A Model for Job Development Services

A model for the skill of job development is presented. The model should be useful to employment, rehabilitation, and career counselors.     

Caring for the Carers: A Note on Counseling for the Wider Impact of AIDS

AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Symdrome) affects the psychological functioning not only of people with AIDS but also of those who care for them. In this article we describe the provision of counseling for voluntary curers, using personal construct counseling. Some of the problems in providing such counseling are considered.     

Mentoring and Networking for Helping Professionals

Awareness of mentoring and networking assists helping professionals personally and as they work with and guide their students and clients toward their life and career goals.     

Program Evaluation and Counseling: Yesterday,Today, and Tomorrow

Spawned by intensified demands for accountability, expanding counselor roles and functions, and increased counselor attention both in the counseling literature and in counseling practice, program evaluation has emerged as a vital aspect of counselor functioning in recent years. This article highlights the differences between program evaluation and research, a long-standing source of confusion; presents major issues in the practice of counseling program evaluation; and identifies current trends in program evaluation.     

Career Counseling with the Handicapped—The Final Stage: Some Unique Approaches

This article examines the roles of job development and placement within the career counseling process and explores four unique approaches now used with handicapped individuals. Counselors of the handicapped must do both decision making and job placement because of the added difficulty of employer resistance.     

Male Friendship and Intimacy

Our primary focus is the concept of intimacy, especially in the context of adult American male relationships. We begin with an examination of comradeship, a nonintimate form of friendship, then develop an account of the nature and value of intimacy in friendship. We follow this with discussions of obstacles to intimacy and of Aristotle's views. In the final section, we discuss the process of men attaining intimacy.     

Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments

In the moral realm, our deontic judgments are usually (always?) binary. An act (or omission) is either morally forbidden or morally permissible. ¹ 1 I realize that I appear to be omitting the category of ‘morally required’ here. But that category does not affect my analysis in part because we can always substitute for a morally required act a morally forbidden omission to act. The question would then be whether the omission to act is permissible or forbidden. In any event, my focus is on deontic boundaries, and it is immaterial how many there are. Thus, I shall continue to speak of acts being morally forbidden or permissible.
Yet the determination of an act's deontic status frequently turns on the existence of properties that are matters of degree. In what follows I shall give several examples of binary moral judgments that turn on scalar properties, and I shall claim that these examples should puzzle us. How can the existence of a property to a specific degree demarcate a boundary between an act's being morally forbidden and its not being morally forbidden? Why aren't our moral judgments of acts scalar in the way that the properties on which those judgments are based are scalar, so that acts, like states of affairs, can be morally better or worse rather than right or wrong? I conceive of this inquiry as operating primarily within the realm of normative theory. Presumably it will give aid and comfort to consequentialists, who have no trouble mapping their binary categories onto scalar properties. For example, a straightforward act utilitarian, for whom one act out of all possible acts is morally required (and hence permissible) and all others morally forbidden, can, in theory at least, provide an answer to every one of the puzzles I raise. And, in theory, so can all other types of act and rule consequentialists. They will find nothing of interest here beyond embarrassment for their deontological adversaries. The deontologists, however, must meet the challenges of these puzzles. And for them, the puzzles may raise not just normative questions, but questions of moral epistemology and moral ontology. Just how do we know that the act consequentialist's way of, say, trading off lives against lives is wrong? For example, do we merely intuit that taking one innocent, uninvolved person's life to save two others is wrong? Can our method of reflective equilibrium work if we have no theory by which to rationalize our intuitions? And what things in the world make it true, if it is true, that one may not make the act consequentialist's tradeoff? I do not provide any answers to these questions any more than I provide answers to the normative ones. But they surely lurk in the background.