The networked mind

The paper discusses the role of networks in cognition on two levels: on the level of the organization of ideas, and on the level of interpersonal communication. Any interesting system of ideas forms a network: ideas presented in a linear order (the order forced upon us by verbal expression) will necessarily convey a distorted picture of the underlying patterns of thought. Networks of ideas typically consist of a great number of nodes with just a few links, and a small number of hubs with very many links; that is, they are, to employ Albert-László Barabási’s term, “scale-free.” Barabási fits into a specific tradition: Hungarians had an early influence on the philosophy of networks, and on the philosophy of communication as developed at Marshall McLuhan’s Toronto Circle. In fact, this was the circle in which certain Hungarian and Austrian ideas on mediated collective thinking first came together—a telling testimony to the conditions of disturbed communication and idiosyncratic networking typical of East-Central Europe, past and present. The nodes-and-hubs pattern is characteristic, too, of social networks, in particular of scholarly and scientific networks. The paper analyses the role of “invisible colleges”—informal groups of scientific elites through whom the communication of information both within a field and across fields is channelled. By way of conclusion the notion of a new type of personality, the “network individual,” is discussed: the network individual is the person reintegrated, after centuries of relative isolation induced by the printing press, into the collective thinking of society—the individual whose mind is manifestly mediated, once again, by the minds of those forming his/her smaller or larger community.     

Judgment and action knowledge in speed adjustment tasks: experiments in a virtual environment

Two experiments were conducted to investigate children's and adults’ knowledge of time and speed in action and judgment tasks. Participants had to set the speed of a moving car to a new speed so that it would reach a target line at the same time as a reference car moving at a higher speed and disappearing in a tunnel at the midway point. In Experiment 1 (24 10‐year‐olds, 24 adults), children's and adults’ speed adjustments followed the normative pattern when responses had to be graded linearly as a function of the car's initial speed. In a non‐linear condition, only adults’ action responses corresponded with the normative function. Simplifying the task by shortening the tunnel systematically in Experiment 2 (24 10‐year‐olds, 24 adults) enabled children to grade the speeds adequately in the action conditions only. Adults now produced normative response patterns in both judgment and action. Whether people show linearization biases was thus shown to depend on the interaction of age, task demands and response mode.     

Knowledge without credit,exhibit 4: extended cognition

The Credit Theory of Knowledge (CTK)—as expressed by such figures as John Greco, Wayne Riggs, and Ernest Sosa—holds that knowing that p implies deserving epistemic credit for truly believing that p. Opponents have presented three sorts of counterexamples to CTK: S might know that p without deserving credit in cases of (1) innate knowledge (Lackey, Kvanvig); (2) testimonial knowledge (Lackey); or (3) perceptual knowledge (Pritchard). The arguments of Lackey, Kvanvig and Pritchard, however, are effective only in so far as one is willing to accept a set of controversial background assumptions (for instance, that innate knowledge exists or that doxastic voluntarism is wrong). In this paper I mount a fourth argument against CTK, that doesn’t rest on any such controversial premise, and therefore should convince a much wider audience. In particular, I show that in cases of extended cognition (very broadly conceived), the most salient feature explaining S’s believing the truth regarding p may well be external to S, that is, it might be a feature of S’s (non-human, artifactual) environment. If so, the cognitive achievement of knowing that p is not (or only marginally) creditable to S, and hence, CTK is false.     

The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions

Armchair philosophers have questioned the significance of recent work in experimental philosophy by pointing out that experiments have been conducted on laypeople and undergraduate students. To challenge a practice that relies on expert intuitions, so the armchair objection goes, one needs to demonstrate that expert intuitions rather than those of ordinary people are sensitive to contingent facts such as cultural, linguistic, socio‐economic, or educational background. This article does exactly that. Based on two empirical studies on populations of 573 and 203 trained philosophers, respectively, it demonstrates that expert intuitions vary dramatically according to at least one contingent factor, namely, the linguistic background of the expert: philosophers make different intuitive judgments if their native language is English rather than Dutch, German, or Swedish. These findings cast doubt on the common armchair assumption that philosophical theories based on armchair intuitions are valid beyond the linguistic background against which they were developed.     

From individual cognition to populational culture

In my response to the commentaries from a collection of esteemed researchers, I reassess and eventually find largely intact my claim that human tool use evidences higher social and non-social cognitive ability. Nonetheless, I concede that my examination of individual-level cognitive traits does not offer a full explanation of cumulative culture yet. For that, one needs to incorporate them into population-dynamic models of cultural evolution. I briefly describe my current and future work on this.     

Dynamic action in virtual environments: constraints on the accessibility of action knowledge in children and adults

In a series of three experiments, we probed the accessibility of action knowledge in different versions of a virtual environment (VE) with 7-year-old children and adults. Using a PHANToM haptic interface, participants performed a virtual throwing task in which they tried to propel a ball from a table to hit a target on the ground. In Experiments 1 and 2, the virtual scene was presented on a computer monitor, and, in Experiment 3, it was projected by using a video projector so that the vertical and horizontal dimensions and the spatial location of the VE corresponded to the real-world dimensions. Results indicate that action knowledge is accessible even in a nonimmersive VE, but also suggest that the need to recalibrate perceptual-motor mappings constrains the accessibility of this kind of intuitive knowledge.     

Recognizing impossible object relations: intuitions about support in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Using looking-time measures, the authors examined untrained chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) ability to distinguish between adequate and inadequate support. In 3 experiments, the chimpanzees' sensitivity to different support relations between 2 objects was assessed. In each experiment, the chimpanzees saw a possible and an impossible test event, presented as digital video clips. Looking times in the 3 experiments suggest that chimpanzees use amount of contact between 2 objects, but not type of contact, to distinguish between adequate and inadequate support relations. These results indicate that chimpanzees have some intuition about support phenomena but their sensitivity to relational object properties may differ from that of human infants (Homo sapiens) in this domain.