Asymmetric option effects on ease of choice criticism and defense

Individuals often criticize others’ choices and seek to defend their own. In theory, the ease of criticizing a particular choice should correspond to the ease of defending it. However, we demonstrate that differences in the types of arguments put forth in choice criticism and defense result in a systematic discrepancy in the ease with which these tasks are performed. Specifically, criticism arguments tend to be based on norms or conventions, and defense arguments on idiosyncratic tastes or circumstances; accordingly, whether the chosen option is perceived as un/conventional has a significantly greater effect on the ease of choice criticism than on the ease of choice defense. Furthermore, assessing the ease of choice defense increases the choice share of unconventional options, whereas judging the ease of choice criticism has only a small impact on choice. We discuss the implications of our findings with respect to research on reason-based choice in socially-intensive environments.     

On negativity in Revolution in Poetic Language

Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language offers a challenge to theories of the subject in psychoanalysis, linguistic theory, and in philosophy. Central to that challenge is Kristeva’s conception of negativity. In this article, I trace the development of the concept of negativity in Revolution in Poetic Language from its root in Hegel, to rejection, which Kristeva develops out of Freud. Both are crucial to the development of the material dialectic between the semiotic and the symbolic that makes up Kristeva’s subject-in-process/on trial. I argue that a clearer understanding of Kristeva’s conception of negativity helps us to better appreciate the force of Kristeva’s challenge, both philosophically and politically. Finally I argue that Kristevan negativity also helps us to clarify the relation between the delimited space of politics and its conditions, laying the groundwork for constitutive exclusion as political critique and opening a space for the possibility of political re-constitutions.     

Moral Rights and the Limits of the Ought‐Implies‐Can Principle: Why Impeccable Precautions are No Excuse

This essay argues against the commonly held view that “ought” implies “can” in the domain of morality. More specifically, I contest the notion that nobody should ever be held morally responsible for failing to avoid the infliction of any harm that he or she has not been able to avoid through all reasonably feasible precautions in the carrying out of some worthwhile activity. The article explicates the concept of a moral right in order to show why violations of moral rights can occur even when no one has acted wrongfully in any fashion. In so doing, it will effectively be maintaining that strict liability (i.e., liability irrespective of the presence or absence of culpability) exists in morality as well as in law. When we take account of the distinction between exoneration and extenuation, we can see that scrupulously thorough precautions are never sufficient to constitute an excuse in morality. Having made that point with some extended examples, the article goes on to consider a number of possible objections – objections that lead into discussions of some basic distinctions within moral philosophy and some central principles within deontic logic.     

Differential Diagnosis with the Bender Gestalt Test

Forty-two patients, 18 of whom were diagnosed as organic and 24 as having a functional psychiatric disorder, were given the Bender Gestalt test. Both the Hain (1964) and the Pascal and Suttell (1951) scoring systems gave mean scores for the two groups which were different at beyond the .001 level of significance. The Pascal-Suttell also gave a significant difference between means when either patient group was compared with normals. Using a previously established cutoff score for the Hain, 76% of the patients were correctly classified, as compared with 81% by a clinical expert on the Bender.     

Clinical utility of the WISC-R and the French Pictorial Test of Intelligence with native American primary grade children

Cultural bias and the clinical utility of the WISC-R and French Pictorial Test of Intelligence were evaluated using scores of 22 male and 22 female Navajo primary grade children. There were no significant differences in performance on either test according to sex. As expected, the Verbal IQ and Full Scale IQ of the WISC-R and the Deviation IQ of the French provided significantly depressed estimates of ability. A prorated Performance IQ might be the least depressed measure of potential among these children.     

A computer-controlled laboratory for studying infant event perception

An integrated software package for testing infants in a habituation procedure is described. The software is written for an Apple II computer with a minimum of 64K of memory. Additional interface cards are required for timing responses and displaying dynamic stimuli. The software is divided into four independent modules: (1) Configure Experiment allows the experimenter to design a specific experiment. (2) Run Experiment controls the running of a previously configured habituation experiment. (3) Calculate Reliability allows a second observer to score the subject for the purpose of computing reliability. (4) Data Summary and Formatting provides a summary of the results and allows the user to flexibly format the data for reading by various statistical packages.