Enlightening the Fully Informed

This paper develops a response to the knowledge argument against physicalism. The response is both austere, in that it does not concede the existence of non-physical information (much less non-physical facts), and natural, in that it acknowledges the alethic character of phenomenal knowledge and learning. I argue that such a response has all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of existing objections to the knowledge argument. Throughout, the goal is to develop a response that is polemically effective in addition to theoretically sound.     

A Light Theory with Heavy Burdens

In “ A Light Theory of Color”, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and David Sparrow argue that color is neither a primary quality of objects, nor a disposition that objects have, nor a property of our visual fields. Rather, according to the view they present, color is a property of light. The present paper aims to show, first, that the light theory is vulnerable to many of the very same objections that Sinnott-Armstrong and Sparrow raise against rival views. Second, the paper argues that the strategies that Sinnott-Armstrong and Sparrow use to avoid certain objections are also available to proponents of rival accounts. This might only seem to show that the light theory is in the same shaky boat as other theories: suffering from the same problems but having the same tools for solving them. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to why this is not the case, but why the existence of the light theory is nevertheless likely to bring increased clarity to the debate about color realism.     

Even zombies Can be Surprised: A Reply to Graham And Horgan

In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the so- called Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look.     

Action,Control and Sensations of Acting

Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for action according to the causal theory, or Searle’s theory, do not add up to agency. I find the agent at work, her engagement in her action, in her sensation of acting.It is often thought that bodily movements are either mere events or actions. I suggest that there is a third possibility: that they are activities which are not actions. Activities, whether they are actions or not, differ from mere events in that they are controlled from within the brain. They are actions only if this control forms agent control, that is, control in which the conscious mind, the agents’ intentions in acting and her sensations of acting, participates.Internally wayward actions are characterized by the fact that the person involved does not have a sensation of action and therefore does not control her movements. In the absence of such a sensation she does not act.     

Psychometric Modeling of response speed and accuracy with mixed and conditional regression

Human performance in cognitive testing and experimental psychology is expressed in terms of response speed and accuracy. Data analysis is often limited to either speed or accuracy, and/or to crude summary measures like mean response time (RT) or the percentage correct responses. This paper proposes the use of mixed regression for the psychometric modeling of response speed and accuracy in testing and experiments. Mixed logistic regression of response accuracy extends logistic item response theory modeling to multidimensional models with covariates and interactions. Mixed linear regression of response time extends mixed ANOVA to unbalanced designs with covariates and heterogeneity of variance. Related to mixed regression is conditional regression, which requires no normality assumption, but is limited to unidimensional models. Mixed and conditional methods are both applied to an experimental study of mental rotation. Univariate and bivariate analyzes show how within-subject correlation between response and RT can be distinguished from between-subject correlation, and how latent traits can be detected, given careful item design or content analysis. It is concluded that both response and RT must be recorded in cognitive testing, and that mixed regression is a versatile method for analyzing test data.I am grateful to Rogier Donders for putting his data at my disposal.