The role of competition in word learning via referent selection

Previous research suggests that competition among the objects present during referent selection influences young children’s ability to learn words in fast mapping tasks. The present study systematically explored this issue with 30‐month‐old children. Children first received referent selection trials with a target object and either two, three or four competitor objects. Then, after a short delay, children were tested on their ability to retain the newly fast‐mapped names. Overall, the number of competitors did not affect children’s ability to form the initial name–object mappings. However, only children who encountered few competitors during referent selection demonstrated significant levels of retention. Results and implications are discussed in terms of the role of competition in studies of children’s fast mapping. The relationship between referent selection and full word learning is also discussed.     

Knowledge without credit,exhibit 4: extended cognition

The Credit Theory of Knowledge (CTK)—as expressed by such figures as John Greco, Wayne Riggs, and Ernest Sosa—holds that knowing that p implies deserving epistemic credit for truly believing that p. Opponents have presented three sorts of counterexamples to CTK: S might know that p without deserving credit in cases of (1) innate knowledge (Lackey, Kvanvig); (2) testimonial knowledge (Lackey); or (3) perceptual knowledge (Pritchard). The arguments of Lackey, Kvanvig and Pritchard, however, are effective only in so far as one is willing to accept a set of controversial background assumptions (for instance, that innate knowledge exists or that doxastic voluntarism is wrong). In this paper I mount a fourth argument against CTK, that doesn’t rest on any such controversial premise, and therefore should convince a much wider audience. In particular, I show that in cases of extended cognition (very broadly conceived), the most salient feature explaining S’s believing the truth regarding p may well be external to S, that is, it might be a feature of S’s (non-human, artifactual) environment. If so, the cognitive achievement of knowing that p is not (or only marginally) creditable to S, and hence, CTK is false.     

Visual variability affects early verb learning

Research demonstrates that within‐category visual variability facilitates noun learning; however, the effect of visual variability on verb learning is unknown. We habituated 24‐month‐old children to a novel verb paired with an animated star‐shaped actor. Across multiple trials, children saw either a single action from an action category (identical actions condition, for example, travelling while repeatedly changing into a circle shape) or multiple actions from that action category (variable actions condition, for example, travelling while changing into a circle shape, then a square shape, then a triangle shape). Four test trials followed habituation. One paired the habituated verb with a new action from the habituated category (e.g., ‘dacking’ + pentagon shape) and one with a completely novel action (e.g., ‘dacking’ + leg movement). The others paired a new verb with a new same‐category action (e.g., ‘keefing’ + pentagon shape), or a completely novel category action (e.g., ‘keefing’ + leg movement). Although all children discriminated novel verb/action pairs, children in the identical actions condition discriminated trials that included the completely novel verb, while children in the variable actions condition discriminated the out‐of‐category action. These data suggest that – as in noun learning – visual variability affects verb learning and children's ability to form action categories.     

“Mindful helpers”: Experiential avoidance,meta-emotions,and emotion regulation in paramedics

Three facets of the mindfulness/acceptance spectrum have been investigated in 134 experienced paramedics exposed to a number of potentially traumatic events. The contribution of (1) experiential avoidance, (2) mindful awareness and (3) meta-emotions in psychological well-being and satisfaction with life was analysed. Changes in these variables due to experiencing highly stressful incidents were explored by comparing experts with 105 novices. With accumulating experience, experiential avoidance remained stable, mindful awareness markedly increased at first and declined thereafter. Both positive and negative meta-emotions decreased with the number of stressful incidents. Experiential avoidance and meta-emotions explained 62% of the variance in psychological well-being, and patterns indicate that non-acceptance of thoughts and emotions might not be generally detrimental in this sample. Being stern and contemptuous about one’s own feelings and having little self-compassion has been found to be beneficial for psychological well-being in these experts. Although this is contrary to contemporary theorizing it might perfectly reflect the role of paramedics and their need for control.     

Haptic curvature comparison of convex and concave shapes

A sculpture and the mould in which it was formed are typical examples of objects with an identical, but opponent, surface shape: each convex (ie outward pointing) surface part of a sculpture has a concave counterpart in the mould. The question arises whether the object features of opponent shapes can be compared by touch. Therefore, we investigated whether human observers were able to discriminate the curvatures of convex and concave shapes, irrespective of whether the shape was convex or concave. Using a 2AFC procedure, subjects had to compare the curvature of a convex shape to the curvature of a concave shape. In addition, results were also obtained for congruent shapes, when the curvature of either only convex shapes or only concave shapes had to be compared. Psychometric curves were fitted to the data to obtain threshold and bias results. When subjects explored the stimuli with a single index finger, significantly higher thresholds were obtained for the opponent shapes than for the congruent shapes. However, when the stimuli were touched by two index fingers, one finger per surface, we found similar thresholds. Systematic biases were found when the curvature of opponent shapes was compared: the curvature of a more curved convex surface was judged equal to the curvature of a less curved concave surface. We conclude that human observers had the ability to compare the curvature of shapes with an opposite direction, but that their performance decreased when they sensed the opponent surfaces with the same finger. Moreover, they systematically underestimated the curvature of convex shapes compared to the curvature of concave shapes.     

The networked mind

The paper discusses the role of networks in cognition on two levels: on the level of the organization of ideas, and on the level of interpersonal communication. Any interesting system of ideas forms a network: ideas presented in a linear order (the order forced upon us by verbal expression) will necessarily convey a distorted picture of the underlying patterns of thought. Networks of ideas typically consist of a great number of nodes with just a few links, and a small number of hubs with very many links; that is, they are, to employ Albert-László Barabási’s term, “scale-free.” Barabási fits into a specific tradition: Hungarians had an early influence on the philosophy of networks, and on the philosophy of communication as developed at Marshall McLuhan’s Toronto Circle. In fact, this was the circle in which certain Hungarian and Austrian ideas on mediated collective thinking first came together—a telling testimony to the conditions of disturbed communication and idiosyncratic networking typical of East-Central Europe, past and present. The nodes-and-hubs pattern is characteristic, too, of social networks, in particular of scholarly and scientific networks. The paper analyses the role of “invisible colleges”—informal groups of scientific elites through whom the communication of information both within a field and across fields is channelled. By way of conclusion the notion of a new type of personality, the “network individual,” is discussed: the network individual is the person reintegrated, after centuries of relative isolation induced by the printing press, into the collective thinking of society—the individual whose mind is manifestly mediated, once again, by the minds of those forming his/her smaller or larger community.