Comparing effects of perceptual and reflective repetition on subjective experience during later recognition memory

Using the Remember/Know procedure, we compared the impact of a reflective repetition by refreshing (i.e., briefly thinking of a just-seen item) and a perceptual repetition (i.e., seeing an item again) on subjective experience during recognition memory. Participants read aloud words as they appeared on a screen. Critical words were presented once (read condition), immediately repeated (repeat condition), or followed by a dot signalling the participants to think of and say the just-previous word (refresh condition). In Experiments 1 and 2, Remember responses benefited from refreshing a word (in comparison with reading it). In Experiment 2, this benefit disappeared when participants had to refresh one of three active items. Perceptual repetition increased Remember responses in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2 regardless of whether participants had just previously seen 1- or 3-items. These findings indicate that under some circumstances, reflective and perceptual repetition may have different consequences for later subjective experience during remembering, suggesting differences in their underlying functional mechanisms.     

INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL DEMOCRACY AND EXCLUSION

Abstract: Does democracy or popular sovereignty imply exclusion and drawing borders? And if so, what type of exclusion and borders, and what kind of justification can we give for them? Moreover, if democracy really requires some kind of exclusion, is global democracy then a paradoxical union of two contradictory ideals? Can we create a demos on the global level? The focus of this collection of essays is on this potential conflict and its underlying values.     

Machiavellian flexibility in negative mate retention

Among the Dark Triad traits (psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism), Machiavellianism is uniquely associated with flexibility. This flexibility should result in the use of aggressive short‐term tactics only when they do not interfere with long‐term goals. Study 1 found that individuals high in Machiavellianism differed from those high in psychopathy with respect to retrospective accounts of negative mate retention tactics. Study 2 found an interaction between Machiavellianism and relationship type such that individuals high in Machiavellianism tempered the use of negative tactics for long‐term (but not short‐term) relationships. The findings highlight the flexibility of the Machiavellianism construct and its relevance to mating strategies among the Dark Triad.     

Reducing excessive questions in adults at adult-day training centers using differential-reinforcement-of-low rates

Differential-reinforcement-of-low rate (DRL) schedules are often used to reduce, not eliminate, behavior. We systematically replicated Austin and Bevan (2011) to determine whether the number of questions asked by two adults with intellectual disabilities working at adult-day-training centers could be reduced using a full-session DRL. The full-session DRL involved delivery of a reinforcer at the end of the day if the number of questions asked was less than a specified number during the entire session. Questions, up to a specified number, were also reinforced within-session. The full-session DRL reduced the number of questions asked by both participants and increased duration of task engagement for one participant.     

A Cross Cultural Examination of Creative Problem Solving Style: The Dutch Translation of VIEW

Creativity and Creative Problem Solving are globally important. This study examined the cross‐cultural applicability of creative problem solving styles by translating VIEW: An Assessment of Problem Solving Style from its native English into Dutch and examining its psychometric properties and preliminary validation evidence. In general, support was found for the Dutch translation of VIEW in that it performed similarly to its original with regard to item performance on factor analysis, had acceptable levels of internal consistency and stability over time, and correlated in a similar manner with two alternative measures of style. Implications for future translations were identified.     

Science as Structured Imagination

This paper offers an analysis of scientific creativity based on theoretical models and experimental results of the cognitive sciences. Its core idea is that scientific creativity — like other forms of creativity — is structured and constrained by prior ontological expectations. Analogies provide scientists with a powerful epistemic tool to overcome these constraints. While current research on analogies in scientific understanding focuses on near analogies, where target and source domain are close, we argue that distant analogies — where target and source domain differ widely — are especially useful in periods of intense conceptual change. To argue this point, we discuss three case studies from the history of science: early physiologists like Harvey, early evolutionary biologists like Darwin, and recent theorists on the evolution of the human mind like Mithen.     

“A GREATEST MIRACLE”: STANLEY CAVELL,MORAL PERFECTIONISM,AND THE ASCENT INTO THE ORDINARY

What to make of “the ordinary,”“the everyday,” and their common “eventfulness”? What to think of what Veena Das, in her recent book Life and Words, prefaced by Stanley Cavell, has called our need to “descent into the ordinary”? Is there a parallel figure of “ascent,” again, into the same “ordinary,” that we might we want to juxtapose with it and that resembles the motif of “change,” even “conversion,” that Cavell analyzes at some length in The Claim of Reason and throughout his oeuvre as a whole? And what could be our reasons for doing so? This essay will draw on Cavell's reading of Ibsen's work in the volume Cities of Words to spell out what such an “ascent” might mean.     

Ethics and Marginal Cases: the rights of the mentally handicapped

ABSTRACT  Some beings, including children, animals and the mentally handicapped, seem to deserve moral consideration, despite the fact that they are not rational or moral agents. These so-called marginal cases create a problem for theories that heavily stress the role of moral and/or rational agency in ethics: the latter seem unable to account for the former's moral status. This paper discusses the recent and original attempt of Loren Lomasky to solve this problem. It is argued that Lomasky's arguments are self-defeating because they can only succeed by relying on common-sense morality and, thus, by giving up the heavy stress on the role of rational agency in ethics.