Thinking about the Needy: A Reprise

This article discusses Jan Narveson’s “Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Today’s World,” and “Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy?” and their relation to my “Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations.” Section 2 points out that Narveson’s concerns differ from mine, so that often his claims and mine fail to engage each other. For example, his focus is on the poor, mine the needy, and while many poor are needy, and vice versa, our obligations may differ regarding the poor than regarding the needy. Also, Narveson invokes a narrow conception of morality as those rules that government or society may compel people to follow. Given a broader, more plausible, conception of morality, many of Narveson’s claims actually support my substantive views. Section 3 shows that many of Narveson’s claims are relevant to the best means of aiding the needy, but do not challenge the validity of that end. This is true, for example, of his claims about the role of poor governments, the importance of freedom, the undesirability of mere “handouts,” and the effects of bad economic policies. Section 4 defends the importance of my distinction between acting justly and acting for reasons of justice. It illustrates that on several widely shared conceptions of justice there might be agent-neutralreasons of justice to aid the needy, even if from an agent-relative perspective one would not be acting unjustly if one failed to do so. Section 5 contests Narveson’s portrayal of egalitarianism as concerned about inequality of wealth, per se, as insensitive to prior wrongs, and as holding that the worse-off have a right to be made better off at the expense of the well-off. In addition, it rejects Narveson’s contention that egalitarians violate impartiality, and aim to impose their personal tastes on others. Section 6 challenges a fundamental assumption underlying Narveson’s doctrine of mutual advantage. In addition, it denies that egalitarians are irrational merely because equality can conflict with the pareto principle. More generally, by appealing to impersonal ideals, it challenges the widely held view that the pareto principle is a condition of rationality. Section 7 argues that Narveson’s meta-ethical assumptions are controversial, internally inconsistent, in tension with his normative views, and ultimately a version of skepticism. In addition, it challenges Narveson’s view about the role intuitions play in moral theory. Section 8 clarifies points where Narveson’s discussion of my views may be misleading. Finally, the paper notes the role that moral reasons may play in deliberation and action, but emphasizes the philosophical and theoretical nature of my work. My aim is to determine the moral considerations that are relevant to how people should act regarding the needy. Whether people will actually be moved to so act, for those reasons or otherwise, is another matter.     

Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations

This article has three main parts, Section 2 considers the nature and extent to which individuals who are well-off have a moral obligation to aid the world’s needy. Drawing on a pluralistic approach to morality, which includes consequentialist, virtue-based, and deontological elements, it is contended that most who are well-off should do much more than they do to aid the needy, and that they are open to serious moral criticism if they simply ignore the needy. Part one also focuses on the United States, and illustrates both how incredibly wealthy the U.S. is and some of the spending habits of its citizens; however, its considerations apply to the well-off generally. Section 3 considers whether justice provides reasons for helping the needy. Noting that justice in an extremely complex notion, it discusses numerous considerations relevant to justice’s scope and implications, including an extended Rawlsian conception of justice, an absolute conception, a comparative conception, the distinction between natural and social justice, and various elements of common-sense morality. Section 2 also distinguishes between agent-relative justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we act justly, and agent-neutral justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we have reasons of justicefor acting. Correspondingly, it argues that even if one can ignore the needy without acting unjustly, as philosophers like Robert Nozick and Jan Narveson contend, there may be powerful reasons of justicefor addressing their plight. Section 4 briefly address the responsibilities of international organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). Drawing on Section 2, it is suggested that in addition to standard reasons to act justlytowards needy members of the world’s community, there will be reasons of justicefor such organizations to aid the needy in both present, and future, generations. The article concludes by contending that the well-off in countries like the U.S. have reason to view international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO as their agents, and to seek to insure that they alleviate misfortunes amongst the world’s needy.     

Trans-parency in the workplace: How the experiences of transsexual employees can be improved

Very little research has focused exclusively on the workplace experiences of transsexual employees. Studies that have been done are either qualitative case studies (e.g., Budge, Tebbe, & Howard; 2010; Schilt & Connell, 2007), or aggregate transsexual individuals with lesbian, gay, and bisexual employees (e.g., Irwin, 2002). The current study focuses on this underexamined population and examines general workplace experiences, and both individual and organizational characteristics that influence transsexual employees' job attitudes. Results reveal that organizational supportiveness, transsexual identity centrality, and the degree to which they disclose to individuals outside of work all predict transsexual employees' disclosure behaviors in the workplace. These disclosure behaviors are positively related to job satisfaction and organizational commitment, and negatively related to job anxiety. These relations are mediated by coworker reactions. This research expands knowledge about diverse employee populations and offers both theory and some of the first large-scale empirical data collected on the workplace experiences of transsexual employees.     

A Pilot Study of Psychotherapist Trainees' Alpha-Amylase and Cortisol Levels During Treatment of Recently Suicidal Clients With Borderline Traits

Psychotherapists often experience stress while providing psychotherapy, in particular when working with difficult presentations such as suicidality. As part of a larger study on the treatment of recently suicidal college students with borderline traits, 6 therapists in training collected their own salivary samples for alpha-amylase (AA) and cortisol (C) analyses immediately before and after sessions with 2 selected clients. On average, samples were collected for the same therapist-patient dyad throughout the year-long study to ensure that data reflected therapist responses across stages of treatment. Therapists also completed a working alliance questionnaire and rated perceived session difficulty immediately after each selected session. Contrary to expectations, therapists demonstrated elevated levels of stress as measured by AA and C at presession relative to postsession levels. Greater session difficulty was related to more pronounced declines in AA, whereas a stronger working alliance was linked to more pronounced reductions in C. Results suggest that physiological stress responses while working with recently suicidal clients with borderline traits occur primarily in terms of session anticipatory anxiety, whereas AA and C changes may be affected differently by factors such as session difficulty and working alliance. This is a pilot study, limited by its sample size, but the design, findings, and inclusion of physiological measures present an initial step in an essential line of research.     

Category effects on stimulus estimation: Shifting and skewed frequency distributions

The category adjustment model (CAM) proposes that estimates of inexactly remembered stimuli are adjusted toward the central value of the category of which the stimuli are members. Adjusting estimates toward the average value of all category instances, properly weighted for memory uncertainty, maximizes the average accuracy of estimates. Thus far, the CAM has been tested only with symmetrical category distributions in which the central stimulus value is also the mean. We report two experiments using asymmetric (skewed) distributions in which there is more than one possible central value: one where the frequency distribution shifts over the course of time, and the other where the frequency distribution is skewed. In both cases, we find that people adjust estimates toward the category’s running mean, which is consistent with the CAM but not with alternative explanations for the adjustment of stimuli toward a category’s central value.     

Complicity and the Rwandan Genocide

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 occurred due to widespread complicity. I will argue that complicity can be the basis for legal liability, even for criminal liability, if two conditions are met. First, the person’s actions or inactions must be causally efficacious at least in the sense that had the person not committed these actions or inactions the harm would have been made significantly less likely to occur. Second, the person must know that her actions or inactions risk contributing to a harmful enterprise, and must intend that these actions or inactions risk making this contribution. But it is not part of this analysis that the defendant must intend the harmful result. I explore the boundaries between legal and moral complicity and end with a discussion of how the analysis defended in the paper affects such questions as how many people in Rwanda should be prosecuted for the genocide which occurred due to widespread complicity.     

The association of parenting style and child age with parental limit setting and adolescent MySpace behavior

Parent and teen MySpace user pairs completed online surveys administered in June (N = 266) and September 2006 (N = 341) to assess relationships between parenting styles and limit setting and monitoring of online behaviors, the prevalence of Internet dangers and pre-teen and teen MySpace behaviors. Cross-comparison measures of MySpace usage, parenting style, limit setting/monitoring, MySpace problems, and media perceptions were used. Parenting styles were strongly related to adolescent MySpace experiences, behaviors, and attitudes, with some age differences. Parents with older children were more likely to have Neglectful or Indulgent parenting styles and less likely to set limits on online behavior. The extent of sexual solicitation, pornography, and cyberbullying was relatively low as compared with studies asserting a high incidence of Internet-related problems. Parents' high estimates of online dangers were not matched by their low rates of setting limits and monitoring teens. Theoretical and practical perspectives of the results are offered to enhance social networking experiences for parents and their children.     

Does performance on the standard antisaccade task meet the co-familiality criterion for an endophenotype?

The “co-familiality” criterion for an endophenotype has two requirements: (1) clinically unaffected relatives as a group should show both a shift in mean performance and an increase in variance compared with controls; (2) performance scores should be heritable. Performance on the antisaccade task is one of several candidate endophenotypes for schizophrenia. In this paper we examine whether the various measures of performance on the standard version of the antisaccade task meet the co-familiality criterion for an endophenotype. The three measures of performance—reflexive saccade errors, latency of correct antisaccades, and gain—show a wide range of effect sizes and variance ratios as well as evidence of significant or near significant heterogeneity. The estimated mean effect sizes [Cohen’s d: error rate: 0.34 (SD: 0.29); latency: 0.33 (SD: 0.30); gain: 0.54 (SD: 0.38)] are significantly greater than 0, but the magnitude of the departures from 0 is relatively small, corresponding to modest effect sizes. The width of the 95% confidence intervals for the estimated effect sizes (error rate: 0.2–0.49; latency: 0.17–0.50; gain: 0.23–0.85) and the coefficients of variation in effect sizes (error rate: 85.3%; latency: 90.9%; gain: 68.4%) reflect heterogeneity in effect sizes. The effect sizes for error rate showed statistically significant heterogeneity and those for latency (P = .07) and gain (P = .09) showed a trend toward heterogeneity. These results indicate that the effect sizes are not consistent with a single mean and that the average effect size may be a biased estimate of the magnitude of differences in performance between relatives of schizophrenics and controls. Relatives of schizophrenics show a small but significant increase in variance in error rate, but the confidence interval is broad, perhaps reflecting the heterogeneity in effect size. The variance ratios for latency and gain did not differ in relatives of schizophrenics and controls. Performance, as measured by error rate, is moderately heritable. The data do not provide compelling support for a consistent shift in mean or variance in relatives of schizophrenia patients compared with nonpsychiatric controls, both of which are required for a major gene involved in co-familial transmission. This set of findings suggests that although intra-familial resemblance in antisaccade performance is due in part to genetic factors, it may not be related to a schizophrenia genotype. Based on the current literature, it would be premature to conclude that any of the measures of antisaccade performance unambiguously meets the co-familiality criterion for an endophenotype.