PAIRED COMPARISON EVALUATIONS OF MANAGERIAL EFFECTIVENESS BY PEERS AND SUPERVISORS

Paired comparison evaluations were solicited for a relatively small group ( N = 20) of savings and loan association branch managers. Peer evaluations were obtained from 16 of these managers; supervisory evaluations were obtained from 4 officers. Inter-judge agreement (both within and between groups) was high. Further, this agreement extended beyond the derived paired comparison score to certain independently measured psychological characteristics of the persons evaluated. The peer-generated evaluations assisted the officers in making acceptable promotional decisions. In addition, discussion by the 4 officers of differences between their independently made evaluations made explicit a previously covert but potentially important difference in perspective about the determinants of managerial effectiveness. Ratings assigned by one officer reflected his implicitly heavy weight to human relations skill as a component of branch manager effectiveness; those assigned by the other 3 tended to give more weight to knowledge about financial matters related to the savings and loan industry.     

Accidental Atheists? Agent‐Based Explanations for the Persistence of Religious Regionalism

This article outlines a new approach to the study of religious commitment. Starting with a variant on Schelling's classic model of mobility and segregation, we develop a multi-agent religion simulation (MARS) that incorporates insights from theories of religious choice, social influence, and preference formation. Compared to standard statistical methods, MARS does a better job of linking individual choices and collective outcomes. In particular, it demonstrates that stable regional patterns require a balanced combination of attachment to personal identity and adaptation to the social environment.     

Leibniz on Conatus, Causation, and Freedom

Abstract: In this paper, I address the topic of free will in Leibniz with particular attention to Leibniz's concept of volition, and its analogue in his physics – his concept of force. I argue against recent commentators that Leibniz was a causal determinist, and thus a compatibilist, and I suggest that logical consistency required him to adopt compatibilism given some of the concepts at work in his physics. I conclude by pointing out that the pressures to adopt causal determinism in Leibniz's system are perhaps more severe than those facing the contemporary libertarian, pressures that stem from empirical considerations about the behavior of bodies in the physical world, and the “well‐founding” of those bodies in simple substances.