Modularity of object and place memory in children

The present study investigated modularity of object and place memory in children with the reaction time/accuracy paradigm. The memory task was presented in two spatial arrays, a frame with landmarks and a grid. Modularity was tested using perceptual size judgment (what-interference) and movement direction judgment (where-interference). Latencies of object memory were increased by same-system what-interference in all age groups indicating limited capacity of an object memory system. With respect to accuracy of object and place memory, only young children's performance was susceptible to same-system interference of perceptual judgment.     

A neuro-cognitive visual system for object recognition based on testing of interactive attentional top-down hypotheses

We propose an extension of a systemic model for object recognition formulated by Rybak et al (1998 Vision Research 38 2387-2400) which is based on the functional organisation of the visual systems in primate brains. In contrast to the learning and recognition scheme of Rybak et al we do not assume a behavioural paradigm, i.e. a visuomotor programmed scanpath that determines the sequence of foveation on the different parts of the object. As in the basis architecture of Rybak et al, the system modules are separated into 'what'-like subsystems corresponding to the ventral occipito-inferotemporal visual path and 'where'-like complexes analogous to the dorsal occipito-parietal visual path. The 'what' system analyses local features in the actual foveation as in Rybak et al. But, in our case, the 'where' memory, instead of programming a behavioural scanpath, scores the spatial relationship between successive fixation and the spatial relationship between the associated main edges. The recognition is based on the identification of parts and their spatial relationship. This gives the learning and recognition mechanisms more flexibility in the sense that, for recognising an object, several different fixation sequences may be accepted.     

Development of object permanence in food-storing magpies (Pica pica)

The development of object permanence was investigated in black-billed magpies (Pica pica), a food-storing passerine bird. The authors tested the hypothesis that food-storing development should be correlated with object-permanence development and that specific stages of object permanence should be achieved before magpies become independent. As predicted, Piagetian Stages 4 and 5 were reached before independence was achieved, and the ability to represent a fully hidden object (Piagetian Stage 4) emerged by the age when magpies begin to retrieve food. Contrary to psittacine birds and humans, but as in dogs and cats, no "A-not-B error" occurred. Although magpies also mastered 5 of 6 invisible displacement tasks, evidence of Piagetian Stage 6 competence was ambiguous.     

Neubewertung kognitiver Leistungen im Lichte der F?higkeiten einzelliger Lebewesen

A closer look at unicellular organisms and their behavior as autonomous and social beings sheds new light on the nature of cognition. This allows, at the same time, a search for minimal conditions that help to identify the yet unknown appearance of cognition during evolution. Positive results might also serve as principles for the construction of intelligent artefacts as striven for in artificial intelligence and cognitive robotics research. Analyzing the abilities of prokaryotes and unicellular eukaryotes and comparing them to the abilities of "higher" organisms, we conclude that common definitions of cognition are not specific enough. The attempt to define cognition by focusing on the coupling between stimulus and response and asserting that (to have cognition) it has to be indirect and modifiable fails, simply because in all organisms every reaction to a stimulus is indirect and modifiable. A definition of cognition based on such a distinction cannot hold unless one is willing to ascribe cognitive capacities also to Escherichia coli bacteria, for instance. Viewing cognition as the sum of abilities necessary for coping with a complex physical and social environment is also highly questionable, i.e. unspecific. We show that functions comparable to the cognitive functions "perception" and "memory" in higher organisms can well be identified in unicellular beings. The "architecture" of the bacterial (prokaryotic) sensorimotor apparatus is also in some structures, but particularly at the functional level, comparable with that of higher organisms and should be, as a consequence, indicative of cognition. Furthermore, we discuss other, somewhat more delimitable, phenomena like detection of identity, counting, adaptation, habituation and learning in ethological categories and compare them to findings from the microorganismic world. In this context, we argue that so-called "true learning" and the appearance of nervous systems are not break-points in the evolution of cognition. The presence of nervous systems means only a huge amplification of the recognition power of individual organisms. The molecular net that realizes the regulation and transduction of signals in unicellular beings is comparable to the processes within a neural net, and a population of unicellular organisms can be viewed as an individual, multicellular net with amplified recognition power. Finally, we show that sophisticated forms of cooperation and competition developed also in populations of unicellular organisms. This seems not to be true for the phenomena imagination (rehearsal) and introspection, also to be seen as stemming from social problem-solving needs. As for these aspects, further research is needed, however, to put them on firm scientific grounds. Zusammenfassung. Eine genaue Betrachtung einzelliger Lebewesen und ihres Verhaltens als autonome und soziale Wesen wirft neues Licht auf die Natur von Kognition. Das erlaubt gleichzeitig eine Suche nach minimalen Bedingungen, die bei der Bestimmung des Erscheinens von Kognition in der Evolution helfen. Positive Ergebnisse könnten auch als Prinzipien für die Konstruktion intelligenter Artefakte dienen, wie sie in der Künstlichen Intelligenz und der kognitiven Robotikforschung angestrebt werden. Ein Vergleich der Fähigkeiten von Einzellern mit denen von "höheren" Organismen führt uns zu dem Schluß, daß gängige Definitionen von Kognition nicht spezifisch genug sind. Der Versuch, Kognition über die Indirektheit und Modifizierbarkeit der Kopplung zwischen Reiz und Reaktion zu definieren, scheitert, weil in allen Organismen Reiz-Reaktionsverbindungen indirekt und modifizierbar sind. Eine solche Definition ist nicht haltbar, es sei denn, man ist bereit, z.B. auch Escherichia coli-Bakterien kognitive Eigenschaften zuzubilligen. Die Definition von Kognition als Summe der Eigenschaften, die notwendig sind, um in einer komplexen physikalischen und sozialen Umgebung zu bestehen, ist ebenfalls hinterfragbar und unspezifisch. Wir zeigen, daß Leistungen, die mit den Kognitionsleistungen "Wahrnehmung" und "Gedächtnis" in höheren Organismen vergleichbar sind, in Einzellern nachweisbar sind. Die sensomotorische Komplexität von Einzellern ist auch in vieler Hinsicht strukturell, vor allem aber funktionell vergleichbar mit derjenigen höherer Organismen und kann deshalb als ein Hinweis auf Kognition gewertet werden. Darüber hinaus diskutieren wir andere, abgrenzbare Phänomene, wie Erfassung von Identität, Zählen, Adaptation, Habituation und Lernen, aus der Sicht der Verhaltensforschung und vergleichen sie mit Befunden aus der Welt der Mikroorganismen. In diesem Zusammenhang bestreiten wir, daß sogenanntes "echtes Lernen" und das Erscheinen von Nervensystemen Bruchstellen in der Evolution von Kognition sind. Die Anwesenheit von Nervensystemen bedeutet nur den Übergang von Systemen mit einem relativ begrenzten (Erkennungs-) Potential zu solchen mit einem riesigen Potential. Das molekulare Netz, das die Regulation und Transduktion von Signalen in Einzellern realisiert, ist vergleichbar mit den Prozessen innerhalb eines Nervennetzes. Eine Population von einzelligen Organismen kann als individuelles, multizelluläres Netz mit erhöhtem Erkennungspotential angesehen werden. Schließlich zeigen wir, daß raffinierte Formen von Kooperations- und Konkurrenzverhalten auch in Einzellerpopulationen vorhanden sind. Eine ähnliche Aussage scheint nicht für Phänomene wie Imagination (Probehandeln) und Introspektion möglich zu sein, die auch im Zusammenhang mit der Bewältigung sozialer Probleme zu sehen sind. Eine genaue naturwissenschaftliche Erfassung solcher Aspekte, die erst einen Vergleich zwischen Mehrzellern und Einzellern erlauben würde, ist allerdings noch zu leisten.     

Grasping visual illusions: no evidence for a dissociation between perception and action

Neuropsychological studies prompted the theory that the primate visual system might be organized into two parallel pathways, one for conscious perception and one for guiding action. Supporting evidence in healthy subjects seemed to come from a dissociation in visual illusions: In previous studies, the Ebbinghaus (or Titchener) illusion deceived perceptual judgments of size, but only marginally influenced the size estimates used in grasping. Contrary to those results, the findings from the present study show that there is no difference in the sizes of the perceptual and grasp illusions if the perceptual and grasping tasks are appropriately matched. We show that the differences found previously can be accounted for by a hitherto unknown, nonadditive effect in the illusion. We conclude that the illusion does not provide evidence for the existence of two distinct pathways for perception and action in the visual system.     

The role of inhibition in the regulation of sequential action

We investigated the regulation of sequential action using a new paradigm. Participants learned a sequence of seven stimulus categories and then monitored for them during successive displays. All displays were instances of these categories, presented in pseudorandom order. On each trial, participants monitored for an instance of Category 1, pressed a key on a computer keyboard, then monitored for an instance of Category 2, pressed a key on the keyboard, and so on for all seven categories. Thus, a perfect trial contained exactly seven responses. Intrusion errors were classified as a function of ordinal distance from the current serial position ( n ). Fewer intrusion errors were made at near serial positions than at far ones, suggesting a gradient of lateral inhibition. In addition, more intrusions were made on n + 1 categories than n − 1 categories, suggesting greater availability of intended than completed goals. In accord with current models of sequential action, the results indicate lateral and self-inhibition as important mechanisms in regulation of sequential action.     

Dimensionen der Gefühle

Zusammenfassung Es war das Ziel der Untersuchung, ein System der Gefühlsqualitäten zu finden, das im Unterschied zu früheren Klassifikationsversuchen nicht auf der Anwendung formaler Kategorien oder anderer, gewissermaßen von außen an den Gegenstand herangetragener Gesichtspunkte beruhte, sondern aus den Erlebnisinhalten selbst hervorging.Nach verschiedenen Methoden wurden drei Versuche unternommen, in denen die Versuchspersonen auf Grund der Vergegenwärtigung des Erlebnisses Urteile über die Ähnlichkeit und über bestimmte Eigenschaften von Gefühlsqualitäten abzugeben hatten.Aus den Ergebnissen aller drei Versuche konnten Ordnungssysteme der verwendeten Gefühlsqualitäten gebildet werden. Trotz der Verschiedenheit der angewendeten Methoden besteht zwischen den drei Systemen in den vergleichbaren Punkten eine nahezu vollkommene Übereinstimmung.Die Gesamtheit der Gefühlsqualitäten ordnet sich nach dem Resultat dieser Untersuchung in drei Dimensionen an, denen die Bezeichnungen Angenehm—Unangenehm, Unterwerfung—Überhebung und Grad der Motivierung gegeben wurden.Nach einigen Betrachtungen über die der Beurteilung von Gefühlsqualitäten zugrunde liegenden subjektiven Prozesse werden methodische Folgerungen gezogen, die besagen, daß die Voraussetzungen für die Untersuchung der Gefühle weit günstiger sind, als dies nach der vorherrschenden Meinung der Fall ist. Schließlich wird die Anwendungsmöglichkeit der Resultate auf einige Fragestellungen der Gefühlsforschung an Hand von Beispielen erörtert.     

Intergenerational transmission of marital quality across the transition to parenthood

One of the most frequently reported changes across the transition to parenthood is a decline in marital quality after the birth of a first baby. Experiences in the family of origin may influence the trajectory of marital quality. Our study aimed to investigate the impact of recollections of family-of-origin marriage on marital quality (self-reports and clinical evaluation) from pregnancy to 1 year after the birth of a first child. A total of 62 first-time parents completed questionnaires (self-reported marital satisfaction) and clinical interviews (clinical evaluation of couples' dialogue quality). Although self-reported marital satisfaction and observed dialogue quality were highly associated, only self-reported marital satisfaction declined from pregnancy to 1 year after birth. This decrease was partly due to very high marital satisfaction during pregnancy. Different trajectories for self-reported marital satisfaction and observed dialogue quality were found for participants with recollections of low-, average-, and high-quality family-of-origin marriage. A structural equation model showed that participants who recollected a negative quality in their parents' relationship reported more negative changes in the quality of their own marriages. There seems to be an intergenerational transmission of marital quality that comes to light when couples are challenged by the birth and rearing of a baby.