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141.
HENT
DE VRIES 《Modern Theology》2011,27(3):462-477
What to make of “the ordinary,”“the everyday,” and their common “eventfulness”? What to think of what Veena Das, in her recent book Life and Words, prefaced by Stanley Cavell, has called our need to “descent into the ordinary”? Is there a parallel figure of “ascent,” again, into the same “ordinary,” that we might we want to juxtapose with it and that resembles the motif of “change,” even “conversion,” that Cavell analyzes at some length in The Claim of Reason and throughout his oeuvre as a whole? And what could be our reasons for doing so? This essay will draw on Cavell's reading of Ibsen's work in the volume Cities of Words to spell out what such an “ascent” might mean. 相似文献
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FRANK DE ROOSE 《Journal of applied philosophy》1989,6(1):87-96
ABSTRACT Some beings, including children, animals and the mentally handicapped, seem to deserve moral consideration, despite the fact that they are not rational or moral agents. These so-called marginal cases create a problem for theories that heavily stress the role of moral and/or rational agency in ethics: the latter seem unable to account for the former's moral status. This paper discusses the recent and original attempt of Loren Lomasky to solve this problem. It is argued that Lomasky's arguments are self-defeating because they can only succeed by relying on common-sense morality and, thus, by giving up the heavy stress on the role of rational agency in ethics. 相似文献
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RAFAEL DE CLERCQ 《美学与艺术评论杂志》2019,77(2):121-132
One of the oldest platitudes about beauty is that it is pleasant to perceive or experience. In this article, I take this platitude at face value and try to explain why experiences of beauty are seemingly always accompanied by pleasure. Unlike explanations that have been offered in the past, the explanation proposed is designed to suit a “realist” view on which beauty is an irreducibly evaluative property, that is, a value. In a nutshell, the explanation is that experiences of beauty are experiences in which it appears that something is beautiful, and that such experiences are identical to experiences of aesthetic pleasure. 相似文献
146.
Causation as a Philosophical Relation in Hume 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
GRACIELA DE PIERRIS 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2002,64(3):499-545
By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. I characterize Hume's radical skeptical standpoint in relation to Hume's perceptual model of the traditional theory of ideas, and I argue that Hume's radical skeptical argument concerning our causal inferences is inextricably linked to his skeptical argument concerning our idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect. I discuss Hume's naturalistic account of the origin of our idea of necessity and offer a new reading of Hume's two "definitions" of cause. I argue along the way against central aspects of two opposing styles of interpretation—Norman Kemp Smith's and Annette Baier's, on the one hand, and Robert Fogelin's, on the other—that in my view do not appreciate the mutual autonomy of radical skepticism and naturalism in Hume. 相似文献
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MARÍA LUISA VELASCO DE PARRA 《Family process》1982,21(2):195-201
Two girls (9 and 10 years old) and one male adolescent (19 years old) with chronic renal failure (CRF) were studied along with their families in order to evaluate their family structure before (4–5 weeks) and after (3–5 weeks) a renal transplant from a live donor. After the renal transplant there was a close association between the donor and the recipient that led to the creation of an alliance or the reinforcement of an alliance already present before the transplant. This may favor a family disruption or a better family equilibrium depending upon whether the donor ranked highest in the family hierarchy and was already in a rigid alliance with the patient before the transplant. It is suggested that the study and diagnosis of the family structure before the renal transplant may help to: (a) select the most suitable donor candidate from a biological as well as psychological point of view so as to allow a better possibility of success in the structural functioning of the family after the transplant; (b) predict changes that will appear within the family after the transplant, which in turn may alert the personnel to detect changes in the family structure as early as possible; and (c) offer more rapid therapeutic assistance to bring the family back to a functional level within its social framework. 相似文献
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This study investigated two main issues: Whether people's judgments about real-life moral transgressions are affected by the role they play in them and whether self-serving biases in such judgments vary with level of moral development. One-hundred twenty university students took Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) test of moral judgment and made open-ended and rating-scale judgments about three real-life transgressions they considered moral in nature. As expected, participants made more exculpatory judgments about transgressions they committed than they did about transgressions others committed, but participants did not judge transgressions committed against them more harshly than they judged transgressions committed against others. The higher participants scored on Kohlberg's test the less they externalized and excused their moral transgressions. Contrary to expectation, this relation also applied to moral judgments about transgressions committed by others against others. These findings have important implications for models of moral development and social cognition. 相似文献