How Not to Argue for Incompatibilism

Ted A. Warfield has recently employed modal logic to argue that compatibilism in the free-will/determinism debate entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. I show that Warfield's argument fails. A parallel argument leads to the false conclusion that the mere possibility of determinism, together with the necessary existence of any contingent propositions, entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. The error in both arguments involves a crucial equivocation, which can be revealed by replacing modal operators with explicit quantifiers over possible worlds. I conclude that the modal-logical apparatus used by Warfield obscures rather than clarifies, and distracts from the real philosophical issues involved in the metaphysical debate. These issues cannot be settled by logic alone.     

A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge

Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an ‘intellectualist’ opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat ‘know’ as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge‐how, which is ‘knowledge’ only so‐called. I develop the challenge and show that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as ‘a capacity to get things right’, covering both knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that. I show how Ryle specifies the general notion into knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that and discuss the mutual interdependence exhibited by the two forms of knowledge. Ryle's positive view of knowledge, properly understood, emerges as an important, neglected, alternative which should be brought back into the ongoing conversation about practical and theoretical knowledge.     

Retroactive interference and mental practice effects on motor performance: a pilot study

This study examined the effect of similar versus dissimilar retroactive interference on the mental practice effects for performing a novel motor skill. Research has shown that mental practice of a motor task can interfere with learning and performance of the task; however, little is known about how different retroactive interference activities affect mental practice effects. 90 volunteers ages 18 to 51 years (M=26.8, SD=9.6) completed a pre-test and post-test of 10 sets of five trials of a throwing task with the non-preferred hand. In the practice phase, participants mentally practiced the throwing task and then mentally practiced a task that was similar, dissimilar, or completed an unrelated reading task. Performance for all groups improved from pre- to post-test; however, there were no differences in increases for the three groups. The findings suggest that mental practice of similar and dissimilar tasks produced no significant interference in performance.     

Exploring the Why of Psychologist Misconduct and Malpractice: A Thematic Analysis of Court Decision Documents

Objective: To identify reasons for misconduct and misconduct amongst Australian psychologists. Method: During the 5‐year period from 2008 to 2013, 42 psychologists across 41 cases were found guilty of misconduct and malpractice by civil and administrative courts across Australia. The court decision documents were analysed using Braun and Clarke’s ( 2006 ) qualitative methodology to explore themes relating to the court’s objective, the psychologist’s subjective, and the authors’ interpretive causal reasons transgressing psychologists engaged in misconduct and malpractice. Results: Explanations given by psychologists for misconduct and malpractice behaviours included the use and abuse of legal and illicit substances, addiction behaviours, and impairment due to mental disorder or unresolved trauma. A number of other reasons identified by the courts and by the authors from the evidence cited in the published court decision documents are also discussed. Possible contributing factors for why misconduct and malpractice behaviours occurred coalesced into three themes: the externalisation of responsibility for personal actions and behaviours, a lack of objectivity concerning why such behaviours occurred, and an inability to understand how personal circumstance affected the provision of ethical services to clients. Conclusion: (a) The complexity of situations and scenarios surrounding psychologist malpractice can be simplified for the benefit of designing interventions by applying Glass’ ( 2003 ) concept of the “slippery slope.” (b) Court records have benefit as detailed data, but could be augmented for greater value with a simple and easily completed additional coversheet of background and demographic data.