Agency and Human Rights

What grounds human rights? How do we determine that something is a human right? James Griffin has persuasively argued that the notion of agency should determine the content of human rights. However, Griffin's agency account faces the question of why agency should be the sole ground for human rights. For example, can Griffin's notion of agency by itself adequately explain such human rights as that against torture? Or, has Griffin offered a plausible explanation as to why one should not broaden the ground for human rights to include other elements of a good life such as freedom from great pain, understanding, deep personal relations, and so on? These concerns have been raised regarding Griffin's agency account, but in his new book, On Human Rights, Griffin has offered new arguments in support of his view that agency is the sole ground for human rights. In this paper, I examine these new arguments, and I argue that Griffin's arguments are ultimately unsuccessful.     

帛书《要》篇"夫子老而好易"章新释

马王堆帛书<要>篇"夫子老而好易"章第十四行中间的缺文当补为"予樂[亓辤也,予何]尤於此乎",第十五行的"校"字当依<论语·泰伯>孔子语读为"绞",第十五行中同的缺文当补为"吾告女(汝)<易>之道:良[筮而善占],此百生(姓)之道[也,非]<易>也",第十六行中间的缺文当补为"[非文王]之自(作<易>,予何[知]亓事纣乎".     

解析道德教育的时代困境

美德可教吗？的疑问，预设了对道德教育功利性的评价标准，但是道德教育对教育对象作用的潜隐性、持久性则意味着对道德教育评价不应是急功近利式的；也不能用确定不变的思路去看待道德教育积极作用。美德是什么？提出了如何选择道德教育内容的问题。一切有助于人格德性形成的东西应当成为道德教育的内容。谁能教？问题，提出了道德教育中的主体能力的问题。道德教育主体的能力应当包括信念和行动的能力。怎么教？的问题，不仅提出道德教育灵活性的原则，并且破除以先进或传统作为选择教育方法的标准，只以教育有益性为原则。