Are Specific Emotion Regulation Strategies Differentially Associated with Posttraumatic Growth Versus Stress?

Extremely few studies have examined emotion regulation strategies as predictors of posttraumatic growth (PTG). This study aimed to examine several specific emotion regulation strategies, along with meaning making, as predictors of PTG, as opposed to posttraumatic distress. Participants were 107 adult women who had experienced a very stressful or traumatic event within the past 3 years and completed questionnaires measuring emotion regulation, meaning making, distress, and PTG. Emotion suppression positively predicted distress, but not PTG. Meaning making positively predicted PTG and negatively predicted distress. Bootstrapped mediation models showed that emotional processing has a significant indirect effect on PTG and distress through its effect on meaning making. Results indicate that researchers should pay closer attention to emotional processes involved in etiological models of PTG. It might also be helpful to examine specific emotion regulation strategies, as these can point to ways to help people navigate recovery from trauma.     

Wanting more than you have and it’s Consequences for Well-being

Americans have a lot of stuff, but are not necessarily happier for it. One possibility is that even if we want what we have, we want more. Wanting more may increase have-want discrepancies and reduce well-being. In this paper, we introduce the construct wanting more, and show that it negatively predicts well-being. We then identify materialism as a mediator of this relationship. Wanting more negatively effects well-being at least in part because those who want more are more likely to be materialistic. Finally, we show that wanting more than one has and wanting what one has are distinct constructs, and that wanting what one has moderates the relationship between wanting more and well-being. Those who want more are less happy only if they also do not want what they have. Wanting what one has may reduce attention to have-want discrepancies that result from wanting more.     

Individual differences in entrainment of mood to the weekly calendar

This study addressed two questions: Do daily fluctuations in mood exhibit a 7-day (circaseptum) cycle, and are there reliable individual differences in how entrained people's moods are to such a weekly cycle? Spectral analysis of daily mood over 84 occasions revealed a strong weekly rhythm in the temporal organization of mood in a sample of 74 undergraduates. A sine wave with a period of 7 days accounted for 40% of the variance in the daily mood data. Individual differences were also found in how entrained subjects' moods were to this weekly rhythm. We predicted that extraverts (compared with introverts) should be less entrained to a weekly cycle. Results suggest that the novelty- and sensation-seeking behavior of extraverts most likely serves to lessen the cyclical predictability of their day-to-day moods. The origin and psychological meaning of the 7-day week are discussed.     

The Maudsley Obsessional-Compulsive Inventory and OCD in a Norwegian nonclinical sample

The 30 item Maudsley Obsessional-Compulsive Inventory (MOCI) was given to 294 under graduate students. The inventory achieved an acceptable internal consistence, but somewhat low reliability. There were no sex difference in total MOCI score, or in any of the subscales. 31% of the variance seemed to be explained by item 18: "attending too much to details", and more than 65% of the variance is explained by the checking subscale. The data give some interesting indications of the prevalence of OCD in the population.     

Seeing or hearing? Perceptual independence,modality confusions,and crossmodal congruity effects with focused and divided attention

Observers were given brief presentations of pairs of simultaneous stimuli consisting of a visual and a spoken letter. In the visual focused-attention conditon, only the visual letter should be reported; in the auditory focused-attention condition, only the spoken letter should be reported; in the divided-attention condition, both letters, as well as their respective modalities, should be reported (forced choice). The proportions of correct reports were nearly the same in the three conditions (no significant divided-attention decrement), and in the divided-attention condition, the probability that the visual letter was correctly reported was independent of whether the auditory letter was correctly reported. However, with a probability much higher than chance, the observers reported hearing the visual stimulus letter or seeing the spoken stimulus letter (modality confusions). The strength of the effect was nearly the same with focused as with divided attention. We also discovered a crossmodal congruity effect: Performance was better when the two letters in a stimulus pair were the same than when they differed in type.