AN EVALUATION OF GENERIC TEAMWORK SKILLS TRAINING WITH ACTION TEAMS: EFFECTS ON COGNITIVE AND SKILL-BASED OUTCOMES

This study evaluated the utility of generic teamwork skills training for enhancing the effectiveness of action teams. Results from 65 4-person action teams working on an interdependent command and control simulator revealed that generic teamwork skills training had a significant and positive impact on both cognitive and skill-based outcomes. Trained team members evidenced higher levels of declarative knowledge regarding teamwork competencies and demonstrated greater proficiency in the areas of planning and task coordination, collaborative problem-solving, and communication. Furthermore, results indicated that cognitive and skill based outcomes were interrelated. Team members' declarative knowledge regarding teamwork competencies positively affected planning and task coordination, collaborative problem solving, and communication skills. However, we found that the effects of declarative knowledge differed across team members depending on their roles and responsibilities. The team benefited the most from the knowledge held by the team member who occupied the most critical position in the workflow. Implications of these findings for future research and practice are discussed.     

Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments

In the moral realm, our deontic judgments are usually (always?) binary. An act (or omission) is either morally forbidden or morally permissible. ¹ 1 I realize that I appear to be omitting the category of ‘morally required’ here. But that category does not affect my analysis in part because we can always substitute for a morally required act a morally forbidden omission to act. The question would then be whether the omission to act is permissible or forbidden. In any event, my focus is on deontic boundaries, and it is immaterial how many there are. Thus, I shall continue to speak of acts being morally forbidden or permissible.
Yet the determination of an act's deontic status frequently turns on the existence of properties that are matters of degree. In what follows I shall give several examples of binary moral judgments that turn on scalar properties, and I shall claim that these examples should puzzle us. How can the existence of a property to a specific degree demarcate a boundary between an act's being morally forbidden and its not being morally forbidden? Why aren't our moral judgments of acts scalar in the way that the properties on which those judgments are based are scalar, so that acts, like states of affairs, can be morally better or worse rather than right or wrong? I conceive of this inquiry as operating primarily within the realm of normative theory. Presumably it will give aid and comfort to consequentialists, who have no trouble mapping their binary categories onto scalar properties. For example, a straightforward act utilitarian, for whom one act out of all possible acts is morally required (and hence permissible) and all others morally forbidden, can, in theory at least, provide an answer to every one of the puzzles I raise. And, in theory, so can all other types of act and rule consequentialists. They will find nothing of interest here beyond embarrassment for their deontological adversaries. The deontologists, however, must meet the challenges of these puzzles. And for them, the puzzles may raise not just normative questions, but questions of moral epistemology and moral ontology. Just how do we know that the act consequentialist's way of, say, trading off lives against lives is wrong? For example, do we merely intuit that taking one innocent, uninvolved person's life to save two others is wrong? Can our method of reflective equilibrium work if we have no theory by which to rationalize our intuitions? And what things in the world make it true, if it is true, that one may not make the act consequentialist's tradeoff? I do not provide any answers to these questions any more than I provide answers to the normative ones. But they surely lurk in the background.     

The Professionalization of Faculty at Religious Colleges and Universities

As faculty become defined more by the professional norms of their discipline, the potential for conflict with the faith-based norms of religious colleges and universities should increase. Survey responses from over 1,900 faculty at six religious colleges and universities show that most faculty members support including religious criteria in hiring, contrary to professional, disciplinary norms, but most faculty reject religious constraints on academic freedom, conforming to professional norms. These seemingly conflicting positions are reconciled by a high level of commitment to the integration of faith and learning.