Cognitive-emotional dysfunction among noisy minds: predictions from individual differences in reaction time variability

Mental noise can be defined as less reliable information processing. Individuals with high levels of mental noise are thought to be disadvantaged in cognitive, emotional, and behavioural realms. The present five studies (total N=298) investigated such potential disadvantages among normally functioning college undergraduates. Mental noise was operationalised in terms of the reaction time coefficient of variation (RTCV), a measure of RT variability that corrects for average levels of mental speed. Individuals with higher RTCV exhibited less effective cognitive control (Studies 1 and 5), less controlled behaviour (Study 2), and were more prone to negative emotional experiences (Study 3) and depressive symptoms (Study 4). Study 5 extended these results and found that individuals higher (versus lower) in RTCV were more adversely affected by their attentional lapses in daily life. Results converge on the idea that mental noise is an important individual difference dimension with multiple adverse correlates and consequences.     

Routine cognitive errors: a trait-like predictor of individual differences in anxiety and distress

Five studies (N=361) sought to model a class of errors--namely, those in routine tasks--that several literatures have suggested may predispose individuals to higher levels of emotional distress. Individual differences in error frequency were assessed in choice reaction-time tasks of a routine cognitive type. In Study 1, it was found that tendencies toward error in such tasks exhibit trait-like stability over time. In Study 3, it was found that tendencies toward error exhibit trait-like consistency across different tasks. Higher error frequency, in turn, predicted higher levels of negative affect, general distress symptoms, displayed levels of negative emotion during an interview, and momentary experiences of negative emotion in daily life (Studies 2-5). In all cases, such predictive relations remained significant with individual differences in neuroticism controlled. The results thus converge on the idea that error frequency in simple cognitive tasks is a significant and consequential predictor of emotional distress in everyday life. The results are novel, but discussed within the context of the wider literatures that informed them.     

Agency affects adults', but not children's, guessing preferences in a game of chance

Adults and children have recently been shown to prefer guessing the outcome of a die roll after the die has been rolled (but remained out of sight) rather than before it has been rolled. This result is contrary to the predictions of the competence hypothesis (Heath & Tversky, 1991 ), which proposes that people are sensitive to the degree of their relative ignorance and therefore prefer to guess about an outcome it is impossible to know, rather than one that they could know, but do not. We investigated the potential role of agency in guessing preferences about a novel game of chance. When the experimenter controlled the outcome, we replicated the finding that adults and 5- to 6-year-old children preferred to make their guess after the outcome had been determined. For adults only, this preference reversed when they exerted control over the outcome about which they were guessing. The adult data appear best explained by a modified version of the competence hypothesis that highlights the notion of control or responsibility. It is proposed that potential attributions of blame are related to the guesser's role in determining the outcome. The child data were consistent with an imagination-based account of guessing preferences.     

Sweet taste preferences and experiences predict prosocial inferences, personalities, and behaviors

It is striking that prosocial people are considered "sweet" (e.g., "she's a sweetie") because they are unlikely to differentially taste this way. These metaphors aid communication, but theories of conceptual metaphor and embodiment led us to hypothesize that they can be used to derive novel insights about personality processes. Five studies converged on this idea. Study 1 revealed that people believed strangers who liked sweet foods (e.g., candy) were also higher in agreeableness. Studies 2 and 3 showed that individual differences in the preference for sweet foods predicted prosocial personalities, prosocial intentions, and prosocial behaviors. Studies 4 and 5 used experimental designs and showed that momentarily savoring a sweet food (vs. a nonsweet food or no food) increased participants' self-reports of agreeableness and helping behavior. The results reveal that an embodied metaphor approach provides a complementary but unique perspective to traditional trait views of personality.     

Indirect object recognition: evidence for associative processes in recognition memory

Rats' exploration of stimulus P (e.g., a domestic object) is reduced following either its direct exposure or its indirect exposure and is taken to indicate recognition memory. Procedures for demonstrating indirect object recognition involve an initial presentation of object P with stimulus X (and of an object Q with stimulus Y). On test, stimulus X is presented with objects P and Q and rats' exploration of Q exceeds their exploration of P. One interpretation here is that the presentation of stimulus X on test associatively activates the memory of object P, which diminishes exploration of P relative to Q. It is possible, instead, that performance is simply the result of a novel pattern of stimulation generated by the unfamiliar combination of X and Q. The authors modified this procedure to reduce the likelihood of such a process. Their procedure involved first the presentation of PX and QY before the presentation of stimulus X alone. During the test that followed, objects P and Q were presented but stimulus X was removed. The authors found that exploration of Q remained greater than that of P despite these modifications and discuss some theoretical implications of indirect, associative processes in recognition memory.     

When aggressive individuals see the world more accurately: the case of perceptual sensitivity to subtle facial expressions of anger

Previous research has suggested that aggressive individuals exhibit a bias to perceive nonangry expressions as angry. Another line of thinking, however, posits that aggression is a learned response to hostile environments and should be linked to social-cognitive skills suited to such environments. If so, aggressive individuals may exhibit greater perceptual sensitivity to subtle facial cues of anger. Three studies were conducted to test this proposal. In them, participants' ability to discriminate between subtly different intensities of facial anger was tested. Aggressive participants generally displayed greater perceptual sensitivity to subtle cues of facial anger. This pattern could not be explained in terms of response bias and was specific to angry expressions. The results thus support the idea that aggression is associated with social-cognitive skills rather than bias and ineptitude.     

The regulatory benefits of high levels of affect perception accuracy: A process analysis of reactions to stressors in daily life

Individuals attuned to affective signals from the environment may possess an advantage in the emotion-regulation realm. In two studies (total n = 151), individual differences in affective perception accuracy were assessed in an objective, performance-based manner. Subsequently, the same individuals completed daily diary protocols in which daily stressor levels were reported as well as problematic states shown to be stress-reactive in previous studies. In both studies, individual differences in affect perception accuracy interacted with daily stressor levels to predict the problematic outcomes. Daily stressors precipitated problematic reactions-whether depressive feelings (Study 1) or somatic symptoms (Study 2)-at low levels of affect perception accuracy, but did not do so at high levels of affect perception accuracy. The findings support a regulatory view of such perceptual abilities. Implications for understanding emotion regulation processes, emotional intelligence, and individual differences in reactivity are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Motor control accuracy: a consequential probe of individual differences in emotion regulation

Two studies (total N = 147) sought to model emotion-regulation processes in cognitive-motoric terms. Hostile or nonhostile thoughts were primed and, immediately following, individuals held a joystick as accurately as possible on a presented visual target. Study 1 revealed that the activation of hostile thoughts impaired motor control at low levels of agreeableness but facilitated motor control at high levels of agreeableness, consistent with emotion-regulation views of this trait. Study 2 did not assess the trait of agreeableness but rather sought to determine whether better motor control following activated hostile thoughts would predict lesser reactivity to stressors in an experience-sampling protocol. It did, and relevant results are reported for daily anger, negative affect, and positive affect. In addition, and consistent with the agreeableness findings of Study 1, better motor control that follows hostile thoughts predicted greater empathy on high-stress days. Motor control probes of the present type thus appear consequential in understanding emotion-regulation processes and successes in emotion regulation.     

Stopping dead in one’s tracks: Motor inhibition following incidental evaluations

Motivational theories of affect contend that negative stimuli should slow motor behavior. However, this claim has been supported mainly by animal research. The current investigation establishes, perhaps for the first time, that incidental negative primes slow subsequent motor behavior among humans. In addition to examining choice reaction time (Studies 1 and 2), we introduce a method for examining the speed of continuous motor behavior (Study 3). In all studies, we found that behavior was slowed following, or in the context of, negative stimuli. It is concluded that, in certain situations, the mere presence of negative stimuli inhibits the speed of subsequent motor behavior.