Gender and Deviance: A Comparison of College Students in Japan and the United States

Although evidence abounds in American criminology that young males are more prone to deviance than females, relatively little is known about the magnitude of the gender gap in deviance across cultures. Drawing on the literature concerning “risk taking” in power-control theory and on theory and research concerning cultural variability in “uncertainty avoidance,” we offer a rationale for predicting that the gender differences in levels of deviance are less among Japanese youth than Americans. Among Japanese, the level of male deviance should be closer to that of females because “uncertainty avoidance” is a strong component of Japanese culture that affects socialization of both males and females. Analysis of identical survey data from college students in Japan and the United States provides strong support for our argument.     

Childhood diagnoses and later risk for multiple suicide attempts

The relationship between childhood diagnosis, personality psychopathology and suicidal behavior in young adulthood was explored in a sample of 327 suicide ideators, single attempters, and multiple attempters. Of the total sample, 174 received at least one childhood diagnosis; the 153 without a diagnosis provided a comparison group. Results suggest that a childhood history of an anxiety disorder or major depression predispose a person to both later multiple suicide attempts and personality psychopathology. Gender was found to play a significant role, with females being predisposed to multiple attempts in young adulthood but only as a function of childhood anxiety, not major depression. Additionally, childhood anxiety disorders were found to predispose to multiple attempts as a function of personality psychopathology, with distinctly different paths for males and females. Implications are discussed in terms of etiology, prevention, and treatment.     

Can one thing become two?

Philosophical Studies -     

Processes linked to contact changes in adoptive kinship networks

The purpose of this study was to reveal underlying processes in adoptive kinship networks that experienced increases or decreases in levels of openness during the child's adolescent years. Intensive case study analyses were conducted for 8 adoptive kinship networks (each including an adoptive mother, adoptive father, adopted adolescent, and birth mother), half of whom had experienced an increase in openness from indirect (mediated) to direct (fully disclosed) contact and half of whom had ceased indirect contact between Waves 1 and 2 of a longitudinal study. Adoptive mothers tended to be more involved in contact with the birth mother than were adoptive fathers or adopted adolescents. Members of adoptive kinship networks in which a decrease in level of contact took place had incongruent perspectives about who initiated the stop in contact and why the stop took place. Birth mothers were less satisfied with their degree of contact than were adoptive parents. Adults' satisfaction with contact was related to feelings of control over type and amount of interactions and permeability of family boundaries. In all adoptive kinship networks, responsibility for contact had shifted toward the adopted adolescent regardless of whether the adolescent was aware of this change in responsibility.     

Psychic trauma and traumatic object loss

Psychoanalysis began with the concept of psychic trauma, which was subsequently not clearly differentiated from traumatic object loss or from unconscious conflict and fantasy. Psychic trauma is investigated in relation to unconscious conflict, with and without concurrent object loss. The syndromes of PTSD, uncomplicated by object loss, of traumatic bereavement, and of relatively nontraumatic bereavement, though often interwoven and inseparable, are all different. The significance of the loss, sociocultural factors, and group process influence individual responses to trauma and traumatic bereavement. There are specific neurobiological and psychological sequelae of traumatic experience. Clinical applications are noted.     

To imitate or not to imitate? How the brain can do it, that is the question!

In this paper the authors discuss the most prominent views addressing the issue of how we imitate actions. It is argued that the existing theories lay along a continuum, with the direct mapping approach at one end (Butterworth, 1990; Gray, Neisser, Shapiro, & Kouns, 1991) the Active Intermodal Matching approach (Melzoff & Moore, 1997) in the middle, and the goal-directed theory (Bekkering, Wohlsh?ger, & Gattis, 2000) and the dual route theory (Rumiati & Tessari, 2002) at the opposite end. Interestingly the latter views can account for behaviors that cannot be explained by invoking the direct mapping or the Active Intermodal Matching approach.     

Central interference in driving: is there any stopping the psychological refractory period?

ABSTRACT— Participants attempted to perform two tasks concurrently during simulated driving. In the choice task, they responded either manually or vocally to the number of times a visual or auditory stimulus occurred; in the braking task, they depressed a brake pedal in response to the lead car's brake lights. The time delay between the onset of the tasks' stimuli, or stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), was varied. The tasks were differentially affected by the manipulations. Brake reaction times increased as SOA was reduced, showing the psychological refractory period effect, whereas the choice task showed large effects of the stimulus and response modalities but only a small effect of SOA. These results demonstrate that a well-practiced "simple" task such as vehicle braking is subject to dual-task slowing and extend the generality of the central-bottleneck model.     

Selection-for-action in visual search

Grasping an object rather than pointing to it enhances processing of its orientation but not its color. Apparently, visual discrimination is selectively enhanced for a behaviorally relevant feature. In two experiments we investigated the limitations and targets of this bias. Specifically, in Experiment 1 we were interested to find out whether the effect is capacity demanding, therefore we manipulated the set-size of the display. The results indicated a clear cognitive processing capacity requirement, i.e. the magnitude of the effect decreased for a larger set size. Consequently, in Experiment 2, we investigated if the enhancement effect occurs only at the level of behaviorally relevant feature or at a level common to different features. Therefore we manipulated the discriminability of the behaviorally neutral feature (color). Again, results showed that this manipulation influenced the action enhancement of the behaviorally relevant feature. Particularly, the effect of the color manipulation on the action enhancement suggests that the action effect is more likely to bias the competition between different visual features rather than to enhance the processing of the relevant feature. We offer a theoretical account that integrates the action-intention effect within the biased competition model of visual selective attention.     

Are cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia mediated by abnormalities in emotional arousal?

We tested 28 individuals with schizophrenia (SZ) and 16 healthy individuals on a test of logical reasoning and "cognitive gating," defined as the ability to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant information in confirming or disconfirming a given belief. The Logical Reasoning and Cognitive Gating Task tests both processes under neutral and affect-laden conditions. This is done by presenting formally identical constructs using benign and emotionally arousing language. When separated by symptom profiles, we found statistically significant differences for performance and arousal response between patients with delusions, patients with formal thought disorder, and patients with neither delusions nor formal thought disorder, as well as between patients and healthy controls. When analyzed by error type, we found that nearly all errors by delusional patients were caused by overly restrictive information choice, a pattern that may be related to a delusional patient's tendency to "jump to conclusions" on Bayesian probabilistic tasks. This is in contrast to patients with formal thought disorder, whose low performance resulted also from overly extensive information choice. The tendencies towards restriction were exacerbated by arousal, which is consistent with studies on cognition and arousal in healthy individuals. After briefly examining research on emotional arousal and SZ, and the interaction between emotional arousal and restriction of perceptual cues in healthy individuals, we conclude by suggesting a model which accounts for the distinctive cognitive characteristics of delusional patients by their possessing distinct vulnerabilities to emotional arousal. Specifically, these results suggest the possibility that delusional patients process information in a manner that is essentially intact. However, delusional patients may possess an acute vulnerability to emotional arousal that might cause delusional individuals to behave cognitively as if they were healthy individuals under significantly more severe forms of stress.