Interracial contexts debilitate same-race face recognition

Social cognitive research has documented the integral role of social categories (e.g., race) in face processing. Activating a social category can lead perception and memory of faces to be biased in a category-consistent direction. The current research extends this past work, to test the hypothesis that making a social category salient can reduce subsequent face recognition. In two experiments, the current research finds that the typically superior same-race recognition is debilitated by making the same-race category salient. We find that when White-Americans self-categorize as ‘White,’ subsequent perceptual and memorial biases reduce the typically strong same-race recognition.     

Storage and non-storage components of working memory predicting reasoning: A simultaneous examination of a wide range of ability factors

The current study examined basic cognitive abilities that are related to or included in the concept of working memory (WM): different WM components, three executive functions, simple short-term storage (STM), and sustained attention. Tasks were selected from well-established models and balanced in terms of content. The predictive power of storage and non-storage components of WM was examined. The same analyses were conducted with mental speed as an additional predictor of reasoning. Finally, we investigated whether the identified predictors of reasoning remain relevant when a general factor is considered in the analysis. The analyses revealed that short-term memory accounted for the relationship between complex span measures of WM and reasoning but not for the relationship between coordination and reasoning. These findings remained stable in the context of a mental speed and a general factor. The mental speed factor did not add an incremental contribution to the prediction of reasoning above and beyond short-term memory and coordination. The general factor was mainly built by mental speed tasks and acted as an additional predictor of reasoning besides STM and coordination. Thus, we concluded that reasoning ability can be explained by coordination, STM, and mental speed.     

Implicit and explicit attitudes respond differently to increasing amounts of counterattitudinal information

This research examined the processes by which explicit and implicit attitudes changed to systematically differing levels of counterattitudinal (CA) information. Explicit attitudes changed quickly in response to relatively small amounts of CA information, reflecting rule‐based reasoning. On the other hand, implicit attitudes changed more slowly in the face of CA information, reflecting the progressive accretion of evaluation‐attitude object pairings. Thus, explicit attitudes were extremely malleable and changed quickly when CA information was presented, however, implicit attitudes revealed a slow, linear change trajectory resulting from the on‐going accrual of information about the attitude object. Implications for the processes underlying implicit and explicit attitudes are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating the predictive validity of a single stimulus engagement preference assessment.

Most preference assessments require individuals to choose among two or more stimuli. More recently, the duration of engagement with items has been used as an index of preference. In the current study, the predictive validity of a single stimulus engagement (SSE) preference assessment was evaluated with 4 individuals. Stimuli were presented singly for a brief period while engagement with that stimulus was recorded. Although SSE preference rankings closely matched paired stimulus preference assessment rankings for only 2 of the 4 participants, relative preference rankings based on duration of engagement predicted relative reinforcer effectiveness for all participants in a subsequent concurrent‐schedule reinforcer assessment. The SSE procedure took less time to administer than the paired stimulus procedure but produced less stable preference rankings across administrations. The SSE procedure may be appropriate for individuals who have difficulty selecting one stimulus from among two or more stimuli, and it may be well suited for evaluating activities that are difficult to present in a paired stimulus format.     

Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism

This paper argues that reliabilism can plausibly live without epistemic consequentialism, either as part of a non-consequentialist normative theory or as a non-normative account of knowledge on a par with certain accounts of the metaphysics of perception and action. It argues moreover that reliabilism should not be defended as a consequentialist theory. Its most plausible versions are not aptly dubbed ‘consequentialist’ in any sense that genuinely parallels the dominant sense in ethics. Indeed, there is no strong reason to believe reliabilism was ever seriously intended as a form of epistemic consequentialism. At the heart of its original motivation was a concern about the necessity of non-accidentality for knowledge, a concern quite at home in a non-consequentialist or non-normative setting. Reliabilism's connection to epistemic consequentialism was an accretion of the ’80s, and a feature of only one of its formulations in that decade.