The end of phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty

In this paper I examine how well Merleau-Ponty's philosophy can respond to Deleuze's challenge to phenomenology. The Deleuzian challenge is double, that of immanence and that of difference; in other words, the double challenge is what Deleuze calls the paradox of expression. I bring together, in particular, Deleuze's 1969 The Logic of Sense and Merleau-Ponty's 1945 the Phenomenology of Perception, and am able to discover a lot of similarities mainly centered around the notion of a past that has never been present. However, this comparison is not decisive; what alone can decide is an interpretation of expression in Merleau-Ponty's final, unfinished The Visible and the Invisible.     

Young children's rapid learning about artifacts

Tool use is central to interdisciplinary debates about the evolution and distinctiveness of human intelligence, yet little is actually known about how human conceptions of artifacts develop. Results across these two studies show that even 2-year-olds approach artifacts in ways distinct from captive tool-using monkeys. Contrary to adult intuition, children do not treat all objects with appropriate properties as equally good means to an end. Instead, they use social information to rapidly form enduring artifact categories. After only one exposure to an artifact's functional use, children will construe the tool as 'for' that particular purpose and, furthermore, avoid using it for another feasible purpose. This teleo-functional tendency to categorize tools by intentional use represents a precursor to the design stance - the adult-like tendency to understand objects in terms of intended function - and provides an early foundation for apparently distinctive human abilities in efficient long-term tool use and design.     

Reasoning about artifacts at 24 months: the developing teleo-functional stance

From the age of 2.5, children use social information to rapidly form enduring function-based artifact categories. The present study asked whether even younger children likewise constrain their use of objects according to teleo-functional beliefs that artifacts are "for" particular purposes, or whether they use objects as means to any desired end. Twenty-four-month-old toddlers learned about two novel tools that were physically equivalent but perceptually distinct; one tool was assigned implicit function information through a short demonstration. At test, toddlers returned to the demonstrated tool when asked to repeat the task, but, unlike older children, also used it for another task. Results imply that at 24 months, toddlers expect artifacts to have functions and proficiently use a model's intentional use to inform tool choices, suggesting cognition that differs from that of tool-using monkeys. However, their artifact representations are not yet specified enough to support exclusive patterns of tool use.     

Comparison and representation failures both cause real-world change blindness

Change blindness (CB) occurs when people miss changes across views. Hypothetically, CB would occur if observers failed to represent information about the changing object, but CB would also occur if observers represented and failed to compare information across views, or represented only the pre- or post-change object. For a variety of reasons, previous studies have been unable to determine which of these alternatives contribute to CB in an incidental real-world setting. To address these ambiguities, we conducted two real-world experiments using stimuli that changed on only one feature and tested recognition memory for both the changing feature and a non-changing feature. Participants also provided confidence ratings on recognition responses, allowing us to test whether CB has multiple causes within a single task setting. The results suggest that, in a single real-world setting, CB can be caused by both a failure to represent and a failure to compare information across views.     

The Moral Value of Envy

It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy is not merely morally permissible, but morally valuable. Here I provide a defense of envy's moral value. I argue that feelings of envy are integral to the value that moral agents place on the goods and talents that they judge to be central to a worthwhile life.     

Feeling Stares: Places,Persons, and Pets

The belief that one can feel others staring without actually seeing them look is a common social phenomenon. From a comparative viewpoint, staring is associated with dominance behavior or aggression. In humans, staring is often viewed as a negative behavior. Thus, being the object of a stare is potentially dangerous. We predicted that persons in vulnerable circumstances (e.g., an unfamiliar situation) or with strangers rather than with friends would be sensitized to detect signals or stimuli associated with danger. We also hypothesized that persons high in self-consciousness or who were in a negative mood would have an increased bias toward detecting stares. The situational-context hypotheses received higher support than did the dispositional hypotheses. Beliefs concerning animals and stare perception were explored.     

Defining Our Clinical Practice: The Identification of Genetic Counseling Outcomes Utilizing the Reciprocal Engagement Model

The need for evidence-based medicine, including comparative effectiveness studies and patient-centered outcomes research, has become a major healthcare focus. To date, a comprehensive list of genetic counseling outcomes, as espoused by genetic counselors, has not been established and thus, identification of outcomes unique to genetic counseling services has become a priority for the National Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC). The purpose of this study was to take a critical first step at identifying a more comprehensive list of genetic counseling outcomes. This paper describes the results of a focus group study using the Reciprocal-Engagement Model (REM) as a framework to characterize patient-centered outcomes of genetic counseling clinical practice. Five focus groups were conducted with 27 peer nominated participants who were clinical genetic counselors, genetic counseling program directors, and/or outcomes researchers in genetic counseling. Members of each focus group were asked to identify genetic counseling outcomes for four to five of the 17 goals of the REM. A theory-driven, thematic analysis of focus group data yielded 194 genetic counseling outcomes across the 17 goals. Participants noted some concerns about how genetic counseling outcomes will be measured and evaluated given varying stakeholders and the long-term nature of genetic concerns. The present results provide a list of outcomes for use in future genetic counseling outcomes research and for empirically-supported clinical interventions.     

How do associative and phonemic overlap interact to boost illusory recollection?

This project investigated the underlying mechanisms that boost false remember responses when participants receive study words that are both semantically and phonologically similar to a critical lure. Participants completed a memory task in which they were presented with a list of words all associated with a critical lure. Included within the list of semantic associates was a target that was either semantically associated (e.g., yawn) to the critical lure (e.g., sleep) or shared the initial (e.g., slam) or final (e.g., beep) phoneme(s) with the critical lure. After hearing the list, participants recalled each list item and indicated whether they just knew it was on the list or if they instead recollected specific contextual details of that item’s presentation. We found that inserting an initial phonemic overlap target boosted experiences of recollection, but only when semantically related associates were presented beforehand. The results are consistent with models of spoken word recognition and show that established semantic context plus initial phonemic overlap play important roles in boosting false recollection.     

Beliefs about emotion: implications for avoidance-based emotion regulation and psychological health

People’s beliefs about their ability to control their emotions predict a range of important psychological outcomes. It is not clear, however, whether these beliefs are playing a causal role, and if so, why this might be. In the current research, we tested whether avoidance-based emotion regulation explains the link between beliefs and psychological outcomes. In Study 1 (N?=?112), a perceived lack of control over emotions predicted poorer psychological health outcomes (increased self-reported avoidance, lower well-being, and higher levels of clinical symptoms), and avoidance strategies indirectly explained these links between emotion beliefs and psychological health. In Study 2 (N?=?101), we experimentally manipulated participants’ emotion beliefs by leading participants to believe that they struggled (low regulatory self-efficacy) or did not struggle (high regulatory self-efficacy) with controlling their emotions. Participants in the low regulatory self-efficacy condition reported increased intentions to engage in avoidance strategies over the next month and were more likely to avoid seeking psychological help. When asked if they would participate in follow-up studies, these participants were also more likely to display avoidance-based emotion regulation. These findings provide initial evidence for the causal role of emotion beliefs in avoidance-based emotion regulation, and document their impact on psychological health-related outcomes.