Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

A self‐determination model of childhood exposure,perceived prevalence,justification, and perpetration of intimate partner violence

The present research was designed to evaluate self‐determination theory as a framework for integrating factors associated with intimate partner violence (IPV) perpetration. The proposed model suggests that childhood exposure to parental violence may influence global motivational orientations which, in turn, results in greater cognitive biases (overestimating the prevalence of IPV and justification of IPV) which, in turn, contribute to an individual's decision to use abusive behavior. Participants included 124 men who had engaged in abusive behavior toward an intimate partner. Results provided reasonable support for the proposed model and stronger support for a revised model suggesting that controlled orientation, rather than autonomy orientation, appears to play a stronger role in the association between childhood exposure to parental violence and cognitive biases associated with abusive behavior.     

A cognitive and an affective dimension of alexithymia in six languages and seven populations

The Dutch Bermond–Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ) is translated into various languages. The aim of this research was to establish the factor structure of subscales on seven cultural groups. The BVAQ consists of five subscales of eight items each: Emotionalising, Fantasising, Analysing, Identifying, and Verbalising emotions. The BVAQ was administered to a group of Dutch students (n=375), a group of English students (n=175), a group of Australian students, university employees and visitors (n=216), a group of French speaking Belgian students (n=175), a group of Italian people (n=791; a mix of various clinical groups), a group of Polish people (n=427; also a mix of various clinical groups) and a group of Russian people (n=141; general population). The hypothesised two-factor structure of an affective alexithymia dimension (Emotionalising, Fantasising) and a cognitive alexithymia dimension (Insight and Verbalising), with “Analysing emotions” loading on both factors, was clearly supported by confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). Both orthogonal and oblique principal components analyses (PCA), without restriction concerning the number of factors, provided the same two-factor solution in all groups explaining between 55% and 64% of the variance. Oblique rotation further demonstrated that the correlations between these two factors were low in all populations. The combined CFA and PCA results, therefore, indicated that a model with two independent factors has to be preferred over the model assuming two correlated factors.     

Posttraining inactivation of excitatory afferent input to the locus coeruleus impairs retention in an inhibitory avoidance learning task

These experiments examined whether the nucleus paragigantocellularis (PGi) contributes to memory storage processing via its ascending excitatory influence on locus coeruleus (LC) neuronal activity. Activation of the LC leads to memory enhancement and also results in a widespread release of norepinephrine in target structures, such as the amygdala and hippocampus. Infusion of norepinephrine into either structure also improves memory for several types of learned responses. Thus, the capacity for norepinephrine to modulate memory within limbic structures may be contingent upon the functional connections between PGi and the LC. To examine this hypothesis, male Sprague-Dawley rats were implanted with cannula aimed above PGi (Experiments 1 and 2) or 1.5 mm dorsal or medial to PGi (Experiment 3). Immediately following inhibitory avoidance training (0.45 mA, 0. 5 s), phosphate-buffered saline, lidocaine (Experiment 1), or 12.5 or 25 nmol/0.5 microl of the GABA agonist muscimol (Experiment 2) was infused into PGi. On a retention test given 48 h later, the latency to reenter the footshock compartment was significantly shorter for subjects given either lidocaine or 12.5 or 25.0 nmol of muscimol compared to controls. In Experiment 3, infusion of lidocaine or muscimol into areas 1.5 mm dorsal or medial to PGi did not significantly alter retention, indicating that the memory impairment observed in Experiments 1 and 2 was site specific and not due to the spread of drug to cell groups surrounding PGi. These findings suggest that PGi may serve a vital function in relaying biologically relevant information to forebrain structures involved in memory via its excitatory influence on the LC.     

Two-Year-Old Children's Understanding of Visual Perception and Knowledge Formation in Others

A landmark study by O'Neill (1996 O'Neill , D. K. ( 1996 ). Two-year-old children's sensitivity to a parent's knowledge state when making requests . Child Development , 67 , 659 – 677 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), in which 2-year-old children were found to be more likely to point toward a hidden object to help an adult who was unsighted during the hiding event than to point helpfully for an adult who had been sighted, seems to undermine the conventional assumption that children this young do not understand the relationship between seeing/not seeing and knowing/not knowing. Concerns remain, however, as to whether the children's success was mentalistic or behavioral. In two experiments, 2-year-old children received first-person experience with two kinds of glasses of different colors but with apparently identical opaque lenses, one of which blocked their vision and the other of which they could see through. When the parent was wearing these glasses, the children were able to use their own first-person experience of the glasses to infer whether the adult could see or not. Despite this, they did not understand the causal relationship between visual perception and knowledge formation, as demonstrated by their indiscriminate pointing behavior in response to an ignorant or a knowledgeable parent. However, in a third experiment, we examined the relationship between experience of the adult's behavioral incompetence when wearing glasses of a certain color and the children's pointing behavior. Here they tended to point appropriately. We conclude that the phenomenon reported by O'Neill (1996 O'Neill , D. K. ( 1996 ). Two-year-old children's sensitivity to a parent's knowledge state when making requests . Child Development , 67 , 659 – 677 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) yields to an account in terms of the 2-year-olds' assumptions about behavioral competence/incompetence rather than about knowledge/ignorance.     

Tool-use and instrumental learning in the Eurasian jay (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Garrulus glandarius</Emphasis>)

Recent research with Rooks has demonstrated impressive tool-using abilities in captivity despite this species’ classification as a non-tool-user in the wild. Here, we explored whether another non-tool-using corvid, the Eurasian Jay, would be capable of similar feats and investigated the relative contributions of causal knowledge and instrumental conditioning to the birds’ performance on the tasks. Five jays were tested on a variety of tasks involving water displacement. Two birds reliably interacted with the apparatuses. In these tasks, both birds showed a preference for inserting stones into a tube containing liquid over a tube containing a solid or a baited ‘empty’ tube and also for inserting sinkable items over non-sinkable items into a tube of water. To investigate the contribution of instrumental conditioning, subjects were then tested on a series of tasks in which different cues were made available. It was found that, in the absence of any apparent causal cues, these birds showed a clear preference for the rewarded tube when the food incrementally approached with every stone insertion, but not when it simply “appeared” after the correct number of stone insertions. However, it was found that subjects did not prefer to insert stones into a tube rewarded by the incremental approach of food if the available causal cues violated the expectations created by existing causal knowledge (i.e. were counter-intuitive). An analysis of the proportion of correct and incorrect stone insertions made in each trial across tasks offering different types of information revealed that subjects were substantially more successful in experiments in which causal cues were available, but that rate of learning was comparable in all experiments. We suggest that these results indicate that Eurasian jays use the incremental approach of the food reward as a conditioned reinforcer allowing them to solve tasks involving raising the water level and that this learning is facilitated by the presence of causal cues.     

Implicit coping and enhancement motives predict unique variance in drinking in Asian Americans

Automatic cognitive processes have been shown to be unique predictors of drinking behavior and can be assessed using implicit measures. Drinking motives (e.g., enhancement and coping motives), which are also predictive of alcohol use, have not been studied using implicit measures. Moreover, in the US, implicit measures have been studied in samples largely consisting of Caucasian or White Americans. This study adapted the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to examine automatic analogues of enhancement and coping drinking motives and approach/avoid tendencies in 56 Asian American undergraduates. Enhancement and coping IATs were correlated with self-reported drinking motives and predicted unique variance in drinking frequency and heavy drinking when controlling for self-reported motives. Approach IAT scores were neither associated with self-reported approach/avoid tendencies nor predictive of drinking behaviors. These findings provide initial support for the unique predictive utility of drinking motives in Asian Americans, an understudied population.     

Beliefs About Cognitive Gender Differences: Accurate for Direction, Underestimated for Size

Although stereotype accuracy is a large, and often controversial, area of psychological research, surprisingly little research has examined the beliefs people have about gender differences in cognitive abilities. This study investigates the accuracy of these beliefs in a sample of 106 highly educated U.S. adults. Participants provided estimates of male and female performance for 12 cognitive tasks and games. These estimates were compared with published data on gender differences on the same 12 cognitive tasks and games. Results showed that participants were generally accurate about the direction of gender differences, but underestimated the size of gender differences.     

Does ‘Ought’ Still Imply ‘Can’?

According to ??ought?? implies ??can?? (OIC), your obligation can never be to do what you cannot do. In a recent attack on OIC, Graham has argued that intuitions about justified intervention can help us determine whether the agent whose actions we use force to prevent would have acted permissibly or not. These intuitions, he suggests, cause trouble for the idea that you can be obligated to refrain from doing what you can refrain from doing. I offer a defense of OIC and explain how non-consequentialists can accommodate his intuitions about his cases