Comment on John Yolton's ‘Is There a History of Philosophy? Some difficulties and suggestions’

In this comment on John Yolton's ‘Is There a History of Philosophy?’ (Yolton, 1985) I review his account of the development during the 17th to 19th centuries of a common sense of the range of philosophical problems and of the canon of philosophical works. I suggest that his account may be read in light of Rorty's four genres of historiography (Rorty, 1984). I criticize his view of the place of the history of philosophy in philosophy as too timid, though correct as far as it goes. I then suggest, but do not attempt to establish, a bolder thesis. Finally, I raise some doubts about the adequacy of Yolton's reading of Descartes and Berkeley set out in two of his ‘Puzzlements.’ The ‘Puzzlements’ themselves are supposed to illustrate typical misreading of major figures in the history of philosophy.     

Prediction of later cognitive behavior from early school perceptual-motor, perceptual, and cognitive performances

Multiple regression equations were generated to predict cognitive achievement for 189 young children (ages 57 to 92 mo.) 1 yr. after original administration of a battery of perceptual-motor, perceptual, and cognitive tests. Regression equations generated from maximum R2 improvement techniques indicated that a battery of perceptual and perceptual-motor performances at pre-kindergarten is useful for prediction of cognitive performance 1 yr. later at kindergarten level. This battery included one fine and two gross perceptual-motor tasks, and one visual and two auditory perceptual tasks. Inclusion of original cognitive performances did not improve the optimal prediction equation for this age group. In contrast, cognitive achievement at first grade and, particularly, at second grade levels was best predicted from knowledge of earlier cognitive performances.     

A frustration effect with adult humans?

In two investigations, the relationship of delays in response opportunity to response latencies was examined. On the basis of a generalized drive approach it was expected that the longer the delays, the greater the frustration, and that consequently the response latencies would be reduced. It was further hypothesized that the frustration effect would be enhanced for Internal locus of control subjects relative to Externals. Although statistically significant relationships between delays in opportunity to respond and response latencies were found, the pattern of the results did not appear to support a generalized drive interpretation of the effects. Consequently, the relationship between partial reward and response latencies that had been previously interpreted as a frustration effect by Libb and Serum (1974) was examined in a third experiment. Again, the results were supportive of specific factors other than a generalized frustration effect.Experiment 3 was conducted by the second author as partial fulfillment of the requirements for a master's degree. We are grateful to Nancy Lindstrom Miller and Gary Ramseyer for their assistance.     

Evidence for recognition and recall schemata

Two experiments manipulated elements postulated to be crucial for the formation of recognition and recall schemata for discrete motor skills. Experiment 1 tested predictions for the formation of a schema to recognize novel and practiced positioning movements. Sensations of practiced locations, followed by knowledge of results, enabled accurate judgment of movement extent. The specification of distances before active practice movements did not help recognition performance. To test recall schema, Experiment 2 allowed practice with active movements over specified distances, or unspecified passive movements. The allowance of response specifications during practice provided clear superiority of recall-dependent performance. This aspect of recall memory should enable the construction of movements with extents and velocities different from those practiced.     

Real-world schemata and scene recognition in adults and children

Recognition memory for previously seen multiobject scenes was examined for different types of contextual arrangements between objects in the scenes. It was found that organized scenes with novel but possible interobject relations were recognized more accurately than either organized scenes with familiar interobject relations or unorganized scenes with impossible interobject relations. This finding was obtained for adults, 8- to 10-year-old children, and 5- to 8-year-old children who indicated concrete-operational ability in Piaget’s conservation-of-liquid quantity task. The results were interpreted in conjunction with a two-stage model of scene processing involving the formation of a schema to represent a scene (Stage 1), and the operation of the schema in governing the further processing of detailed information in the scene (Stage 2). It was concluded that preoperational children can form schemata to represent organized scenes (Stage 1), but it is not until the emergence of concrete operations that these schemata become operational with respect to guiding the further processing of information in the scene (Stage 2).     

A device for silent on-line recording of continuously changing behavioral measures

A nonintrusive method of monitoring continuously changing behavior frequently is required in experimentation with human subjects, particularly infants. The touch-sensor switch box provides the observer with an ongoing record on a polygraph and allows the observer to give undivided attention to the subject. The mode of operation is completely silent.     

Using a microcomputer for on-line psychiatric assessment

The on-line computer-assisted psychiatric system has been shown to be effective in bringing about an improvement in mental health service delivery. However, it was initially developed on a computer system that was too costly for most potential users. The present paper describes the approach used to implement the on-line assessment system on an inexpensive microcomputer, the PDP-11 V03.     

Losing claims of rights

Conclusion I have contended that acting on some principle and complaining when others act in accordance with the same principle in similar circumstances is morally improper. By wrongdoing one forfeits the right to claim the right (s)he disregards in interacting with others. This is not equivalent to a view that one's acting in a certain way justifies others acting in that way, i.e. that by wrongdoing one forfeits rights (s)he disregards in interacting with others. It may still be morally improper to treat malfeasors in the same way they treat us but, I have argued, they cannot themselves claim a right not to be treated in that way.This analysis of the right to claim rights can help explain the change in moral status of wrongdoers in two important ways. First, if there are some non-forfeitable human rights, the loss of moral standing of one who disregards those rights in others can be explained. Second, and perhaps potentially more important, if having a right implies the right holder's being justified in claiming it, we have a basis for saying all human rights are forfeitable.This second position would require a tightening of the link between the right to X and the ancillary right to claim the right to X. I have not undertaken that burden here. Instead, I argued that the loss of the right to claim is, itself, a significant loss.