Developmental Changes in Strategies for Gathering Evidence About Biological Kinds

How do people gather samples of evidence to learn about the world? Adults often prefer to sample evidence from diverse sources—for example, choosing to test a robin and a turkey to find out if something is true of birds in general. Children below age 9, however, often do not consider sample diversity, instead treating non-diverse samples (e.g., two robins) and diverse samples as equivalently informative. The current study (N = 247) found that this discontinuity stems from developmental changes in standards for evaluating evidence—younger children chose to learn from samples that best approximate idealized views of what category members are supposed to be like (e.g., the fastest cheetahs), with a gradual shift across age toward samples that cover more within-category variation (e.g., cheetahs of varying speeds). These findings have implications for the relation between conceptual structure and inductive reasoning, and for the mechanisms underlying inductive reasoning more generally.     

The Affective Experience of Aesthetic Properties

It is widely agreed upon that aesthetic properties, such as grace, balance, and elegance, are perceived. I argue that aesthetic properties are experientially attributed to some non‐perceptible objects. For example, a mathematical proof can be experienced as elegant. In order to give a unified explanation of the experiential attribution of aesthetic properties to both perceptible and non‐perceptible objects, one has to reject the idea that aesthetic properties are perceived. I propose an alternative view: the affective account. I argue that the standard case of experiential aesthetic property attribution is affective experience.     

The Effect of Anxiety Sensitivity and Gender on the Experience of Pain

The association between negative affectivity (NA) and health complaints is thought to reflect a stronger attentional focus on bodily sensations in high NA persons. Perceiving these sensations as rather threatening, high NA persons may scan their internal environment for impending signs of pain and trouble. Using an on-line registration of attentional deployment, we tested whether high NA persons were allocating more attentional resources to internal sensations and less to external stimuli compared to low NA persons. High and low NA participants (N = 68) performed a Stroop-like primary task during a number of trials in which: (1) only an internal; (2) only an external; or (3) both an internal and an external stimulus could occur. Internal stimuli consisted of 7.5% carbon dioxide administrations, causing slight increases in ventilation. An increase in time interval between successive tones served as the external stimulus. Participants were asked to press a button when they noticed one of both events. Results showed that high NA participants: (1) detected the effects of a first respiratory stimulus faster; (2) performed poorer on the tone task when anticipating a respiratory challenge; (3) performed slower on the Stroop task during respiratory stimuli. These findings may indicate that high NA participants show a stronger attentional bias to internal sensations.