The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes

Evidence from four studies demonstrates that social observers tend to perceive a “false consensus” with respect to the relative commonness of their own responses. A related bias was shown to exist in the observers' social inferences. Thus, raters estimated particular responses to be relatively common and relatively unrevealing concerning the actors' distinguishing personal dispositions when the responses in question were similar to the raters' own responses; responses differing from those of the rater, by contrast, were perceived to be relatively uncommon and revealing of the actor. These results were obtained both in questionnaire studies presenting subjects with hypothetical situations and choices and in authentic conflict situations. The implications of these findings for our understanding of social perception phenomena and for our analysis of the divergent perceptions of actors and observers are discussed. Finally, cognitive and perceptual mechanisms are proposed which might account for distortions in perceived consensus and for corresponding biases in social inference and attributional processes.     

Laterality differences and practice effects under central backward masking conditions

Two experiments were conducted to examine laterality differences and practice effects under various central backward masking conditions. Critical stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was determined for subjects on 3 consecutive days using single letters as target stimuli (TS) and a pattern masking stimulus (MS). There was a right visual field (RVF) advantage on Day 1 but no difference between the visual fields on following days. The decline in the RVF advantage appeared to be dependent upon prior experience with laterally located letters, to be independent of initial experience with a particular set of letters, and to be more pronounced for females than for males. In addition, large improvements in performance were found, particularly between the first and second testing sessions. These practice effects were discussed in terms of the possible development of strategies for enhancing TS features or attenuating MS features.     

A view of the background of Freudian theory.

A major concern of nineteenth century scientists was to delineate the objective units or entities with which science deals. While some philosophers of science abandoned the search as futile and tried to redefine science, investigators in the biological sciences and the sciences of man attempted to discover new entities upon which to base their disciplines. A new understanding of hypnotism gave Freud the opportunity to isolate objective entities within the mind and to found a psychology on that basis.     

Effects of expectancies of different reward magnitudes in transfer from noncontingent pairings to instrumental performance

In two experiments, rats received noncontingent pairings of two stimuli with food reward, one paired with small reward and the other with large reward, and received bar press training with large reward or with small reward. When the noncontingent stimuli (NS) were presented for test during subsequent rewarded bar pressing and during early extinction of bar pressing, responding for each group was faster in the presence of the NS which was paired with the same reward magnitude that group received in bar press training than to the NS which had been paired with a different reward magnitude. As extinction progressed, all groups responded more slowly in the presence of the NS which had been paired with the large reward than in the presence of the NS which had been paired with small reward. These results were interpreted as indicating that responding in the presence of an NS depends on: (i) whether the reward expectancy elicited by the NS has been conditioned to the instrumental response, and (ii) the relationship between the reward expected in the presence of the NS and that received in test.