Moderate epistemic expressivism

The present paper argues that there are at least two equally plausible yet mutually incompatible answers to the question of what is of non-instrumental epistemic value. The hypothesis invoked to explain how this can be so—moderate epistemic expressivism—holds that (a) claims about epistemic value express nothing but commitments to particular goals of inquiry, and (b) there are at least two viable conceptions of those goals. It is shown that such expressivism survives recent arguments against a more radical form of epistemic expressivism, as well as two further arguments, framed in terms of the two most promising attempts to ground claims about epistemic value in something other than commitments to particular conceptions of inquiry. While this does not establish that moderate epistemic expressivism is true, its ability to explain a significant but puzzling axiological datum, as well as withstand strong counterarguments, makes clear that it is a theory to be reckoned with.     

Deaths of Despair: Conceptual and Clinical Implications

Since the late 1990s, mortality rates for middle-aged (45-55), White non-Hispanic (WNH) Americans began to rise while rates declined for all other demographic and age groups. Coinciding with the rise in mortality, rates of death due to suicide, drug- and alcohol-related overdoses, and alcohol-related liver diseases increased as well for this demographic. Research suggests these causes of death (i.e., suicide, poisoning, alcohol-related liver disease) are driving the overall mortality rate for middle-aged WNHs and have been described as “deaths of despair” in the literature. In the current paper, we describe the social and clinical features of “deaths of despair,” explore theoretical models of psychopathology (e.g., depression, posttraumatic stress disorder) that may inform our understanding of mechanisms of risk for negative mental health outcomes, and propose an initial conceptual model of “deaths of despair” to identify intervention targets. We then review an applied case example demonstrating how this model could be used for clinical application. We conclude our paper by describing how current cognitive-behavioral interventions may address these mechanisms of “despair.”     

Is There a Problem With Cognitive Outsourcing?

To what extent can we rely on others for information without such reliance becoming epistemically problematic? In this paper, this question is addressed in terms of a specific form of reliance: cognitive outsourcing. Cognitive outsourcing involves handing over (outsourcing) one's information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others. The specific question that will be asked about such outsourcing is if there is an epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. To ask if there is an epistemic problem with x for S is to ask if x is a problem for S’s ability to acquire true belief and avoid false belief. To ask if there is a problem for S with x as such is to ask if it is impossible to solve the problem for S while leaving x as is. I argue that, if we consider the five most plausible candidate epistemic problems raised by cognitive outsourcing—i.e., unreliability, gullibility, irrationality, dependency, and lack of epistemic autonomy—we see for each candidate that it is either not an epistemic problem, or not a problem about cognitive outsourcing as such.     

Predictive minds in Ouija board sessions

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - Ouija board sessions are illustrious examples of how subjective feelings of control – the Sense of Agency (SoA) - can be manipulated in real life...     

Meno and the Monist

Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato's Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, and is under closer scrutiny fully compatible with veritistic value monism. Consequently, contrary to what seems to be supposed in the literature, the critics of monism have little to gain from turning to the Meno for support.     

A latent profile analysis of coping responses to individuals’ most traumatic event: associations with adaptive and maladaptive mental health outcomes

ABSTRACT

Background & Objectives: This study explores how empirically-derived coping response patterns influence mental health.

Design: Emerging adults, currently enrolled in college and aged 18–24 (N?=?432; M_age?=?19.66; SD?=?1.65), completed self-report measures of trauma exposure, coping responses to self-selected most traumatic event (MTE), resilience, posttraumatic growth (PTG), depressive symptoms, and posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSS).

Methods: Eight coping subscales were included as indicators in a latent profile analysis. Then, associations between established profiles and mental health outcomes were examined, covarying for demographic and trauma-related variables.

Results: Considering fit statistics, class size, profile patterns, and theory, the four-class model was deemed most appropriate: High Overall Coping (HCOPE; n?=?146, 34%), Low Overall Coping (LCOPE; n?=?92, 22%), High Engagement Coping (HENG; n?=?115, 27%), and High Disengagement Coping (HDIS; n?=?73, 17%). HENG participants endorsed above-average resilience and PTG, coupled with below-average depressive symptoms and PTSS. Compared to the sample average, HDIS participants endorsed lower resilience and PTG, coupled with higher depressive symptoms and PTSS. LCOPE participants endorsed low levels of all outcomes. HCOPE participants endorsed high levels of all outcomes.

Conclusions: Findings suggest that clinicians who promote engagement coping and discourage disengagement coping among trauma-exposed individuals may engender the most desirable constellation of mental health outcomes.