The Importance of the Task in Analyzing Expert Judgment

The accuracy of judgmental forecasts of temperature and precipitation was analyzed. In contrast to the findings of many studies of expert judgment and forecasting, forecasts were highly accurate and forecaster agreement was high. Human forecasters performed better than an operational forecasting model and about the same as a linear regression model. Differences between temperature and precipitation forecasts could be predicted from differences between the tasks. In general, differences between tasks were much greater than differences between forecasters. Task predictability was an excellent indicator of forecast accuracy. The characteristics of the environment for forecasting temperature and precipitation that contribute to accuracy include high-quality information and the availability of "guidance" based on a computer model. It is concluded that an understanding of the properties of the task is essential for understanding the accuracy of expert judgment.     

Psychometric properties of the Chinese Self-Directed Search (1994 edition)

In this study, we (a) examined the measurement equivalence/invariance (ME/I) of the Chinese Self-Directed Search (SDS; 1994 edition) across gender and geographic regions (Mainland China vs. Hong Kong); (b) assessed the construct validity of the Chinese SDS using [Widaman, 1985] and [Widaman, 1992] MTMM framework; and (c) determined whether vocational interests are measured equivalently by Chinese SDS subtests. Confirmatory factor analyses suggested that males and females from Mainland China and Hong Kong interpreted the instrument in conceptually similar manner. Also, the Chinese SDS demonstrated sound construct validity. However, we found that like-named interests were not measured equivalently by the SDS subtests.     

How big is big? Relative and absolute properties in memory

Previous studies of semantic memory have overlooked an important distinction among so-called “property statements”. Statements with relative adjectives (e.g., Flamingos are big) imply a comparison to a standard or reference point associated with an immediate superordinate category (a flamingo is big for a bird), while the truth of statements with absolute adjectives (e.g., Flamingos are pink) is generally independent of such a standard. To examine the psychological consequences of this distinction, we asked subjects in Experiment 1 to verify sentences containing either relative or absolute adjectives embedded in either predicate-adjective (PA) constructions (e.g., A flamingo is big (pink)) or predicate-noun (PN) constructions (e.g. A flamingo is a big (pink) bird), where the predicate noun was the immediate superordinate. Reaction times (RTs) and errors for relative sentences decreased when the superordinate was specified, but remained constant for absolute sentences. These data also suggest that the truth value of relative sentences depends, not just on the superordinate, but also on a more global standard for everyday, human-oriented objects. Experiment 2 extends these results in showing that ratings of the truth of relative sentences are a function of the difference in size between an instance and its superordinate standard (e.g., between the size of a flamingo and that of an average bird) and the difference between the instance and the standard for everyday objects. Experiment 3 replicated these findings using reaction time as the dependent measure.     

Quantification and semantic memory

Two models are considered for how people verify explicitly quantified sentences, such as All fathers are parents and Some fathers are parents. The models share the same second stage, but have different first-stage mechanisms. In the Predicate Intersection Model, suggested by Meyer (1970), the first stage involves a serial, self-terminating search among names of categories that intersect the predicate category. In the Feature Comparison Model (Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974a), the first stage involves evaluating the overall relatedness between the subject and predicate categories by comparing their semantic features. To test the models, three reaction time experiments required subjects to verify statements quantified by Some or All. In the first experiment, the semantic relatedness of categories in false Some-statements was varied. Contrary to predictions of the Predicate Intersection Model, related categories increased reaction time for both true and false Some-statements. While the first experiment revealed that All-statements took longer to verify than comparable Some-statements, the second experiment demonstrated that the All-Some difference can be eliminated by presenting both statement types in the same block of trials, also disconfirming the Predicate Intersection Model. Finally, Experiment III examined the meaning of Some-statements in more detail by having subjects interpret the quantifier Some as “some but not all.” With this interpretation, Some-statements took longer to verify than All-statements. Overall the results support the Feature Comparison Model.     

Examining the Differential Item Functioning of the Rosenberg Self‐Esteem Scale Across Eight Countries1

We examined the differential item functioning (DIF) of Rosenberg's (1965 ) Self‐Esteem Scale (RSES) and compared scores from U.S. participants with those from 7 other countries: Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Kenya, South Africa, Singapore, and Taiwan. Results indicate that DIF was present in all comparisons. Moreover, controlling for latent self‐esteem, participants from individualistic countries had an easier time reporting high self‐esteem on self‐competence‐related items, whereas participants from communal countries had an easier time reporting high self‐esteem on self‐liking items ( Tafarodi & Milne, 2002 ). After adjusting for DIF, we found larger mean self‐esteem differences between the countries than observed scores initially indicated. The suitability of the RSES, and the importance of examining DIF, for cross‐cultural research are discussed.     

Employee Attachment: Implications for Supervisor Trustworthiness and Trust

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of adult attachment on perceptions of trustworthiness and trust in one’s supervisor. Specifically, we cast trustworthiness perceptions as the cognitive mechanisms by which attachment influences trust, which then influenced work outcomes.

Design/methodology/approach

Data on attachment, trustworthiness, and trust were obtained from employees, and performance ratings were provided by the employees’ direct supervisor (n = 353, 157 supervisors).

Findings

Secure and counterdependent attachment had a significant impact on trustworthiness perceptions, and secure attachment was also significantly related to trust, even in the presence of trustworthiness perceptions. Overdependent attachment had no significant influence on trustworthiness or trust perceptions.

Implications

Adult attachment influences one’s regulatory processes in interpersonal relationships and will certainly influence trust in one’s supervisor. Understanding the process by which attachment influences trust in one’s supervisor via trustworthiness perceptions provides a more comprehensive picture of how trust develops. This study provides evidence that adult attachment influences trustworthiness and trust simultaneously, which may be helpful in the selection process but also in managing the interpersonal aspect of the employee–supervisor relationship.

Originality/value

Though trust has been linked to attachment in the literature, no research has examined adult attachment and its influence on trustworthiness perceptions. Our paper provides an examination of attachment and its role in a comprehensive model of interpersonal trust. In addition, we examine attachments influence on trustworthiness and trust beyond the influence of propensity to trust, a commonly studied dispositional variable in the trust literature.

     

Children's Understanding of the Natural Numbers’ Structure

When young children attempt to locate numbers along a number line, they show logarithmic (or other compressive) placement. For example, the distance between “5” and “10” is larger than the distance between “75” and “80.” This has often been explained by assuming that children have a logarithmically scaled mental representation of number (e.g., Berteletti, Lucangeli, Piazza, Dehaene, & Zorzi, 2010 ; Siegler & Opfer, 2003 ). However, several investigators have questioned this argument (e.g., Barth & Paladino, 2011 ; Cantlon, Cordes, Libertus, & Brannon, 2009 ; Cohen & Blanc‐Goldhammer, 2011 ). We show here that children prefer linear number lines over logarithmic lines when they do not have to deal with the meanings of individual numerals (i.e., number symbols, such as “5” or “80”). In Experiments 1 and 2, when 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds choose between number lines in a forced‐choice task, they prefer linear to logarithmic and exponential displays. However, this preference does not persist when Experiment 3 presents the same lines without reference to numbers, and children simply choose which line they like best. In Experiments 4 and 5, children position beads on a number line to indicate how the integers 1–100 are arranged. The bead placement of 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds is better fit by a linear than by a logarithmic model. We argue that previous results from the number‐line task may depend on strategies specific to the task.     

Do children learn the integers by induction?

According to one theory about how children learn the meaning of the words for the positive integers, they first learn that "one," "two," and "three" stand for appropriately sized sets. They then conclude by inductive inference that the next numeral in the count sequence denotes the size of sets containing one more object than the size denoted by the preceding numeral. We have previously argued, however, that the conclusion of this Induction does not distinguish the standard meaning of the integers from nonstandard meanings in which, for example, "ten" could mean set sizes of 10, 20, 30,... elements. Margolis and Laurence [Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2008). How to learn the natural numbers: Inductive inference and the acquisition of number concepts. Cognition, 106, 924-939] believe that our argument depends on attributing to children "radically indeterminate" concepts. We show, first, that our conclusion is compatible with perfectly determinate meanings for "one" through "three." Second, although the inductive inference is indeed indeterminate - which is why it is consistent with nonstandard meanings - making it determinate presupposes the constraints that the inference is supposed to produce.