Performance gains from directed training do not transfer to untrained tasks

Given the increasing complexity of the tasks and skills needed in modern society, developing effective training strategies is of tremendous practical importance. Furthermore, training that improves performance of both trained and untrained tasks would be highly efficient. In the present study, we examined how directed training contributes to skill acquisition, and more importantly, to engendering transfer of training to untrained tasks. Participants learned a complex video game for 30 h (Space Fortress, Donchin, Fabiani, & Sanders, 1989) using one of two training regimens: Hybrid Variable-Priority Training (HVT), with a focus on improving specific skills and managing task priority, or Full Emphasis Training (FET) in which participants simply practiced the game to obtain the highest overall score. We compared game performance, retention of training gains, and transfer of training to untrained tasks as a function of the training regimen. Compared to FET, HVT learners reached higher levels of mastery on the game and HVT was particularly beneficial for initially poor performing participants. This benefit persisted seven months after training. However, contrary to expectation, both HVT and FET were unsuccessful in producing transfer to untrained tasks compared to a group that received limited game experience, suggesting that directed training and practice can produce task-specific improvements, but improvements do not necessarily transfer from trained to untrained tasks.     

Executive functions and the down-regulation and up-regulation of emotion

This study examined the relationship between individual differences in executive functions (EF; assessed by measures of working memory, Stroop, trail making, and verbal fluency) and ability to down-regulate and up-regulate responses to emotionally evocative film clips. To ensure a wide range of EF, 48 participants with diverse neurodegenerative disorders and 21 older neurologically normal ageing participants were included. Participants were exposed to three different movie clips that were designed to elicit a mix of disgust and amusement. While watching the films they were either instructed to watch, down-regulate, and up-regulate their visible emotional responses. Heart rate and facial behaviours were monitored throughout. Emotion regulatory ability was operationalised as changes in heart rate and facial behaviour in the down- and up-regulation conditions, controlling for responses in the watch condition. Results indicated that higher verbal fluency scores were related to greater ability to regulate emotion in both the down-regulation and up-regulation conditions. This finding remained significant even after controlling for age and general cognitive functioning. No relationships were found between emotion regulation and the other EF measures. We believe these results derive from differences among EF measures, with verbal-fluency performance best capturing the complex sequence of controlled planning, activation, and monitoring required for successful emotion regulation. These findings contribute to our understanding of emotion-cognition interaction, suggesting a link between emotion-regulatory abilities and individual differences in complex executive functions.     

Influence of attentional capture on oculomotor control

Previous research has shown that when searching for a color singleton, top-down control cannot prevent attentional capture by an abrupt visual onset. The present research addressed whether a task-irrelevant abrupt onset would affect eye movement behavior when searching for a color singleton. Results show that in many instances the eye moved in the direction of the task-irrelevant abrupt onset. There was evidence that top-down control could neither entirely prevent attentional capture by visual onsets nor prevent the eye from starting to move in the direction of the onset. Results suggest parallel programming of 2 saccades: 1 voluntary goal-directed eye movement toward the color singleton target and 1 stimulus-driven eye movement reflexively elicited by the abrupt onset. A neurophysiologically plausible model that can account for the current findings is discussed.     

Visible persistence and form correspondence in Ternus apparent motion.

Visual stimuli remain visible for some time after their physical offset (visible persistence). Visible persistence has been hypothesized to play an important role in determining the pattern of correspondence matching in the Ternus apparent-motion display. In this display, one or more elements reappears in overlapping locations at different times, whereas another element appears alternately to the right or the left of these elements. Usually either the elements are perceived to move coherently as a group (group motion), or one element may be perceived to hop over one or more other elements (element motion). According to the visible-persistence account of the perceptual organization of the Ternus display, element motion is seen when the temporal gap between elements in overlapping locations is small enough to be bridged by visible persistence; if it is not, group motion is seen. We conducted four experiments to test this visible-persistence account. In Experiments 1 and 2, a form correspondence cue (line length) was introduced to bias the visual system toward the element-motion interpretation, while visible persistence was either reduced or eliminated. The element-motion percept dominated despite the elimination of visible persistence. In Experiments 3 and 4, we found that Ternus elements presented without interruption, and thus presumably persisting over time, can be perceived in group motion. Together, the results indicate that visible persistence is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for the pattern of correspondence matches in the Ternus display.     

Self-defeating personality, self-reinforcement, and depression

51 men who were more self-defeating were observed to use lower frequency of self-reinforcement and to be more depressed. The results were seen as supporting Beck's early work which proposed a relationship between depression and self-defeating patterns. They also provide construct validity for the measure of Self-defeating Personality used in the study.     

Movement and focused attention: a failure to replicate.

Our original goal was to explore the nature of the grouping-by-movement phenomenon reported by Driver and Baylis (1989). In their studies, distractors that moved in common with a centrally located target had a larger influence on focused-attention performance than did more proximate but stationary distractors. These results seemed particularly important since they suggested, contrary to the predictions of space-based models of attention, that attention could be allocated to noncontiguous regions of the visual field. Their results also suggested mandatory processing of stimuli with common motion. Unfortunately, we were unable to replicate this grouping-by-movement effect. In the conditions of Experiment 1 in which we replicated Driver and Baylis's methodology, stationary distractors produced a larger response-compatibility effect than did the more distant distractors that moved in common with the target. In Experiment 2, we redundantly coded the centrally located target and the far distractors with common movement and color. However, the results were identical to those obtained in Experiment 1. The stationary near distractors that appeared in a different color from the target and the far distractors produced the largest response-compatibility effect. In a final experiment, we attempted to compensate for the reduced acuity of the moving distractors by adjusting their size by a cortical magnification factor. However, even with this manipulation, we found a larger response-compatibility effect for the stationary near distractors than for the moving distant distractors. Our results suggest that subjects are capable of selectively processing a target item that moves in common with distractors.     

Young children's free responses to anomalous commands

Twelve children, 21–34 months old, six in R. Brown's Stage I and six in Stages II and III, responded to commands varying in length, grammaticality, and meaning. All of the children responded significantly less often when the commands were situationally anomalous and/or ungrammatical. Results failed to replicate the results of E. Shipley, E. Smith, and L. Gleitman (Language, 1969, 44, 332–342) and J. Wetstone and B. Friedlander (Child Development, 1973, 44, 743–750). The results also suggest that young children rely heavily upon situational cues in their earliest comprehension of adult speech, and this supports arguments made by J. Strohner and K. Nelson (Child Development, 45, 567–576) and R. Chapman and J. Miller (Journal of Speech and Hearing, 1975, 18, 355–371). Since subjects rely upon nonlinguistic cues to respond appropriately, syntactic competence cannot be inferred from apparent comprehension.     

Linking antisocial behavior, substance use, and personality: an integrative quantitative model of the adult externalizing spectrum

Antisocial behavior, substance use, and impulsive and aggressive personality traits often co-occur, forming a coherent spectrum of personality and psychopathology. In the current research, the authors developed a novel quantitative model of this spectrum. Over 3 waves of iterative data collection, 1,787 adult participants selected to represent a range across the externalizing spectrum provided extensive data about specific externalizing behaviors. Statistical methods such as item response theory and semiparametric factor analysis were used to model these data. The model and assessment instrument that emerged from the research shows how externalizing phenomena are organized hierarchically and cover a wide range of individual differences. The authors discuss the utility of this model for framing research on the correlates and the etiology of externalizing phenomena.     

Is Law’s Conventionality Consistent with Law’s Objectivity?

Legal positivism’s multi-faceted insistence on the separability of law and morality includes an insistence on the thoroughly conventional status of legal norms as legal norms. Yet the positivist affirmation of the conventionality of law may initially seem at odds with the mind-independence of the existence and contents and implications of legal norms. Mind-independence, a central aspect of legal objectivity, has been seen by some theorists as incompatible with the mind-dependence of conventions. Such a perception of incompatibility has led some anti-positivist theorists to reject the notion of law’s conventionality, and has led some positivist theorists to query law’s mind-independence. What will be contended here is that both camps are mistaken.