay-De-Jong logicsD _n; to all finitely axiomatizable modal and intermediate logics of finite depth etc. Semantic criteria for recognizing admissibility for these logics are offered as well.The results of this paper were obtained by the author during a stay at the Free University of Berlin with support of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in 1992 – 1993.Presented byWolfgang Rauntenberg     

Factor analytic structure of theScale to Asses World View

This article reports on the factor structure of theScale to Assess World View ^(c) (SAWV). Alpha reliabilities for the factors are presented. Gender differences in world views are also explored to understand how men and women in this sample viewed the world. Recommendations for client assessment, therapy, education and training, and scale revision are discussed. The research reported here is based on a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, August 17, 1992.     

Authenticity as a foundational principle of medical ethics

Increasingly, contemporary medical ethicists have become aware of the need to explicate a foundation for their various models of applied ethics. Many of these theories are inspired by the apparent incompatibility of patient autonomy and provider beneficence. The principle of patient autonomy derives its current primacy to a large extent from its legal origins. However, this principle seems at odds with the clinical reality. In the bioethical literature, the notion of authenticity has been proposed as an alternative foundational principle to autonomy. This article examines this proposal in reference to various existentialist philosophers (Heidegger, Sartre, Camus and Marcel). It is concluded that the principle of autonomy fails to do what it is commonly supposed to do: provide a criterion of distinction that can be invoked to settle moral controversies between patients and providers. The existentialist concept of authenticity is more promising in at least one crucial respect: It acknowledges that the essence of human life disappears from sight if life's temporal character is reduced to a series of present decisions and actions. This also implies that the very quest for a criterion that allows physicians to distinguish between sudden, unexpected decisions of their patients to be or not to be respected, without recourse to the patient's past or future, is erroneous.     

The calibration and resolution of confidence in perceptual judgments

Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontariot Canada Confidence rating based calibration and resolution indices were obtained in two experiments requiring perceptual comparisons and in a third with visual gap detection. Four important results were obtained. First, as in the general knowledge domain, subjects were underconfident when judgments were easy and overconfident when they were difficult. Second, paralleling the clear dependence of calibration on decisional difficulty, resolution decreased with increases in decision difficulty arising either from decreases in discriminability or from increasing demands for speed at the expense of accuracy. Third, providing trial-by-trial response feedback on difficult tasks improved resolution but had no effect on calibration. Fourth, subjects can accurately reportsubjective errors (i.e., trials in which they have indicated that they made an error) with their confidence ratings. It is also shown that the properties of decision time, conditionalized on confidence category, impose a rigorous set of constraints on theories of confidence calibration.     

Human Signal-detection Performance: Effects Of Signal Presentation Probabilities And Reinforcer Distributions

University students participated in one of four standard two-choice signal-detection experiments in which signal presentation probability was varied and the reinforcement distribution was held constant and equal. In Experiments 1, 3 and 4, subjects' performance showed a systematic response bias for reporting the stimulus presented least often. Experiments 1 and 4 showed that this effect was reliable with extended training and monetary, rather than point, reinforcement. In Experiment 2, all correct responses were signaled in some way, and this produced the opposite relationship between signal presentation probability and response bias. Experiments 1 and 3 found that explicitly deducting money (intended as punishment) for equal numbers of incorrect responses on each alternative, or varying the obtained overall rate of reinforcement, produced no clear change in response bias. The bias, shown by humans, for reporting the stimulus presented least often remains a challenge for theories of stimulus detection.     

The conversion of Paul

This essay extrapolates from recent psychological data on the phenomena of guilt and splitting to possible implications for the understanding of the experience of the Apostle Paul.     

When More is Better than Less; Three Theories of Psychosis—Projection, Double Bind, and Possession

Three psychological theories of psychosis are described, each of which has standing in psychiatry. Defined by the terms projection, double bind, and possession, they initially appear to have little or nothing in common to explain psychosis, but converge at four points: (1) A high degree of anxiety precipitated by a dilemma or conflict perceived to be unsolvable by the person; (2) the anxiety triggers a shift from one thought or motive in the direction of its opposite, because the original was believed too antagonistic to the wishes of significant others; (3) the opposite, in order to remain opposite, requires that the original thought or motive be forgotten, (4) a singular means to produce and reinforce forgetting is the interposition of psychiatric symptoms. In psychiatry today treatment would fit more consistently with the three theories taken as a whole rather than any one, and a rationale for this viewpoint is elaborated.