Getting it right

Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed is that accuracy is a genus with several species. Believing truly is a prominent species, but it is not the only one. Finally, it is argued that accuracy monism is equally good or better than both traditional truth monism and its main dialectical rival, value pluralism, when it comes to satisfying three important axiological desiderata.     

Interpersonal pathoplasticity in individuals with generalized anxiety disorder

Recent theories of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) have emphasized interpersonal and personality functioning as important aspects of the disorder. We examined heterogeneity in interpersonal problems in 2 studies of individuals with GAD (n = 47 and n = 83). Interpersonal subtypes were assessed with the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-Circumplex (Alden, Wiggins, & Pincus, 1990). Across both studies, individuals with GAD exhibited heterogeneous interpersonal problems, and cluster analyses of these patients' interpersonal characteristics yielded 4 replicable clusters, identified as intrusive, exploitable, cold, and nonassertive subtypes. Consistent with our pathoplasticity hypotheses, clusters did not differ with GAD severity, anxiety severity, or depression severity. Clusters in Study 2 differed on rates of personality disorders, including avoidant personality disorder, further providing support for the validity of interpersonal subtypes. The presence of interpersonal subtypes in GAD may have important implications for treatment planning and efficacy.     

Against The Bifurcation Of Virtue

It has become customary in the virtue epistemological literature to distinguish between responsibilist and reliabilist virtue theories. More recently, certain problems affecting the former have prompted epistemologists to suggest that this distinction in virtue theory maps on to a distinction in virtue, specifically between character and faculty virtue. I argue that we lack good reason to bifurcate virtue in this manner, and that this moreover counts in favor of the virtue reliabilist.     

WHY WE CANNOT RELY ON OURSELVES FOR EPISTEMIC IMPROVEMENT

There is something very appealing about the idea that we are epistemic agents. One reason—if not the main reason—is that, while we are undoubtedly fallible creatures, us being epistemic agents that do things means that it might just be within our power to improve and thereby do better. One important way in which we would want to improve is in relation to our well‐established tendency for cognitive bias. Still, the proper role of epistemic agency in us avoiding or correcting for cognitive bias is highly limited. In fact, what we know from empirical psychology—particularly with respect to our tendencies for overconfidence—suggests that we cannot rely on ourselves for epistemic improvement, and have good reason to impose significant constraints on our ability to exercise such agency in ameliorative contexts.     

In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism

Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of monism cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value, an examination of the most promising pluralist counterexamples casts serious doubt upon the claim that there is any such evidence.     

Profiles of bystanders' motivation to defend school bully victims from a self‐determination perspective

This study was aimed at exploring which latent profiles emerge based on ratings of self‐determined motivation to defend victims of bullying, and to explore if they are related to bystander roles and victimization in bullying, as well as student–teacher relations. Data were collected from 1,800 Swedish and Italian students, with an age range between 10 and 18 years (M = 12.6, standard deviation = 1.74). The students completed a survey in their classrooms. Latent profile analysis was used to explore the possible clusters of individuals with similar ratings on the motivational variables. Multivariate analysis of variances were conducted to explore differences between the profiles in relation to their roles when witnessing bullying and to student–teacher relationships. Four latent profiles emerged. The profiles represented respondents (a) high in prosocial motivation, (b) high in externally extrinsic motivation, (c) intermediate in externally extrinsic motivation, and (d) with identified/introjected motivation. Multivariate analyses showed that reports of bystander roles when witnessing bullying, teacher–student relationships, and bullying victimization, significantly differed over the motivational profiles. The bystanders were unevenly distributed across the four groups and most individuals were categorized in the prosocial motivation group. Female and male bystanders were evenly distributed across clusters. The prosocial motivation group experienced victimization to a lesser extent than the other profile groups. Students in the intermediate externally extrinsic group were more likely to take the pro‐bully and outsider role during bullying. Concerning student–teacher relationships, the prosocial motivation group reported the closest relationships with their teachers, while the intermediate externally extrinsic group reported the most conflictual relationships.     

Can a Mediator Moderate? Considering the Role of Time and Change in the Mediator-Moderator Distinction

The concepts of mediation and moderation are important for specifying ways in which psychological treatments work and for whom they are most beneficial. Historically, the terms were confused and used interchangeably, so a rich body of scholarly literature makes clear their distinction. Researchers are also becoming increasingly aware that mediation and moderation can be integrated and that such integration can advance theory development and testing. One question that has not received sufficient attention is whether a mediator can simultaneously moderate. We tackle this question in this paper, and in doing so we expand on the MacArthur conceptualizations of mediation and moderation. The result is a presentation of a meta-theoretical model that illustrates how a construct that is initially a mediator can, not simultaneously but over time, evolve into a construct that moderates. When this occurs, a construct that changed for the better as a result of an intervention can later promote more positive change during a later intervention. Various implications of this novel paradigm for future research are discussed, including the importance of this model in the emerging context of managed health care.     

A Micro-Process Analysis of Functional Analytic Psychotherapy's Mechanism of Change

This study sought to clarify the micro-process of Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP) by using the Functional Analytic Psychotherapy Rating Scale (FAPRS) to code every client and therapist turn of speech over the course of successful treatment of an individual meeting diagnostic criteria for depression and histrionic personality disorder. Treatment consisted of cognitive behavioral therapy alone followed by the addition of FAP techniques in a unique A / A + B design. In-session client behavior improved following the shift to FAP techniques, and micro-process data suggested that client behavior was effectively shaped by in-vivo FAP procedures. These results support FAP's purported mechanisms of change and highlight the advantages of utilizing molecular coding systems to explore these mechanisms.     

The Social Virtue Of Blind Deference

Recently, it has become popular to account for knowledge and other epistemic states in terms of epistemic virtues. The present paper focuses on an epistemic virtue relevant when deferring to others in testimonial contexts. It is argued that, while many virtue epistemologists will accept that epistemic virtue can be exhibited in cases involving epistemically motivated hearers, carefully vetting their testimonial sources for signs of untrustworthiness prior to deferring, anyone who accepts that also has to accept that an agent may exhibit epistemic virtue in certain cases of blind deference, involving someone soaking up everything he or she is told without any hesitation. Moreover, in order to account for the kind of virtue involved in the relevant cases of blind deference, virtue epistemologists need to abandon a widespread commitment to personalism, i.e., the idea that virtue is possessed primarily on account of features internal to the psychology of the person, and accept that some virtues are social virtues, possessed in whole or in large part on account of the person being embedded in a reliable social environment.