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Jennifer Lackey 《Philosophical Issues》2021,31(1):188-209
In this paper, I offer three different arguments against the view that knowledge is the epistemic norm governing criminal convictions in the Anglo-American system. The first two show that neither the truth of a juror's verdict nor the juror's belief in the defendant's guilt is necessary for voting to convict in an epistemically permissible way. Both arguments challenge the necessity dimension of the knowledge norm. I then show—by drawing on evidence that is admissible through exclusionary rules—that knowledge is also not sufficient for epistemically proper conviction. A central thesis operative in all of these arguments is that the sort of ideal epistemology underwriting the knowledge norm of conviction should be rejected and replaced with a non-ideal approach. I then defend an alternative, justificationist norm of criminal conviction that not only avoids the problems afflicting the knowledge account, but also takes seriously the important role that narratives play in criminal courts. 相似文献
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Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Jennifer Lackey 《The Philosophical quarterly》1999,49(197):471-490
We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial knowledge. The stronger thesis is that each speaker in a chain of testimonial transmission must know that p in order to pass this knowledge to a hearer. The weaker thesis is that at least the first speaker must know that p in order for any hearer in the chain to come to know that p via testimony. I argue that both theses are false, and hence testimony, unlike memory, can be a generative source of knowledge. 相似文献
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Jennifer Lackey 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):27-42
A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable
to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses
have been offered to my argument and I here consider each of these objections in turn. I show that none succeeds in undermining
my argument and, thus, my original conclusion stands—the Credit View of Knowledge is false.
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Jennifer LackeyEmail: |
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Douglas Lackey 《The Philosophical forum》2003,34(3-4):391-400
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