Groups as epistemic providers: need for closure and the unfolding of group-centrism

Theory and research are presented relating the need for cognitive closure to major facets of group behavior. It is suggested that a high need for closure, whether it is based on members' disposition or the situation, contributes to the emergence of a behavioral syndrome describable as group-centrism--a pattern that includes pressures to opinion uniformity, encouragement of autocratic leadership, in-group favoritism, rejection of deviates, resistance to change, conservatism, and the perpetuation of group norms. These theoretical predictions are borne out by laboratory and field research in diverse settings.     

Forgetting all else: on the antecedents and consequences of goal shielding

Six studies explore the role of goal shielding in self-regulation by examining how the activation of focal goals to which the individual is committed inhibits the accessibility of alternative goals. Consistent evidence was found for such goal shielding, and a number of its moderators were identified: Individuals' level of commitment to the focal goal, their degree of anxiety and depression, their need for cognitive closure, and differences in their goal-related tenacity. Moreover, inhibition of alternative goals was found to be more pronounced when they serve the same overarching purpose as the focal goal, but lessened when the alternative goals facilitate focal goal attainment. Finally, goal shielding was shown to have beneficial consequences for goal pursuit and attainment.     

Assimilative behavior identification can also be resource dependent: the unimodel perspective on personal-attribution phases

Three studies examine the role of situational constraint information on behavior identification. It was found that where the behavior-identification task is relatively easy assimilation of the behavior-identification to situational constraints is independent of cognitive load. However, where the behavior-identification task is relatively difficult, assimilation is undermined by load. Given that the discounting of situational constraint information, too, can be independent of load where the dispositional-inference task is easy, and is load-dependent when the task is difficult, it appears that both assimilation and discounting behave identically in regard to load. This conclusion is consistent with the judgmental unimodel whereby behavior identification and dispositional inference differ in the contents of the judgmental questions they address while sharing the underlying process whereby these questions are answered.     

That "vision thing": the state of theory in social and personality psychology at the edge of the new millennium.

Social psychololgy's status as a theoretical discipline is assessed. Whereas it has excelled as an experimental science, the field has generally eschewed broad theorizing and tended to limit its conceptualizations to relatively narrow, "mid-range" notions closely linked to the operational level of analysis. Such "theory shyness" may have spawned several negative consequences, including the tendency to invent new names for old concepts, fragmentation of the field, and isolation from the general cultural dialogue. Recently, steps have been taken to encourage greater theoretical activity by social psychologists, and there are now several major outlets for theoretical contributions. Further initiatives are needed, however, to instigate theoretical creativity, including ways of overcoming disciplinary risk aversion and the training of young social psychologists in ways and means of theory construction.     

Rethinking social cognition in means-ends terms: A tale of two surprises

The resurgence of motivation science in recent decades ushers in a new functionalism whereby behavior, cognition and emotion are viewed as means to specific goals. Two classic social psychological issues are analyzed from the means-ends perspective: (1) humans’ alleged need (or drive) for cognitive consistency, and (2) the notion that attitudes drive behavior. A careful conceptual analysis yields, contrary to received views, that cognitive consistency, rather than constituting a general need or goal, represents instead a means of knowledge validation. Consequently, the degree to which inconsistency is experienced as aversive depends on the desirability of the knowledge that is being invalidated. Furthermore, the notion that attitudes directly drive behavior is contested on the grounds that attitudes (i.e., liking) must transmute into wanting and wanting must transmute into a (dominant) goal for behavior to be initiated. Major theories of attitude-behavior relations are discussed from this perspective and their supportive evidence is reinterpreted in the present means-ends terms.     

Tailoring visual images to fit: Value creation in persuasive messages

The present studies aimed to extend Regulatory Fit Theory in the domain of persuasive communication by (a) using printed advertisement images without any verbal claim, instead of purely or mostly verbal messages; (b) selecting the images to fit the distinct orientations of regulatory mode rather than regulatory focus; and (c) priming regulatory mode orientation instead of relying on chronic prevalence of either locomotion or assessment orientation. We found that recipients primed with a locomotion orientation experienced fit, and were more persuaded, when exposed to “dynamic” versus “static” visual images; conversely, recipients primed with an assessment orientation experienced fit and were more persuaded when exposed to “static” versus “dynamic” images. Our findings show that the experience of fit can be induced by visual messages, resulting in positive effects in terms of attitude toward product advertisement and estimated price of advertised products. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the inferential epistemics of trait centrality in impression formation

We provide a novel, inferential, account of the trait centrality phenomenon. We suggest that a trait possesses the property of “centrality” to the extent that it is subjectively deemed to imply other traits. Five studies explore four central elements of this view. First, trait relations can be stored as unidirectional rules (“if X then Y” but not necessarily “if Y then X”). Second, the strength of individuals' lay inference rules determines the effect of traits on impressions. Third, situationally manipulating the strength of lay inference rules influences the impact of traits on impressions. Fourth, the impact of an inference rule is reduced when it is difficult to discern the inference rule and when processing resources are limited. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.